THE NARRATIVE VOICE IN THE *THEOGONY* OF HESIOD

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S.R. SLINGS†

BIBLIOTHECAE FASCICULOS EDENDOS CURAVIT

H. PINKSTER, KLASSIEK SEMINARIUM, OUDE TURFMARKT 129, AMSTERDAM

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KATHRYN STODDARD

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BY

KATHRYN STODDARD

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For my dear Parents

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ………………………………………..…… ix

Introduction ……………………………………………..… xi

Chapter One The ‘Autobiographical’ Reading of Hesiod …... 1

Chapter Two The Implied Author of the *Theogony* ………… 34

Chapter Three The Muses and the Mortal Narrator …………... 60

Chapter Four Character-Text, Attributive Discourse,
And Embedded Focalization ………………………………... 98

Chapter Five Anachrony in the *Theogony* ………………….. 126

Chapter Six Commentary ………………………………….. 162

Conclusion ………………………………………………….. 189

Bibliography ………………………………………………... 193

Index Nominum ac Rerum ……………………………………. 203

Index Locorum……………………………………………….. 207

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Kathryn B. Stoddard
Florida State University, March 2004

INTRODUCTION

Hesiodic scholarship has long labored under the inhibiting assumption that Hesiod composed from an autobiographical standpoint, and that his first-person statements are intended to be taken as accurate descriptions of his socio-economic status rather than as *persona* adopted for literary purposes. Although scholars such as Gagarin, Clay, and Nagy have begun to treat Hesiod as a poet capable of formulating and expressing complex literary ideas, the belief that Hesiod actually was a shepherd or a struggling farmer, resoundingly adopted by M. L. West in his influential commentaries and taken up in several recent books, continues to dominate the field of Hesiodic scholarship.[1] This 'biographical' approach to Hesiodic poetry has led scholars not only to construct elaborate biographies of Hesiod based on what he 'tells us about himself' in his works, but to interpret the works themselves in light of these supposed 'biographical facts'. The result is that scholars have traditionally underestimated the poetic skill and depth of thought in the poems of this 'shepherd/farmer', due in some part to the often discursive-seeming nature of archaic Greek poetry. The *Theogony,* therefore, though it has received attention as the repository of early concepts of justice and mythology, has traditionally not been given close analytical scrutiny as an unified work of a skilled poet pursuing specific artistic aims.

Continuing along the lines established by Mark Griffith,[2] I reject the biographical approach to Hesiod in my analysis of the *Theogony.* It is intellectually unsound to base one's assessment of a poem on an assumption of the poet's educational or social background that is itself the product of that poem, given the possibility that the poet has deliberately adopted a persona for the purposes of that poem. I therefore analyze the *Theogony* as the work of a poet who chooses in a specific scene of the Proem of his work to *present himself* as a shepherd, and attempt to see with what purpose he may have done so.

The analytical method that I choose for this purpose is that of narratology, specifically the method of Mieke Bal as developed by

[1] See West 1966 esp. 40 48; Stein1990; and Nelson 1998: 36 38 for recent and elegant examples of the 'biographizing' approach to Hesiod.

[2] Griffith 1983.

Irene de Jong. Narratology is particularly well suited for poetic analysis because it is based on the premise that authors, rather than describing their own experiences, create narrative voices for each work that they compose, and that the narratorial persona is chosen for its efficacy in achieving the specific poetic purpose of the work in which it is adopted. Narratological analysis consists of a close observation of the ways in which the narrator seeks to influence the audience's reception of his text and thus to ensure that his poetic purpose or 'message' is properly grasped. By using the techniques of narratology in my examination of the *Theogony* I hope to demonstrate that Hesiod is far from being the unreflective and clumsy farmer-poet that many scholars still consider him. The Introduction to Chapter Two further explains the particulars of my narratological approach to the *Theogony.*

In addition to rejecting the biographical reading of the *Theogony,* I adopt an untraditional approach to the Proem of this work. The hymnic elements of the first 115 lines of this poem have led scholars to regard the Proem as a hymn in function to the point where they have largely overlooked the possibility that it may have programmatic relevance for the rest of the work. By analyzing the Proem, and especially the scene in which the narrator meets the Muses, not as autobiography but as a statement of the implied author's artistic program for the rest of the work, I emphasize an important theme that shapes many aspects of the *Theogony*: the relationship of god to man. The concept of the vast distance separating man from gods is such a pervasive element of archaic Greek literature that it may well have been in Hesiod's mind when he contemplated the creation and final ordering of the cosmos. In the work that follows I attempt to demonstrate the poetic techniques that Hesiod employs to convey his ideas about the formation of the cosmos and to define his own poetic role as the human poet who, in temporarily bridging the gulf between the divine and the human, emphasizes the vastness of the gulf itself.

Unlike de Jong's narratological analyses of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, my book is primarily interpretive in nature. I analyze the narratological structure of the *Theogony* with the purpose of elucidating what I see as a major, unexplored unifying theme in this poem: the relationship between the divine and mortal realms. I use the techniques of narratology to support my argument that Hesiod, who consistently presents himself as an emphatically *mortal* narrator (despite the divine favor that has been shown him), presents a view of the cosmos as one sharply divided between gods and men, with the

fundamentally didactic goal of explaining this most important aspect of cosmic structure.

This theme of the divine—human polarity of the cosmos is introduced programmatically in the *Dichterweihe* scene of the Proem (*Th.* 22-34), recurs in the Kings and Singers passage (80-104), and is featured most saliently in the Hecate and Prometheus passages, where the relationship of gods to men is addressed directly. The prominence and importance of these 'purple passages', all of which deal with the causes and results of the schism between god and man, and the miraculous grace by which that rift is bridged, make it clear that the motif of the immortal—mortal polarity of the cosmos is intended to color the audience's reception of the rest of the *Theogony* as well. The Hesiodic view of the cosmos essentially and fundamentally bipolar, divided by immeasurable distances into the divine and mortal realms, and this dualistic vision of the universe is so ingrained in Hesiod's approach to his cosmogonic poem that it can be seen to affect, as I hope to demonstrate, even the structure of the poem itself.

In Chapter One, 'The 'Autobiographical' Reading of Hesiod I discuss Hesiodic scholarship, especially as it relates to the supposedly autobiographical content of Hesiod's poems. Since much of the 'autobiographical' scholarship on Hesiod concerns his other poem, the *Works and Days,* this chapter discusses the question of autobiographical content in this poem as well. The rest of my book, however, deals exclusively with the *Theogony.* I have chosen to limit the focus of this project to the *Theogony* not only from considerations of space, but because I regard the two poems as so utterly divergent in tone, poetic purpose, and most especially in the narrators that Hesiod employs for each that it would be pointless to attempt a narratological analysis of the two poems together. I intend to take up the subject of the narrative voice in the *Works and* Days in my next book. A brief outline of my views on the narrator of the *Works and Days* can be found in the Conclusion.

In Chapter Two, 'The Implied Author of the *Theogony*', I begin with a discussion of de Jong's narratological model, with an emphasis on her concept of the implied author. I then proceed to analyze the attributes of the primary narrator-focalizer of the *Theogony,* which, like that of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey,* can be classified for the most part as 'reliable', external, and omniscient. Unlike the Homeric narrator, however, Hesiod's narrative voice is more self-assertive and does not present itself as merely the 'mouthpiece' of the narrating Muse. Throughout this chapter I compare the Hesiodic to the Homeric

narrator and argue that Hesiod has chosen to present his narrating voice in a much more obviously self-conscious light than Homer does.

Chapter Three, 'The Muses and the Mortal Narrator', consists of an extended discussion of the crucial *Dichterweihe* scene, in which Hesiod is accosted and initiated by the Muses. I offer a new interpretation of the Muses' cryptic statement about 'truth', and show that what they are really doing is drawing a distinction not between lies and truth, but between immortal truth (ἀληθέα) and mortal reality (ἔτυμα). The Muses emphatically signal their own divinity and strongly oppose it to Hesiod's mortal nature. Noting this, I argue that Hesiod uses the *Dichterweihe* programmatically to demonstrate the vast gulf separating gods from men and to point ahead to the view of the cosmos that pervades the rest of the poem, especially the Hecate and Prometheus passages.

In Chapter Four, entitled 'Character-Text, Attributive Discourse, and Embedded Focalization', I analyze the speeches (character-text) of the *Theogony* and the words/phrases that introduce and cap them (attributive discourse). I argue that Hesiod uses speech as a means of highlighting division in this poem. The speeches of Gaia to Kronos, Zeus to Prometheus, and Zeus to the Hundred-Handers all occur at crucial scenes of separation that have a permanent effect on the structure of the universe (the division of earth from sky, gods from men, and Olympians from Titans, respectively). Hesiod makes extensive use of attributive discourse to manipulate the audience's reception of the speeches and in some cases to clarify their contents. In my discussion of Hesiod's use of embedded focalization (passages in which the narrator, Hesiod, embeds the emotional viewpoint of one of his characters in his own narration) I explore the way in which Hesiod uses indirect discourse as his primary means of characterization. This marks a divergence from Homer, who mainly uses speeches for this purpose.

Chapter Five, 'Chronology', is concerned with Hesiod's use of analepses ('flashbacks') and prolepses ('flash-forwards') as means for directing and controlling the audience's reaction to his story. I argue here that Hesiod makes extensive use of prolepsis in an effort to link the divine events that he narrates to the effect that they will have on humankind. I also discuss the way in which Hesiod manipulates anachrony in the *Dichterweihe*, the Hecate passage, and the poem's two similes in order to emphasize the difference between divine time

and human time and the importance of his own role as poet in being able to bridge this divide.

In Chapter Six, ‘Commentary’, I treat the passages of the *Theogony* in which the narrator ‘comments’ on his material, either explaining, interpreting, or judging the events that he narrates. One of the most striking passages of commentary in this poem is the ‘Kings and Singers’ passage (80-103), which is introduced as an explanation for why Calliope is ‘preeminent’ among the Muses (79). I offer a new interpretation of this passage, drawing the connection between the sceptre and laurel bough that the Muses grant Hesiod in the beginning of he Proem to the ‘king’ and ‘singer/lyre player’ at the end of the poem. Both the king and the singer have powerfully persuasive voices: the former uses his power to lead people to just action, and the latter, to delight the minds of his listeners. By having the Muses name him, in effect, both king and poet, Hesiod establishes for himself a double legitimacy as both poet and teacher. The reason that Hesiod uses a passage of commentary for this purpose is because the very act of commentary highlights the relationship between narrator and audience whose existence it presupposes. It is thus a fitting vehicle for the poet’s statement of his right both to instruct and to delight his audience.

Throughout this book I attempt to use the Bal—de Jong narratological model to elucidate what I believe to be important themes in the *Theogony.* I have made an effort to avoid what has been criticized as the ‘jargon’ of narratology as much as possible and to use a terminology familiar to Classical philologists. In the belief that narratology or any theoretical approach is useful only insofar as it can shed light on a text, I have employed narratology it as a means of interpreting the *Theogony,* combining it with more a traditional philological approach as it seemed best to me. The result is that this book neither is nor purports to be a work of ‘pure’ narratology—if ‘pure’ mean ‘divorced from philological interpretation’—but offers instead something of a hybrid approach to the text of Hesiod that I believe is effective in challenging the traditional and still prevalent misconceptions of this poet’s work.

CHAPTER ONE

THE 'AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL' READING OF HESIOD

Any investigation of narrative technique in Hesiod must inevitably address the controversy surrounding the poet's self-referential statements. Since antiquity the 'autobiographical' material contained in the proem of the *Theogony* and throughout the *Works and Days* has been accepted as factual information on the life of Hesiod. Starting in the early 19th century, however, the alternative view began to find support: that the Hesiodic 'I' represents a literary persona adopted by the poet for dramatic purposes and thus reveals nothing about the author himself (except that he has chosen this persona). Both sides of the question have been argued so thoroughly and from so many different perspectives over the years that it is useful to devote this first chapter to a general review of the scholarship surrounding the issue of the authorial first person in Hesiod.

Intertwined with the question of whether Hesiod's first person references reflect historical reality are the corresponding assumptions of what sort of a person the poet was. Those who take the traditional stance of accepting the first person statements as genuinely autobiographical are led by those statements to conclude that Hesiod was a peasant and "no trained singer," and this conclusion in turn affects their assessment of Hesiod's poetic ability.[1] Conversely, those who believe that the 'I' in Hesiod represents a literary persona start from the assumption that he is a poet capable of some degree of mimetic representation, and thus feel justified in looking for evidence of Hesiod's literary sophistication when they analyze his poems. There seems to be little room for compromise between these two extremes, and recent attempts to effect one have not been happy.[2] The majority of Hesiodic scholars subscribe to the traditional autobiographical reading of the poems, a fact that M. Griffith, in an influential article, attributes in part to the Romantic movement and the effect it had on the interpretation of ancient poetry:

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[1] West 1978: 48.

[2] I refer to the work of Rousseau 1996: 93 210, and that of Most 1991: 73 91. The contributions of these scholars are discussed below.

> In place of the Classical (rhetorical) model, concentrating on the audience and the effects of literature, Romantic criticism looks to the author, and evaluates a poem according to its expressiveness—i.e., the intensity of emotion, 'sincerity,' and spontaneity that it demonstrates....By these standards, the more Hesiod lets us know about himself as a person, the higher may we rank his spontaneity and expressiveness as a poet.[3]

The influence of the Romantic movement, Griffith implies, makes readers of Hesiod that much more eager to accept his first person statements as truly self-reflective and to conclude from them that he represents a "rustic pioneer of self-expression, a rough nugget of an amateur poet."[4] Needless to say, Griffith himself does not hold this view, and he goes on to argue convincingly that Hesiod is speaking wholly through a dramatic persona in the *Works and Days*. It should be said in fairness to the proponents of the autobiographical position that if Hesiod adopt a persona in his poems, the fact that he does so is not obvious, nor is it easy to see what purpose such a literary construct would serve. When a poet about whom we know nothing says 'I,' it is not unreasonable nor overly 'Romantic' to assume that he refers to his own experiences; the burden is on those who would argue otherwise to prove that conventions of genre or other literary constraints make it likely that the first person statements in Hesiod belong to a dramatic persona.

The dominant tendency has always been to regard the personal information that Hesiod gives about his father, brother, and home city as genuinely reflective of his experiences and rustic lifestyle. The classic statement of this romanticized view of Hesiod as a member of the "coarse, dull peasantry" is found in W. Jaeger:

> His thought was rooted in the rich soil of primitive peasant life; . . . the Muses enabled him to create eternal poetry out of the ideals of the farmer's work and life, and to add them to the spiritual heritage of all Greece. . . .The public for whom he writes is first and foremost the peasantry. . . .[5]

Although it has become less fashionable to paint such a glowing picture of Hesiod's rusticity, scholars who adhere to this traditional view nevertheless obviously continue to operate with the same basic assumptions as Jaeger makes. H. Fränkel, for instance,

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[3] Griffith 1983: 37 65, 39.
[4] Griffith 1983: 39.
[5] Jaeger 1945: 58.

refers to Hesiod as "a sturdy peasant" whose poetry is designed to give practical advice to his fellow peasants.[6] West adds his influential name to the list of traditionalists, despite the fact that the format of the *Works and Days*, by his own admission, has much in common with the literary conventions of Near Eastern wisdom poetry. West finds the details of the personal situation described between Hesiod and Perses too peculiar to be merely a literary convention, an opinion in which he is joined either implicitly or explicitly by a host of other scholars.[7]

Another aspect of the traditional view of Hesiod is the widespread assumption that his self-referential statements reflect an evolution in self-awareness from the impersonality of the Homeric epics. Hesiod's apparent willingness to discuss his personal life is taken as a sign of the development of a sense of individuality in the Greek mind that was not yet present in Homeric poetry. Jaeger and Snell endorse this view, which stipulates a diachronic development of Greek literature from Homeric epic, to Hesiodic epic, to lyric, to drama.[8] This theory has found broad support among those who believe that Hesiod's self-references indicate a significant break from earlier tradition.[9] The diachronic evolution theory, however, requires that Homer precede Hesiod in time, an assumption that not all scholars—even those who support the autobiographical reading of Hesiod—are willing to entertain. West, for example, argues strongly for Hesiod's precedence, although he remains one of the few scholars not convinced by I. Sellschop's authoritative dissertation arguing that Homer came first.[10] G. Most also finds fault with this interpretation of the Hesiodic first person, noting that the view of Hesiod as the first self-conscious voice of Greek literature "makes problematic presuppositions about both subjectivity and discourse." "A safer approach," he continues,

> would emphasize the constraints of production and reception in an oral poetic context: for the audience of an orally composed and delivered

[6] Fränkel 1975: 112, 113 n. 1.

[7] For example, Evelyn White 1914; von Wilamowitz Moellendorff 1928, (repr. 1962); Snell 1953; van Groningen 1958. littéraire archaïque grecque. (Amsterdam 1958).

[8] Jaeger 1945: 72 73, 112 113; Snell 1953: 43.

[9] See, for instance, Kerschensteiner 1944: 149 91; Woodbury 1952: 20 41; G. Misch 1907 (Eng. ed. 1950); Versenyi 1974; Østerud 1976: 13 28; Barron/Easterling1985: 92 105.

[10] West 1966: 40; Sellschop 1934 (repr. in Heistch 1966).

> text, there can be no doubt who its author is, hence no necessity for him to name himself.[11]

Most's views are typical of the approach taken by many scholars nowadays who are in reaction against the biographical approach towards Hesiod. In the forefront of this movement are G. Nagy and M. Griffith, who take the radical step of denying all autobiographical validity to Hesiod's first person references. Nagy's theory is that Hesiod has constructed his identity (including his name, which he takes to mean "something like 'he who emits the Voice'" so as to personify in himself the concept of the Panhellenic rhapsode, who is not tied to any local community.[12]

Such a poet can claim to know the 'truth' about the gods by presenting to his hearers a composite of the various local myths about them, and raising them from the sites of their local cults to a common dwelling place, Olympus: "As in the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, the mutually incompatible traditions of various locales are rejected as lies, in favor of one single tradition that can be acceptable to all."[13] In the *Works and Days* the personal information that Hesiod gives about himself and his brother can also be explained in terms of Panhellenic abstraction: his father flees a city (Cyme) that has been destroyed by *hubris*, and Perses, whose name means 'destroyer' (of a city) exhibits the same kind of *hubris* that now endangers his own city, and thus was created by Hesiod to provide a negative behavioral example in his didactic poem. Nagy objects strongly to the autobiographical approach of Jaeger et al. and the conclusions to which it inevitably leads:

> Another obstacle to our understanding of Hesiodic poetry . . . is the commonplace visualization of Hesiod as a primitive landlubber of a peasant who is struggling to express himself in a cumbersome and idiosyncratic poetic medium clumsily forged out of an epic medium that he has not fully mastered. Hesiod's self-dramatization as one who works the land for a living is thus assumed to be simply historical fact, which can then serve as a basis for condescending speculations about an eighth-century Boeotian peasant's lowly level of thinking.[14]

Nagy's theory on Hesiod's identity, while not completely convincing in itself, is nevertheless a powerful statement against the traditional view of Hesiod as the ignorant peasant, and it is

[11] Most 1991: 76.
[12] Nagy 1982: 49.
[13] Nagy 1982: 48.
[14] Nagy 1982: 67.

valuable for its innovative approach to the question of the poet's artistic goals and identity. P. Judet de la Combe is one of the modern French scholars who follow Nagy's lead and take his approach to even higher levels of abstraction. "L'individualité de l'Hésiode heliconien," he writes, "est donc fonctionnelle: elle permet, narrativement, de mettre en place une dialectique du visible et de l'invisible qui fonde la possibilité de tout chant."[15]

Instead of adopting Nagy's Panhellenic argument against taking Hesiod's 'I' autobiographically, Griffith relies on recent developments in the study of lyric poetry, especially that of Pindar and Archilochus, to make his point that Hesiod is very likely adopting a literary persona in the *Works and Days* to make his didactic message more vivid:

> Most of us are now prepared to acknowledge, first, that various forms of Greek lyric are at least as old, and probably older, than hexameter and epic narrative; and, second, that a poet may adopt different authorial stances, different personae, according to the occasion and genre in which he is writing, and if we are ignorant of the occasion and the attendant conventions, we run the risk of misjudging the author's tone and intentions.[16]

Wisdom poetry, Griffith argues, is usually set in a dramatic framework, as is the case with the poetic admonitions of Theognis to Cyrnus and the Near Eastern parallels to the *Works and Days.*[17] Griffith believes that in this respect Hesiod is similar to Archilochus and Pindar, whom many scholars now suspect of employing literary personae in their first person statements.[18] Dover, in his influential article arguing that Archilochus' self-references are not autobiographical, draws a cautious parallel between the compositional style of Archilochus and Hesiod.[19] Few critics, however,

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[15] de la Combe 1996: 38.

[16] Griffith 1983: 40.

[17] Griffith 1983: 44.

[18] See e.g. Johnson 1982: 72, who makes the point that Greek lyric poets attempt to recreate in their poems "the reciprocity which must govern any genuine act of discourse." The listener can identify with either the 'I' of the song, or the 'you,' or with both. See also Schadewaldt 1928 and esp. Lefkowitz 1963: 177 253 and 1976: 181 189, where she argues that we have no basis for assuming that the poems of Archilochus say anything about his life; Maehler 1963; Hamilton 1974; West 1974 points out several instances in Archilochus where it is likely that literary devices peculiar to iambic poetry are being employed by the poet; Nagy 1976: 191 205, where he argues that much that appears to be personal material in Archilochus is in fact stylized invective; and Dover 1964: 183 222.

[19] Dover 1964: 196.

are willing to draw very strong parallels between the elegiac verses of Archilochus and the dactylic ones of Hesiod, since the difference between these metres implies a difference—perhaps a significant one—between the artistic goals of the two poets and the conventions of their respective genres.

The 'Theogony'

The first autobiographical statement in the Hesiodic poems occurs in the proem of the *Theogony* as part of the famous *Dichterweihe,* Hesiod's sanctification as a poet by the Muses (lines 22-34).[20] After invoking and naming the Muses, Hesiod declares, "They are the ones who first taught Hesiod beautiful song as he tended his sheep under god-haunted Helicon" (22-23). Hesiod's first reference to himself is thus in the third person, a peculiarity which gave rise to the theory, set forth by Evelyn-White and R. Waltz, that the author of the *Theogony* is not himself Hesiod, but describes his own sanctification by the same Muses who had visited Hesiod.[21] This argument has found a few supporters, notably S. Pinsent and A. Ballabriga, but has largely been rejected by Hesiodic critics in favor of the simpler explanation that the poet utilizes the third person here in order to mention his own name and thus assure himself of the κλέος he deserves.[22] The rest of the scholars who deal with the question of the epiphany of the Muses are divided between two extreme positions. Most believe that in these lines Hesiod is describing a genuine religious experience that occurred to him and changed his life forever.[23] Others argue that there are so many literary conventions incorporated into Hesiod's *Dichter-weihe* that it must have been created by the poet in order to lend the necessary divine authority to his words. West lists these conventions, which are pointed out by F. Dornseiff, who compares them to similar events in other poetic traditions and in the Old Testament: 1. The poet/prophet is visited by a god and given

[20] For a study of 'poet sanctification' in Classical poetry see Kambylis 1965.

[21] Evelyn White 1914: xv; Waltz 1914: 229 35.

[22] Pinsent 1985; Ballabriga 1990: 22 23.

[23] E.g. Fränkel 1975: 107 108; Latte 1946: 152 63; Dodds 1951: 117; Marquandt 1981: 250 ff.: "Hesiod's encounter with the Muses had a profound effect on his life" 250. West guardedly agrees: "If one believes in nymphs, it is not at all difficult to see them" (1966, ad 22 34).

instructions; 2. the epiphany occurs on a mountain; 3. the recipient of the god's words is a shepherd; 4. the god addresses him in insulting terms; 5. the god bestows a staff or some other physical object on the human; 6. the human, who was lacking in eloquence before, suddenly acquires skill in speaking.[24] Dornseiff's view is held also by Trencsényi-Waldapfel, who draws further parallels between Hesiod's epiphany and those of Near Eastern literature.[25] West ad 22-34 disagrees, however, stating that "there are fashion in religious experience, and any vision that he [sc. Hesiod] had would naturally assemble itself in accordance with his subconscious expectations and ambitions." Here again, as occurs throughout the scholarship on Hesiod, we are faced with the conflict between two mutually exclusive poles of thought: is Hesiod writing about himself or simply creating art?

Another passage in the *Theogony* in which the personality of Hesiod is traditionally believed to play a role is the 'Hymn to Hecate' (411-52). Although not formally a hymn, this passage contains several hymnic elements: superlatives, repetitions, a description of the god's τιμή, etc.[26] The encomiastic tone and hymnic qualities of this lengthy digression, the remarkable singling-out of a relatively minor deity for praise, and the fact that it occurs in the middle of a straightforward genealogical catalogue have led many critics to doubt the authenticity of the Hecate passage. Some declare that the passage is unhesiodic because it contains words or phrases that differ from Hesiod's usual diction. Sellschop, for example, argues that the Hecate section is an interpolation on the basis of two occurrences (in lines 414 and 418) of the word τιμή to mean "nicht wie sonst bei Hesiod den Rang der Göttin, sondern die Vorzugsstellung der von ihr begünstigen Menschen."[27] Beyond merely linguistic arguments, all of which West (ad loc.) dismisses out of hand, these and other scholars have also suspected the passage on the basis of its overall tone and style. Göttling (ad loc.) believes that the excessive and exclusive praise of a single goddess violates the extreme simplicity of the style of the *Theogony* and that it is suspect for that reason. A. Fick thinks that he could detect elements in the Hecate passage that pointed to its inter-

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[24] West 1966 ad 22 34; Dornseiff, 1934: 397 415; repr. in Heitsch 1966.

[25] Trencsényi Waldapfel 1955: 45 76.

[26] Griffith 1983: 52. For more on hymnic style see Norden 1929; R. Wünsch 1914: 140 183; Friedländer 1914: 1 16; Solmsen 1982: 8 9.

[27] Sellschop 1934: 52 n. 83.

polation by adherents of the Orphic sect, whereas Wilamowitz maintains that it was an earlier hymn from Asia Minor that was later clumsily incorporated into the text of Hesiod.[28]

Instead of concluding that the linguistic peculiarities of this passage (if they can truly be described as such) are due to an interpolator, a number of critics ascribe them to the strong religious fervor with which Hesiod, as they claim, regarded the goddess Hecate. This personal involvement of Hesiod's with the cult of Hecate is believed to manifest itself in his desire to glorify the goddess, either because he wishes to express his own adoration[29] or because he wants to publicize (and thus increase) the honor of a local deity.[30] Yet others argue that Hesiod's motive behind glorifying Hecate is to give a prominent place to a goddess worshipped chiefly by the peasantry, with whom he wished to identify himself.[31] Here as elsewhere the lack of any firm knowledge of Hesiod's life or social situation has led scholars to reconstruct the facts of the poet's life at will.

The most vehement statement of the idea that Hesiod had personal feelings for the goddess is found in West's commentary: "It is a section of extreme interest for the student of Greek religion; for seldom elsewhere do we find a Greek setting out in so full a statement his personal beliefs concerning the nature and powers of a god" (ad 404-452). Hecate is, according to West, Hesiod's primary deity, and her functions have been expanded to meet the needs of her worshippers. Zeal for the worship of Hecate, he believes, is what led Hesiod's father to name his other son Perses, which is given in *Theogony* 377 as the name of Hecate's father. As a sea-trader from Cyme, Hesiod's father would have come into contact with the cult of Hecate on his occasional visits to Miletus, where Hecate's worship was firmly established.[32]

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[28] Fick 1887: 17; von Wilamowitz Moellendorff 1931: 169 ff.

[29] Mazon 1928: 21 ff.; van Groningen 1953: 269 70; West 1966 ad loc., where he declares that Hecate "is the chief goddess of her evangelist [sc. Hesiod]," et al.

[30] E.g Mazon 1928: 24.

[31] Pfister 1928: 6 8; Aly 1966: 65 n. 23.

[32] ". . .We have already had reason to conjecture that [Hesiod's father's] trading activities brought him within hail of Miletus, . . . and Miletus is the site of the oldest known piece of archeological evidence for Hecate worship. . ." West 1966 ad 404 52. West asserts that the cult of Hecate originated in Caria, but several scholars dispute this claim: Mazon 1928, who argues that the cult of Hecate was already established in Boeotia before Hesiod's time; Berg 1974: 128 40, who argues against her being Anatolian and claims that Hecate originated in

West's ideas regarding the personal devotion of Hesiod to the goddess are in tune with the opinions of several other scholars. Mazon, for instance, anticipated West's point about the sharing of the name 'Perses' by Hesiod's brother and Hecate's father; he believes that it must imply a highly personal relationship between Hesiod's family and the cult of the goddess.[33] Mazon believes that Hecate must have been the patron deity of Ascra, a type of nature goddess or πότνια θέρων and that the *Theogony* was composed specifically for one of her festivals.[34] van Groningen also accepts this interpretation of the passage and welcomes a manifestation of what he considers to be true religious fervor in Hesiod in the midst of the attitude of sober respect that Hesiod exhibits towards the other gods in the *Theogony.*[35]

Another manifestation of the desire to seek evidence of Hesiod's personality in the Hecate passage is found in the work of scholars who believe that the Hecate described in the *Theogony* was primarily a peasant's goddess, and that Hesiod praises her in order to associate himself with (and to some extent glorify) this social class. The chief exponent of this view, W. Aly, opines that the fact that Hesiod is at such pains to describe the goddess and her powers shows that she was a goddess of an unofficial, private cult.[36] Pfister takes this point further, claiming that Hesiod gives Hecate prominence because she is ignored by the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*—epics that were composed for and about the upper class. Hesiod thus glorifies Hecate "weil sie keine Gottheit der Herren sondern des kleinen Mannes war."[37] The idea that Hesiod was the champion of the lower classes and used Hecate to further his cause is unfortunately marred by a double uncertainty: there is no evidence either that Hecate was the goddess of the common man or that Hesiod was trying to identify himself as a peasant in writing the *Theogony.* Indeed, one could argue that Hesiod's acceptance of the royal staff from the Muses (31) and his praise of wise and just

Greece; Kern 1926: 245 n. 2, who asserts that we do not have enough information on Boeotian religion in Hesiod's time to say which deities were or were not worshipped there. For an extensive review of scholarship on the goddess Hecate and her cult, including archaeological evidence, see Marquandt 1981: 250 55.

[33] Mazon 1928: 21 24.

[34] Mazon 1928: 5. J. S. Clay 1984: 28 refutes the suggestion that Hecate, whose powers extend to almost every sphere except that of wild beasts, is a *potnia theron.*

[35] van Groningen 1953: 269 70.

[36] Aly 1966: 65 n. 23.

[37] Pfister 1928: 8.

kings (81-92) indicate that he wishes to associate himself with the aristocracy. Referring to the ideas of Aly and Pfister, J. S. Clay notes that "such an interpretation takes its bearing from the naive but still tenacious view of Hesiod as the singing peasant."[38]

Griffith argues vigorously against the 'personal' interpretation of the Hecate passage offered by West and Aly: "If Hesiod felt so strongly, because of his personal ties to her, that a special place must be 'set aside' for this divinity, even at the cost of disrupting his whole poem, and if her cult was indeed so important in his neighborhood," he would have indicated this in his poem.[39] Hesiod could easily have introduced Hecate together with the Muses in the proem, he contends, and it would have been extremely unusual for him to compose an actual hymn to a deity without "demonstrat-[ing] his connection with the *laudandus,* whether through *hypomnesis* of past favors or through the direct appeal of the song itself. . . ."[40] Rather than being the object of a heartfelt song of praise by the poet, Hecate is used by him to indicate the transition from the old order of the cosmos to the new:

> In sum, so far from distorting his poem for private reasons to give a special place to a personal favorite or to a deity of the downtrodden farming folk of the area, Hesiod has specially tailored and developed his Hecate to fit the requirements of his poem. . . . Her role in the *Theogony,* at least, is a poetic, not a personal, matter.[41]

Griffith emphasizes that if we do not know what Hesiod himself believed, we do not have the right to extrapolate this information from his poetry and then use it to interpret the poetry itself.

Nagy also dissents from the views of the biographists. Instead of considering the Hecate episode as something that reflects the poet's own feelings, he sees Hecate as "an ideal paradigm for the Panhellenic nature of Hesiodic poetry."[42] Her Panhellenic nature is evident in her role at the sacrifice: because every sacrifice includes an invocation to Hecate (as Hesiod states in 416-420), and thus no god is called upon except in conjunction with Hecate, an invocation of Hecate is "tantamount to a blanket invocation of all the other gods as well."[43] Thus Hecate is given so large a part in

[38] J. S. Clay 1984: 29.
[39] Griffith 1983: 51 52.
[40] Griffith 1983: 52.
[41] Griffith 1983: 55.
[42] Nagy 1982: 64.
[43] *Ibid.*

this poem not because she is a local favorite but for precisely the opposite reason; she is a ‘synthetic’ deity whose Panhellenic qualities allow Hesiod in his performance to transcend the local perspective of each polis and produce a work of meaning and value for all Greeks. The *Theogony* would presumably have been performed at a Panhellenic festival, and so Hesiod had an obvious interest in appealing to as wide an audience as possible.

Several scholars follow the example of Nagy and Griffith and reject the biographical approach to the Hecate episode in favor of an interpretation that uses the text of the *Theogony* itself to argue for the passage’s authenticity. The results of their research are more easily defensible than those based on theories of Hesiod’s personal religious or social sympathies. P. Friedländer, for instance, has argued that the τιμή-motif that is so prominent in the Hecate section pervades the whole poem, especially the Styx passage, and thus that the Hecate hymn must be a genuine part of the poem. Friedländer makes the further connection between the Hecate passage and the proem to the *Works and Days,* noting that both passages are strikingly imbued with a similar rhetorical style: “Es gibt überhaupt keine anderen Stücke archaischer Poesie die so stark mit ‘rhetorischen’ Mitteln wirkten wie das Ergaproömium und der Hecatehymnos: mit Reim, Antithese, Anapher.”[44] Furthermore, both passages use their rhetoric towards the same aim: to praise one god before all others, hence, according to Friedländer, the tone of the Hecate hymn cannot be called unhesiodic.[45] Solmsen agrees with this assessment, stressing that the importance placed on τιμή in the Hecate passage is a sign of genuinely Hesiodic thought.[46] Pfister wholeheartedly concurs: “Durch das τιμή-Motiv ist also der sog. Hecate-Hymnos fest in die *Theogonie* verankert. . . .”[47]

Following along the same lines, i.e. using the text of the *Theogony* as the basis for all efforts to interpret the Hecate passage, some modern readers have focused on the nature of Hecate as described in the hymn and the placement of the hymn itself within the poem as a means to understanding it. The older interpretations, which tended to attribute the hymn to Hesiod’s personal religious fervor, had the advantage of a built-in explanation for the

[44] Friedländer 1914: 124.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] Solmsen 1949: 53 n. 169.
[47] Pfister 1928: 6.

passage's length and encomiastic qualities. Scholars who abandon the personal in favor of the textual approach to the passage, however, must face these questions anew, and they have responded to them in several ways. One mode of interpretation emphasizes the willful or capricious nature of the goddess and bases understanding of the passage on the analysis of this point. Rudhardt agrees that the arbitrary nature of the goddess is her central feature: Hecate can both harm and help mankind according to her whim. He extrapolates further: "Puis qu'elle n'intervient pas pour assurer le salut des sociétés humaines mais pour privléger seulement certains individus, il est naturel qu'elle soit l'objet de cultes privés plutôt que de cultes publics."[48] Rudhardt argues that the peculiar nature of this goddess and the circumstances under which she receives her τιμή justify her being developed in the *Theogony* for a longer space than that given to the other gods.[49] However, he concludes with a bow in the direction of the traditional interpretation: "Il est compréhensible qu'Hésiode use d'un ton personnel, quand il parle d'elle [*sc.* Hecate]."[50] Rudhardt, then, is to some extent influenced by the common view that Hesiod was personally devoted to this goddess.[51]

The 'willfulness' of Hecate is emphasized further by P. Judet de la Combe and H. Wismann. Judet de la Combe interprets the figure of Hecate as the embodiment of the principle of disorder, the goddess of chance and the indeterminate in human life. She is thus a toned-down, Zeus-sanctioned version of the Titans, who themselves represented the "puissances naturelles du désordre" before they were subjugated by Zeus.[52] Wismann has a similar view, but instead of stressing Hecate's embodiment of disorder, he interprets her as a foil to the retributive justice that Zeus comes to represent. According to Wismann, Hecate incarnates "par son comportement capricieux, le refus de la justice distributive qui pacifie l'univers des Olympiens. . . ."[53] In opposing the rule of justice, Wismann contends, Hecate symbolizes the desire for openness and differentiation that Gaia represents, only in a form controllable by

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48 Rudhardt 1993: 213.
49 Rudhardt 1993: 211.
50 Rudhardt 1993: 212.
51 Indeed, one could argue that the Hecate passage, being hymnic, laudatory, and full of rhetorical devices, is self consciously artificial and hence quite the opposite of 'personal.'
52 de la Combe 1996: 263 99.
53 Wismann 1996: 21.

Zeus.[54] Judet de la Combe and Wismann thus break from earlier tradition by interpreting Hesiod's Hecate not as a cult figure to whom a panegyric is suddenly inserted, but as the representative of the old chthonic forces harmoniously integrated with the new Olympian gods under the rule of Zeus. Since (according to this analysis) Hecate stands for ideas of such significance for the poem, it offers a justification for why Hesiod chose to devote so much space to her exclusively.

The concept of Hecate as the representative of the chthonic race of gods, only touched on by de la Combe and Wismann, is more deeply explored by J. S. Clay.[55] As Clay points out, the Hecate episode in the *Theogony* comes right after the description of the 'old order' of the Titans and directly before the inauguration of the 'new order' of the reign of Zeus. By being given a place of honor by Zeus in his new regime, Hecate forms a bridge between the old gods and the new. The Hecate passage is complemented by the Prometheus/Pandora passage, which tells of how gods and men drew apart from each other and how ritual sacrifice originated.

Because Hecate is invoked by humans as they sacrifice (sacrifice being the chief way in which men communicate with the gods), and because she is given the power either to grant or to deny the prayers of men, Clay sees Hecate as having an important mediating role: "Hecate mediates not only between the old and the new order, the Titans and the Olympians: her powers bridge the three spheres of the *cosmos*, and she forms the crucial intermediary between gods and men."[56] Hesiod has, Clay argues, etymologized the goddess' name as coming from ἕκητι, 'by the will of,' and so his emphasis on Hecate's 'willfulness' is explained by her role in the sacrifice: when humans do not get what they pray and sacrifice for, it is because the goddess Hecate has not *willed* it. By her analysis of the Hecate episode in its relation to the surrounding passages, Clay not only clarifies the role of Hecate in the poem (without resorting to speculations about Hesiod's personal religious convictions), but sheds light on the structure of the *Theogony* and the way in which Hesiod may have conceived of the cosmic evolution of which he writes.

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[54] *Ibid.*

[55] J. S. Clay 1984: 34 37.

[56] J. S. Clay 1984: 37.

Several critics have recently espoused the argument that Hecate as a specifically female figure performs an important balancing function with regard to the new male ruler of the universe, Zeus. Zeitlin, for one, believes that Hecate is included as an embodiment of a positive female character, and therefore she offsets the negative female figure whose description follows hers, Pandora. The fact that these opposite female characters flank the story of the birth of Zeus show that they have an important function in defining Zeus himself.[57] Arthur also views Hecate as the representation of the 'positive pole' of female power, identifying her as a precursor to Athena as the masculine-oriented daughter of Zeus who is benevolent toward mankind. She is thus the opposite of Gaia, who fights for supremacy against the masculine.[58] Boedecker further asserts that Hecate represents Zeus' benevolent functions in feminine form. Noting that "all Hecate's dealings with mortals fall into the tri-functional Indo-European pattern of sovereignty, force, and productivity," Boedecker suggests that this aspect of Hecate could be due to her role as a 'transfunctional' deity in the Indo-European tradition.[59] Since Zeus also exhibits these trifunctional powers, Hecate can be seen as a "model for Zeus' synthesis of powers."[60] The analyses of Boedecker, Zeitlin, and Clay show how the actual placement of the Hecate passage relative to the other episodes in the poem is given its due significance.

As studies of Homeric 'ring-composition' have shown and as van Groningen has argued, archaic Greek poets were highly conscious of the sequence of the events that they narrate in their apparently sprawling works, and so any legitimate attempt at understanding an archaic poem must take its structure into account. By looking at the Hecate passage as a piece of a larger whole, these critics allow Hesiodic scholarship to escape from the dead-locked position into which the biographical interpretation of the Hecate passage had worked itself. It is more profitable to assume that everything needed to understand the passage is provided in the poem itself and need only be discovered. While this approach may run the risk of fostering overly intricate and abstruse analyses of

[57] Zeitlin 1996: 53 86.
[58] Arthur 1982: 69.
[59] Boedecker 1983: 85.
[60] Boedecker 1983: 92.

the Hesiodic poems, the speculations it engenders at least can claim to be rooted in the text itself.

The 'Works and Days'

The single most widely debated issue in Hesiodic scholarship, and the one with which the biographical reading of the *Works and Days* is most inseparably bound up, is that of the quarrel between the two brothers, Hesiod and Perses. The scholarly debate, which concerns the particulars of the dispute over the patrimony and the financial situation of Perses, has been the almost exclusive domain of the biographists. They take the view that the quarrel (or lawsuit, as most of them term it) was unquestionably an actual event in Hesiod's life and the main motivating force behind his composition of the *Works and Days.* Hence, based on the vague and incomplete information that Hesiod provides in lines 27-41, these critics have concentrated on reconstructing the trial process and the events leading up to it. The contrary view, that the quarrel is merely a dramatic construct that enables Hesiod to assume the role of paraenetic wisdom poet, has been advanced by a small yet persistent minority from the very beginnings of the debate.

Among the earliest Classicists to express the view that Hesiod was using the quarrel merely as a literary theme was P. Welcker in 1826. Comparing Hesiod's addresses to Perses to those of Theognis to Cyrnus, Welcker argues that it was conventional for ancient poets to address didactic material to a named individual. In this way the poet is able to present himself as a wise and sympathetic person concerned for the welfare of his friend, rather than a lecturing old curmudgeon, haranguing the general public.[61] Welcker's radical ideas were echoed some seventy years later by Murray, who dismisses the autobiographical material contained in the *Works and Days* as "what purport to be personal reminiscences."[62]

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[61] Welcker 1826: 77 78. Welcker also doubted the historical reality of 'Hesiod' himself, being among the first to note that this name is derived from the Greek for 'he who sends forth song' (Welcker 1865: 5). One may add the observation, recently made by Rousseau 1993: 41 that the poet of the *Works and Days* never names himself as he does in the *Theogony*. Hence nothing exists within the poem that implies that Hesiod is even pretending to speak in his own person except his use of the lyric first person singular.

[62] Murray 1966: 53.

An eloquent exponent of the 'literary convenience' theory is Dornseiff, who was the first to develop extensively the argument that the *Works and Days* is akin to Near Eastern wisdom literature. In an extensive comparison with the Proverbs of Solomon and other wisdom poetry, Dornseiff concludes that Hesiod is just as capable of creating a literary fiction as any other poet of any other age:

> . . . Dinge wie der Persesprozeß, die Berufungsvision in der *Theogonie* sind alle viel literarischer als es der hier heute noch herrschende naive Realismus der Erklärung wahr haben will. . . . Die bei Properz, Tibull, Ovid, Horaz vorkommenden Liebeserlebnisse nimmt man nicht mehr als reale Vorkomisse. In der älteren griechischen Lyrik und Elegie, bei Sappho, Theognis usw. muß alles real sein.[63]

Dornseiff's bold assertion that Hesiod and Sappho were every bit as steeped in poetic convention and the rules of genre as the Augustan love poets is recalled in the work of Rand, who finds an 'Horatian urbanity' pervasive in the *Works and Days.* By the term 'urbanity' Rand means no more than that Hesiod forbears to denounce his errant brother outright, but instead "point[s] out the folly of wrongdoing and shame[s] him by ridicule" in the manner of Horace in his *Satires.*[64] In all other respects, however, Rand's thought is diametrically opposed to Dornseiff's, since Rand believes that the biographical material in the poem reflects Hesiod's actual experience. Dornseiff's lead is followed more faithfully by Kranz,[65] who argues that the personal references are included only for the sake of dramatic vividness, and to some extent by Welles, who observes that the picture Hesiod draws of himself and his family is "too symbolically appropriate" to be true.[66]

The symbolism inherent in the first part of the poem forms the basis for the interpretation of Rousseau as well. Remarking on the fact that the name 'Perses' means 'destroyer [of a city],' Rousseau argues that Hesiod has created the character of Perses to represent epic poetry (in which the heroes are occasionally given the epithet 'destroyers of cities') so that he can then challenge the warlike values of epic and replace them with the more peaceful and

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[63] Dornseiff 1934: 144. Among the few supporters that Dornseiff's theory has attracted is W. Kranz 1961: 3 46, 97 124), who thirty years later agreed that the quarrel and all the other 'personal' details of Hesiod's life found in the *Works and Days* were nothing more than literary conveniences.

[64] Rand 1911: 146.

[65] Kranz 1961: 3 46, 97 124.

[66] Welles 1967: 5 23.

productive values of hard work. Rousseau's theory is especially interesting because it draws a thematic link among the proem, the ἔρις section, and the admonishment to Perses and mention of νεῖκος which comprise the first three sections of the *Works and Days*. By invoking the Muses in the proem Hesiod is mimicking (and thus calling to the reader's mind) the idea of heroic poetry.

The next section, which discusses the two types of ἔρις, was not inserted in order to 'correct' the *Theogony*, as is commonly believed, for why, Rousseau asks, would Hesiod begin a section admonishing Perses with a correction of the *Theogony*? In fact the bad ἔρις represents the warlike behavior of epic poetry, which Perses is anachronistically using as a model for his own behavior: he is "un homme qui tend à choisir, pour regler sa conduite, les modèles de vie héroïque qu'il trouve dans les récits des aèdes . . . il incarne le point de vue d'une écoute non critique de l'épopée."[67] Thus in attacking the bad ἔρις Hesiod is attacking that which is faulty in Perses, and so the ἔρις section is connected to the section of instruction to Perses. The fact that Hesiod pointedly mentions that the good ἔρις pits 'singer against singer,' Rousseau believes, shows that the question with which Hesiod is dealing in this section is actually one of poetic genres.[68] The reason why Hesiod begins his poem with a description of the νεῖκος between himself and Perses is because heroic epic always starts with a νεῖκος, such as that between Achilles and Agamemnon. The strife between Hesiod and Perses thus has an allegorical and dramatic purpose but is not a true piece of autobiography: "Le conflit est bien donné comme 'réel,' mais cette réalité n'est pas extérieure à la fiction qui organise la présentation du poème."[69]

Despite the limited support of the scholars mentioned above, Dornseiff's radical views have engendered a great deal more opposition than endorsement. West, in his commentary on the *Works and Days,* challenges Dornseiff's approach. Although admitting that "a personal setting, often fictitious, is characteristic of didactic literature," and that Hesiod is clearly adopting a "traditional literary form," West argues that the quarrel with Perses is inconsistent with the traditional patterns of wisdom literature.[70] The usual dramatic setting for wisdom poetry, he

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67 Rousseau 1996: 49.
68 Rousseau 1996: 53 54.
69 Rousseau 1996: 62.
70 West 1978: 34.

claims, involves a father instructing a son or a sage advising a king; there is no example in surviving Near Eastern wisdom literature of a brother admonishing a brother.

The deviation from the normal dialectical patterns found in the *Works and Days* is sufficient to convince West of the reality of Perses and the quarrel in which he was involved. In making this judgment West follows the lead of Walcot and Nicolai, and he refers to the latter's famous quotation in refuting the theories of Dornseiff: "Hesiod kann seinem Vater nicht einen nichtnutzigen Sohn (Perses) anhängen, den es nie gegeben hat."[71] Since Hesiod describes his father's experiences so vividly, the father must be real; and to so real a father Hesiod could not ascribe a 'good-for-nothing' son like Perses unless the son were also real. To this reasoning West adds that, since the name Perses is given by Hesiod to a wise deity in the *Theogony* (line 377), Hesiod would not have used it as a name for a fictitious brother who is decidedly *not* wise.[72]

"Further," West continues, "a fictitious personal setting normally involves the speaker as well as the addressee: it would be exceptional for a pretend person to be addressed by one who is just who he seems to be, namely Hesiod—and no one supposes Hesiod himself to be an assumed character."[73] In fact, however, Welcker's theory about the origin of the name 'Hesiod,' which is embraced by Nagy and Griffith, poses a very serious question as to the reality of the authorial character. The question of the reality or fiction-

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[71] Walcot 1966: 105; Nicolai 1964: 199. Cf. Knox 1989:7: "Some critics have of course assumed that Perses and the story of the quarrel is a fiction, but no one has gone so far as to doubt the existence of this father; and it seems unlikely that Hesiod would add a fake brother to a real father." In fact, Nagy argues eloquently that Hesiod's 'father' character is employed as a symbol of 'reverse colonization', and is hence not likely to be a real person (Nagy 1982: 63). Griffith 1983 also sees Hesiod's father as possessing suspiciously convenient literary qualities, referring to him as "a negative portrayal of a man who unwisely looked to the sea for prosperity" (Griffith 1983: 61), though he reserves judgment on whether he was a historical figure or not.

[72] West 1978: 34. West also believes that the Hecate passage in the *Theogony* reveals a personal association between Hesiod's family and the cult of Hecate, and so he suggests that Hesiod's father named his other son Perses because that was the name of Hecate's father (West 1966 ad 404 52). Rousseau and others, however, believe that the name Perses is derived from πέρσις and its cognates, and so signifies the destruction that can come upon a city when its inhabitants exhibit the kind of behavior that Hesiod is reprimanding in Perses.

[73] West 1978: 34.

ality of Perses is thus a good example of the deadlock between these opposing points of view.

Taking up where West leaves off, Schmidt declares forcefully that there is no justification for the view that Perses is a literary device. His reasons for believing this center upon his finding that the level of individualization in the *Works and Days* is far greater than that found in any of the comparable examples of wisdom literature and that Hesiod is therefore the more unlikely to have fabricated these details in response to the norms of wisdom poetry.[74] Like West's argument, though, Schmidt's theory (however convincingly stated) ultimately rests on his opinion alone, and offers no evidence of any kind. If one decides beforehand that Hesiod is a relatively simple poet who lacks artistic sophistication, one will incline toward the view that the biographical material in his poems is an honest representation of the poet's experiences.

It is possible, however, to take the view that Hesiod deliberately established a detailed dramatic setting in which to frame his didactic poem. Neither view can be definitely proven, but merely argued. In a cynical response to this unfortunate fact, Welles claims that it does not matter whether what Hesiod says about himself and his family is true or not; the only thing that matters is what he says in his poetry.[75] But Welles' suggestion that the question can simply be ignored is incorrect. It is impossible to read the Hesiodic poems, especially the *Works and Days*, without addressing and answering for oneself the question of the biographical statements they contain, because one's understanding of the poem and the poet who composed it is inevitably shaped by whether one approaches the work as an autobiographical or a literary creation.

Another major question that tends to divide Hesiodic scholars is that of the portrayal of Perses himself in the *Works and Days*. Is Perses a consistent figure over the course of the poem, or does Hesiod represent him differently according to the point he is making in any one passage? This question generally splits Hesiodists into the broad categories of Analysts and Unitarians. The Analysts believe that the poem is a conglomeration either of poems by different authors or of different Hesiodic poems that were composed separately, whereas the Unitarians hold that the poem

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[74] Schmidt 1986: 20.
[75] Welles 1967: 7 9.

was composed more or less in the form in which we now possess it, with the possible exception of the controversial 'Days' section at the end of the poem. The Analysts, consisting mainly of scholars who wrote in the 19th and early 20th centuries, regard the figure of Perses as inconsistently presented in the poem—a view that naturally stems from their position that the *Works and Days* was composed in unconnected stages or by different authors. The Unitarians, on the other hand, consist mainly of those writing in the late 20th century and are led by their belief that the *Works and Days* stands as Hesiod wrote it to seek for a common thread that unifies the figure of Perses and explains why he appears to change over the course of the poem.

The problem surrounding the figure of Perses is that he is first represented as having swindled Hesiod out of property or chattels (lines 37-41) and is then urged not to employ arrogant violence against those weaker than he (213). He is called νήπιος in line 286 but then δῖον γένος in line 298, and it is unclear whether Perses is to be regarded as a hubristic robber or a lazy beggar. As one scholar concisely puts it,

> An initial difficulty . . . arises concerning the portrait of Perses, who, on the one hand, it would appear, is exhorted to avoid the dangers of poverty, and on the other is accused of excessive acquisition. This inconsistency tends to support those who have argued that Perses, though he may have been a real brother, is used as a lay figure in this poem.[76]

Faced with such a many-sided Perses, scholars of Analytical tendencies have explained his apparent inconsistency as being the result of a combination of several different poems in which Perses plays a role. Following in the footsteps of earlier scholar Schoemann,[77] Kirchhoff expanded upon the theory that the *Works and Days* is the conglomeration of eight separate 'advice poems' (*Mahnlieder*) arranged in chronological sequence. Kirchhoff believes that Hesiod's *Mahnlieder* were transmitted orally until they were pieced together by an anonymous redactor. These *Mahnlieder,* he argues, interrupt the logical sequence of Hesiod's didactic argument and therefore must represent foreign material that was inserted into the *Works and Days* by someone other than the poet.[78] Kirchhoff's theory thus requires that a distinction be made within the *Works and Days* between material that 'belongs there'

[76] Howe 1958: 44 65, 63.
[77] Schoemann 1868.
[78] Kirchhoff 1889.

and that which has been interpolated into the poem. The subjectivity inherent in this type of analysis, which relies totally on the individual critic's sense of Hesiodic style and in which for that reason no two Classicists can ever be found to agree, ultimately caused the majority of Hesiodists to abandon it.

Another great German scholar, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, also holds the view that Perses is presented inconsistently in the poem. Wilamowitz explains this phenomenon as a result of Hesiod's composing the *Works and Days* in two parts, one before and one after the lawsuit with Perses had taken place. He argues that the first part of the poem (lines 11-382), in which Hesiod urges Perses to settle the dispute fairly and forsake his idle ways, was written before the poet knew what the outcome of the trial would be.[79]

The second part of the poem (lines 1-10, 383 ff.) was written after Hesiod had been victorious in the dispute; he is now dealing with a Perses who has given up hopes of gaining wealth through lawsuits and is ready to receive instruction on how to be a diligent farmer. Wilamowitz believes that he can detect in this second part a pervasive self-confidence, which is especially evident in the proem and in other sections of the work in which Zeus is praised as the god of justice. Accordingly, Hesiod could not have assumed this tone of confidence until after he had defeated Perses in court: "Allein ist es denkbar, daß der Dichter, wenn er nicht des Erfolges sicher war, in diesen hohen Tönen den Gott priese?"[80] The bipartite nature of the poem's composition renders the shift that occurs in the characterization of Perses unavoidable. Wilamowitz concludes that Hesiod designed the poem for recitation in public for the purposes of instructing his fellow citizens, using the trial (now over and done) as a didactic tool.[81]

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[79] von Wilamowitz Moellendorff 1928: 132 34.

[80] von Wilamowitz Moellendorff 1928: 134.

[81] von Wilamowitz Moellendorff 1928: 133 35. Wilamowitz's theory complements that of Hays 1918, who also believes that the poem was composed in two distinct time periods with a lapse of time between them. Hays argues that the first part of the poem (written, as Wilamowitz also believed, before the trial was completed) is characterized by a strong feeling of anxiety, which is absent in the second part of the poem (written after Hesiod's victory). Hesiod "feels himself in the talons of the hawk" in the first part of the poem, and this results in his portraying Perses in a much harsher light than he does later on (Hays 1918: 19 20). For Hays, as for Wilamowitz, the lapse of time between the two periods of composition and the change of circumstances that it brings are responsible for the inconsistency of the representation of Perses.

With his insistence upon the point that the trial was over before the *Works and Days* was completed, Wilamowitz is responding to theories like that of Wade-Gery that the poem was composed as a series of 'agitation speeches' designed to influence the outcome of the case. "What I conceive happened," writes Wade-Gery, "is that when the case was pending Hesiod stumped the country, round Ascra and Thespia, making agitation: and these are his agitation poems, and the agitation was successful."[82] Solmsen entertains this theory as well, noting that the *Works and Days*' "public and extraordinarily eloquent appeal to the kings may have kept them from disgracing themselves by another 'crooked judgment'."[83] If the *Works and Days* be understood as a series of 'agitation speeches,' the inconsistency of Perses is perhaps readily explained by the poet's need to customize the depiction of his errant brother for each particular audience being addressed. In effect, this theory explains the supposed lack of coherence in Perses' character portrait by denying that coherence was ever an objective of Hesiod's in the first place; the speeches were composed separately and only later combined into one.

West's approach to the question of Perses' inconsistency is to reject Kirchhoff's *Mahnlieder* theory as 'over sharp' and to develop the ideas of Wilamowitz further.[84] West believes that not only does the progress of the poem's argument require that Perses be shown in different circumstances, but that his very failings "are determined by the requirements of the context in each place, and in some cases apparently invented only after the context had been composed."[85] One of the examples West gives of a fault in Perses that Hesiod seems to add at the last minute occurs in lines 396-97, in which we unexpectedly learn that Perses has come to Hesiod asking for aid. West regards the passage with suspicion:

> It is hard to resist the impression that Perses' current appeal to his brother—something of which we have heard nothing till now, and which sits strangely with some of the things we have heard—is not a fixed datum that Hesiod is working towards in 394-5, but something that he only thinks of after 395.[86]

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[82] Wade Gery 1949: 84 90, 90.
[83] Solmsen 1949: 213 n.8.
[84] West 1978: 35 makes this assessment of Kirchhoff's idea.
[85] West 1978: 36.
[86] West 1978: 39 40.

According to West, then, Perses is inconsistent because Hesiod has composed the poem as an unreflective stream-of-consciousness, without attempting to make each new statement about Perses consistent with the last.

West, who believes that the biographical material in this poem is factual, distinguishes between those self-referential statements of Hesiod's that are true and those that must have been last-minute additions, and hence false. If one accept the story line of the poem as truly recounting the story of a dispute between two brothers, however, there are no reliable criteria that can separate the 'true' autobiographical data from the false ones. In effect, West blames the inconsistency of Perses on the inadequacy of Hesiod, who is unable to formulate a logical or coherent argument and plan it out in advance, but must blurt out each new thought as he stumbles across it.

It is partly in reaction to this remarkable contempt for Hesiod's skill as a poet that the Unitarians have sought to explain the changing representation of Perses as a deliberate element of Hesiod's artistic plan for the *Works and Days*. Arguing specifically against West and his view of an inconsistent Perses, Schmidt puts forward the idea that the figure of Perses does not change back and forth in the poem, but evolves. Perses heeds the warnings of his brother and, by the time Hesiod begins to give concrete agricultural advice, he has been convinced and is ready to work.[87] Clay also believes that Perses undergoes a transformation over the course of the poem, and she joins Schmidt in opposition to West's view of a 'changeable' Perses: "Perses does indeed change in the course of the poem as he absorbs Hesiod's teaching, but those changes represent the dynamic linear development of Perses' education."[88]

Hesiod has, according to Clay, deliberately obscured the facts of the case so that the didactic message of the poem, how a person should live his life, can reach a far wider audience than the material specifically concerned with the trial.[89] Each stage of the poem has a different lesson for Perses (and the rest of the audience), "first turning Perses onto the path of justice, then to work as the sole legitimate means of gaining a livelihood, and, finally, to a comprehension of the ἐτήτυμα promised by Hesiod in the

87 Schmidt 1986: 52.
88 J. S. Clay 1993: 25.
89 J. S. Clay, 1993: 26.

prologue."[90] Hesiod, then, is not merely fashioning a new Perses to fit every new piece of ammunition that can be aimed against him, but carefully guiding him and us through the steps of a lesson that he wishes us to learn. Nagy expresses a similar view of the evolution of Perses, noting that the outrage of the poet against his brother begins to die down by line 286, and Hesiod begins to direct his didactic efforts towards a 'generalized second person singular,' rather than to Perses as an object of wrath: "it is as if Perses were now ready to accept the teachings of his righteous brother."[91]

The middle position between the radical view that coherence was impossible (due to multiple authorship, a compiling of separate poems, two-stage composition, or the poet's ineptitude) and the equally radical view that the consistency in the character of Perses must be perceived as tied to the ongoing, linear process of his education is an attempt to interpret the words of Hesiod in such a way that all the representations of Perses make sense in their contexts. Lattimer, for instance, asserts that the question of Perses' change from wealth to poverty has been over stressed by critics. Perses is not absolutely destitute in the second half of the poem; Hesiod merely warns him that he is headed that way.[92] Lattimer argues against the theories of Wilamowitz and Hays that the two different representations of Perses are due to the poem's being composed in two separate stages. Instead, he believes that Hesiod wrote the poem after all threat of a lawsuit had passed and merely uses the quarrel as a particular example from which he proceeds to draw general applications concerning the state of justice in his times.[93] Gagarin bases his argument for a consistently-presented Perses on his own interpretation of the events surrounding the case. Building on the theory put forward by van Groningen, Gagarin asserts that the *Works and Days* does not depict Perses as now rich, now poor; instead Perses must be understood to have lost his first attempt to get more than his share of the patrimony. He has used up whatever wealth he received from the inheritance, partly in court fees to the 'gift-eating kings,' and is now poor.[94]

Gagarin supports his argument for Perses' consistent state of poverty by reinterpreting the lines in which Hesiod seems to

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90 J. S. Clay 1993: 24.
91 Nagy 1982: 59.
92 Lattimer 1930: 76.
93 *Ibid.*
94 Gagarin 1973: 106.

accuse his brother of stealing wealth from him. In ἄλλα τε πολλά / ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις (37-38), the imperfect ἐφόρεις should not be treated as an aorist but be translated with conative force, "you kept trying to carry goods off, but failed." Thus Perses is indeed consistent throughout the poem—consistently destitute and in need of some good advice on how to turn his life around.[95] In his interpretation of the *Works and Days* Jones claims that the whole story of the trial should not be taken out of its context in the poem.[96] Jones argues that Hesiod's main goal is to urge Perses to resume the *timely* (i.e. properly scheduled) working of the land and to abandon his efforts in the law courts, which waste both time and resources. The only reason why the bad ἔρις is bad is because it keeps a farmer from his work, and so Hesiod wrote the poem in order to bring Perses back to his duties. He argues that the figure of Perses is consistently presented in that he exhibits "not different failings but sequential stages of the same failing": Hesiod shows how Perses advances from merely observing the quarrels of other litigants, to engaging in quarrels of his own against others' property, to "the dramatic revelation that his opponent is none other than Hesiod himself."[97]

Jones explains the statement that Perses has come begging to Hesiod (ὡς καὶ νῦν ἐπ' ἐμ' ἦλθες, 396) as an event that actually occurred in the past, hence the aorist tense of ἦλθες rather than a present perfect, contrasting it with the preceding hypothetical future case (πτώσσῃς ἀλλοτρίους οἴκους καὶ μηδὲν ἀνύσσῃς,

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[95] Gagarin 1973: 110 11. Gagarin 1973 and van Groningen 1953 both deny that the epithet 'gift eating' implies that the kings (i.e. judges) have been bribed by Perses. They argue that the 'gifts' in question were merely the usual court fees that were paid by both parties in a lawsuit. If the kings were willing to sit on many cases for the sake of collecting as many fees as possible, this would account for Hesiod's indignation at their greed (Gagarin 1973: 111). In asserting that Perses has not bribed the judges, however, van Groningen and Gagarin challenge the nearly universal opinion of other Hesiodic scholars who regard the lawsuit as real. Munding 1959, for example, bases his entire interpretation of the poem on what he takes to be Hesiod's accusation of bribery. Munding understands the phrase οἳ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δικάσσαι (39) to refer to judges "who are willing to judge this kind of justice" (i.e. one tainted by bribery). Hesiod then goes on, he argues, to describe the real kind of justice in the rest of the poem. Thus, just as there are two kinds of ἔρις and two kinds of αἰδώς in the *Works and Days* so there are two kinds of δίκη. Other critics base their assumption of bribery simply on the epithet δωροφάγους and on the indignant tone in which it seems to be applied.

[96] Jones1984: 307 323.

[97] Jones 1984: 317.

395).[98] The reason why there is confusion about the events surrounding Perses is because Hesiod has combined general statements about the right way to behave (almost all of which are in the third person singular) with statements made to Perses in particular (in the second singular). Once the material relating to Perses is sifted out from the statements made to mankind, Jones believes, it becomes clear that Perses is a consistent figure in this poem.

Scholars have thus opted for one of three possible ways of dealing with the apparent changeability of Perses in the *Works and Days*. They have either decided that the representation of Perses as we have it is illogical and therefore cannot have been produced in that form by Hesiod (e.g. Kirchhoff, Wilamowitz);[99] or they have sought to reinterpret his words in such a way that the figure of Perses becomes consistent (Jones, Gagarin); or they have viewed the portrait of Perses as a dynamic element within the poem, changing and evolving as he accepts the didactic messages that Hesiod imparts, and that Perses, though purposely different at the end of the poem from what he was at the beginning, is yet always consistent as a character (e.g. Clay, Schmidt).

The first two of these positions are designed in response to the assumption that Perses is a real person whose actions and circumstances Hesiod attempts to relate in this poem. The last position takes the radically different approach that Perses is treated in the *Works and Days* as a character in an unfolding drama who exists for the purpose of receiving and incorporating the didactic message of the poem. This interpretation does not insist that Perses is only a literary construct with no historical reality, it merely treats him as a character in the poem and seeks to explain his role in context. Whether Hesiod's brother really existed cannot be determined, and so this factor is wisely left out of consideration. The approach represented by Clay and Schmidt is valuable because it attempts to operate outside the sphere of pre-formed opinion and draws its conclusions from the text alone. The other two approaches are weak insofar as they build upon the unsubstantiated and unprovable assumption that Hesiod's purpose in writing the *Works and Days* was to give an account of his personal experiences.

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[98] Jones 1984: 319.

[99] West however, is perfectly willing to attribute illogical thought patterns to Hesiod; cf. West 1978: 37.

The 'Works and Days': An Agricultural Manual?

One of the questions arising from an autobiographical reading of the *Works and Days* concerns the nature of the agricultural advice that the poem imparts and its relation to the overall purpose of the work. For the past thirty years the question has been debated whether Hesiod, in making his prescriptions for the farmer's tasks and the proper times at which to perform them, actually intends to instruct his audience on these matters. That he is adopting a didactic tone is not in question, but what critics have begun to inquire is whether the advice that Hesiod gives on farming would actually benefit an aspiring farmer. Could a man who knew little or nothing about farming, as many suppose was the case with Perses, learn from the *Works and Days* as if it were an agricultural manual?

The traditional approach to this issue is not to regard it as an issue at all. Scholars who adopt the biographical reading of Hesiod have no reservations about the poet's intentions to provide useful information in these passages. Jaeger, who believes that Hesiod was primarily a peasant writing for peasants, regards the *Works and Days* as a compendium of peasant wisdom that is presented by the poet in a series of easily-remembered maxims for the purpose of instruction.[100] The question of the didactic nature of this section is not, however, treated by Jaeger in detail. Fränkel, whose conservative views on Hesiod are similar to Jaeger's, also takes for granted the serious instructional nature of the 'Works' section (roughly lines 286 ff.). Without questioning the value of the agricultural advice that Hesiod offers, Fränkel broadly states that the poet of the *Works and Days* "sketches a general picture of the daily life of the peasant and gives practical prescriptions for the 'works' (387) which must be performed."[101]

West delves further into the subject of Hesiod's didactic intentions, analyzing the 'systematic programme' with which Hesiod takes us 'methodically through the year' of the Greek farmer.[102] By taking this section as instructional, however, West does not imply that he has unqualified confidence in Hesiod's personal knowledge of every aspect of the agricultural subjects that he treats: "On the subject of woodcutting the poet has some quite technical knowledge to impart; one might almost think that he was

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[100] Jaeger 1945: 61.
[101] Fränkel 1975: 112.
[102] West 1978: 52.

more of an expert on this than on anything else he deals with." Furthermore, West notes that some of the agricultural instructions imparted by Hesiod here, especially the later ones, are covered less fully than others. West attributes this fact to the tendency for poets who are listing a series of items to become increasingly more cursory towards the end of the list.[103] This view fits well with West's argument that the entire 'Works' section was an afterthought that was only later appended to the poem's original plan; thus an unplanned addition the agricultural advice can be excused for treating its several subjects with inconsistent thoroughness. Griffith, whose views on Hesiod are far from West's traditional standpoint, nevertheless embraces without reservation the traditional position that Hesiod wrote the 'Works' section for the purpose of serious agricultural instruction. "He is now speaking as a technical expert," Griffith declares of Hesiod in lines 286 onward.[104]

Another staunchly conservative student of Hesiod, Lesky, shares West's opinion that the 'Works' section is not the real and original subject of the *Works and Days,* "since all this section can be taken as an elaboration and amplification of the injunction to Perses to work hard."[105] In contrast to what West would later opine, however, Lesky declares that this section is "not a systematic instruction in husbandry, but a mixture of practical advice and hints from general experience."[106] Indeed, this view of the unsystematic nature of Hesiod's instruction is by far the most widely held; West has been among the very few scholars to argue that Hesiod follows a logical order in the progression of his pieces of advice on farming.

In an interesting variation on the traditional standpoint, N. Jones argues that Hesiod does indeed intend to teach Perses and his wider audience in the 'works' section, but that the main essence of his teaching is the timing of the specified tasks. Perses must learn not only how to be a farmer but how to farm 'in season' so as not to suffer catastrophe when his poorly-timed efforts yield no fruit. Knox also emphasizes the preventative nature of Hesiod's agri-

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[103] West 1978: 53.
[104] Griffith 1983: 60.
[105] Lesky 1966: 103.
[106] Lesky 1966: 100.

cultural instruction by identifying it as "instruction which will help to avoid the irremediable disaster of a crop failure."[107]

These exponents of the traditional way of reading the *Works and Days* all agree in accepting the poet's didactic statements as genuine attempts at instruction, but they do not question whether those statements actually have anything of value to impart. It is unclear whether this silence on their part results from their belief that the instruction is sound or their conviction that Hesiod was unable to express himself any more coherently than he does in giving it. Most of them prefer to regard the 'works' section as a series of instructional maxims that makes no pretence at being a thorough or sufficient 'farmer's manual'. The problem that this position then raises, however, is why Hesiod would choose to jumble together a series of maxims that are themselves insufficient for the instruction of Perses in the art of agriculture. Since they all agree that Hesiod is attempting to instruct but that his instruction is not thorough enough, it follows that these scholars either do not regard the didactic section as possessing primary importance for Hesiod (and so not needing to be complete), or that they assume that Hesiod has tried his best to give sufficient instruction but has failed.

Howe strongly believes in the instructional purpose of the *Works and Days* but dismisses the problems with the meagreness of that instruction. Using evidence from Linear B records from Mycenean palaces, Howe constructs the theory that the Mycenean Greeks subsisted primarily upon meat and barley groat porridge, but that, after the Dorian invasions, the sudden influx of new mouths to feed forced the inhabitants of Greece to switch to land cultivation and the baking of bread to survive. Since there could never be adequate grazing land in Greece to feed everyone on their wonted diet of meat, the Greeks either had to colonize elsewhere or switch to bread as the staple of their diet. Land cultivation in Greece was of course an exhausting and never-ending task, and it was to get his countrymen used to this dreadful new state of affairs that Hesiod wrote the *Works and Days*. Howe's point is that Hesiod's audience needs to be instructed and exhorted in the adoption of a new and demanding way of life, and the novelty of the situation explains why some of Hesiod's instructions are so

[107] Knox 1989: 7.

obvious.[108] As to Hesiod's deficiencies and omissions, Howe protests that the *Works and Days* "represents a *working hypothesis* which needs only practical, immediate application to demonstrate its pertinence," and that Hesiod was no 'Dean of Agriculture.'[109] These somewhat evasive answers fail to explain why, if Hesiod was writing an agricultural manual, he would write one that was incomplete and thus leave Howe's argument open to inevitable attack.

Walcot takes issue with Howe's position. He does not object to her theory about the Mycenean diet or the change they made to being an agriculture-based society, but with her assertion that Hesiod wrote the *Works and Days* as an agricultural manual. Howe's thesis, he argues, puts too much emphasis on the 235 lines devoted to agricultural matters and ignores the remaining 500+ lines that deal with other subjects. Furthermore, he contends that if the poem were intended as a manual for inexperienced farmers, Hesiod would not have made them "sit through half the poem before hearing the part that caters to them."[110] Walcot's objection, which largely echoes the earlier ideas of Sinclair, thus centers upon the relative insignificance of the 'works' section with regard to the 'range of subject matter' and 'prophetic fervor' displayed in the other parts of the poem.[111] Drawing his conclusion from sociological studies he made on Greek 'peasants' of our own time, Walcot argues elsewhere that Howe is wrong to analyze Hesiod's advice on farming logically. Based on this evidence, Walcot opines: "To offer advice, even pitiably obvious advice, is characteristic of the Greek, who adores talking and hates silence."[112] Doubtless the race of Greeks is exceedingly grateful to Prof. Walcot for his perspicacity in characterizing them, but his theory that Hesiod in the *Works and Days* gives advice merely for the love of hearing himself speak reduces the poem to the level of a peasant's pointless ramblings. Walcot's arguments against Howe's thesis, however, have convinced the majority of subsequent Hesiodic scholars, none of whom has attempted to resuscitate Howe's intriguing yet far-fetched interpretation.

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[108] Howe 1958: 56 59.
[109] Howe 1958: 45.
[110] Walcot 1963: 5 21.
[111] Walcot 1963: 5.
[112] Walcot 1970: 21.

In opposition to the belief that Hesiod is writing primarily to instruct his audience, several recent scholars cite the fact that Hesiod spends too much time on purely poetic description in the 'works' section (such as the excursus on the summer picnic and the effects of the cold winter wind) and too little time on the methods of farming for his instruction to be an effective educational tool. Kumaniecki makes this point, which is taken up and developed at greater length by subsequent scholars.[113] Burford concurs in Kumaniecki's assessment of the basically ornamental purpose of Hesiod's agricultural 'instruction,' arguing that Hesiod could have written a farmer's manual if that had been his purpose, but that it was not. The "curiously incomplete or at best allusive" information on farming shows that Hesiod is not providing it for the sake of actual instruction.[114] Heath is also of this opinion, arguing that Hesiod in the 'works' section adopts a didactic stance that is purely formal and assumed for the sake of his poetic aims.[115]

Nelson offers an elegant solution to the problem of Hesiod's agricultural instruction.[116] She takes the bold position that Hesiod's intention is not to teach his audience how to *farm*, but to express vividly to them "how farming *feels*."[117] He does this, she argues, by dramatizing the farmer's year, with special emphasis on the sense of breathless haste that fills a farmer in the critical seasons of the year (harvest, sowing) and on the idleness that is forced upon him by the long winter months. Nelson begins her article with a detailed exposition of the many inconsistencies of Hesiod's agricultural 'instruction', pointing out how he spends disproportionately small amounts of time on crucial subjects like sowing and reaping and utterly neglects the important subjects of the detailed care of vines and animals. Furthermore, Hesiod's chronology is strange and inconsistent, beginning the farmer's year in the off-season and often jumping ahead of itself, as when Hesiod mentions spring planting in the 'fall' section (615-18) and the

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[113] Cf. Kumaniecki 1963: 89: "Generally speaking, Hesiod has no intention of writing a sort of farmer's calendar, because he devotes considerable space to descriptions which do not tell us directly about tilling the soil. . . . Besides, the various occupations are unevenly treated by the poet. The autumnal plowing season and the implements then needed are carefully described, while the picture of the vintage season or that of harvest time is more sketchily drawn."

[114] Burford 1993: 103 104.

[115] Heath 1985: 245 63.

[116] Nelson 1996: 44 53.

[117] Nelson 1996: 48.

building of winter shelters in the 'summer' passage (502-503). He mentions the spring harvest but not the very important threshing, choosing to describe the summer picnic instead.[118] Obviously, she concludes, if Hesiod were intending to teach Perses how to be a farmer in this section, we would have to adjudge him a very poor teacher.

According to Nelson, Hesiod makes a 'flash-forward' to the three kinds of possible harvest in the spring when he is describing the farmer's fall sowing (462 ff.) precisely because he wants to "duplicate the farmer's anxious worries as he goes forth to sow."[119] Nelson sums up the feeling of the 'works' section as being one of constant worry and never enough time. She asserts that Hesiod frames this section with references to Perses for the purpose of creating a didactic illusion: "The first [reference to Perses] deliberately creates the presupposition that we, along with Perses, are about to be instructed, while the second leaves us with the impression that we have been."[120] Hesiod's real intention, however, is to instill a sense of urgent responsibility regarding farm work in his audience, and to link this aspect of the human condition with the will of Zeus.

Nelson's theory is remarkable insofar as it is one of the very few that honestly admits that Hesiod's so-called 'instruction' in matters agricultural is meagre to the point of uselessness and seeks to explain this fact without falling back on the increasingly outdated excuse that Hesiod was unable to think or write clearly enough to write a coherent farmer's manual. Approaches such as

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[118] Nelson 1996: 46 47. Another explanation of the anachronistic oddities of this passage is provided by J. S. Clay 1993: 30 31, who interprets the temporal disruptions as connected with the didactic message to Perses: "Hesiod first describes the dog days of mid summer, the only time in the yearly cycle when relaxation and feasting are in order (lines 582 96). He then moves back in time to the June threshing (lines 597 608) before jumping forward to the grape harvest (lines 609 14). The temporal displacement of the threshing season literally cuts into the period of feasting and leisure, rhetorically diminishing the possibility idleness, to which Perses is particularly prone." This interpretation has the advantage over Nelson's in that it maintains the importance of the passage as a didactic tool intended to change Perses' behavior, rather than relegating it to the status of mere description of the farmer's emotions.

[119] Nelson 1996: 49.

[120] Nelson 1996: 53. Her 1998 book, God and the Land, uses her arguments about the purpose of the agricultural advice in the *Works and Days* to demonstrate the unity of the poem. According to her, to understand the purpose and unity of the poem we "must see farming as Hesiod saw it, not as a business for profit, but as a way of life determined for man by Zeus..." Nelson 1998:11.

those of Nelson, Clay, and others help to liberate Hesiodic scholarship from the sterile bonds into which the biographists have led it by showing that the poem itself provides the clues required to understand it. There is no need (and no justification) for extrapolating personal details about the poet's life from his poetry, and then in turn using those details to interpret the poem from which they were extracted. Critics like Jaeger, Fränkel, and West, who have convinced themselves of Hesiod's peasant status and correspondingly simple mental processes, trap themselves by their own unfounded presuppositions into being unable to perceive any evidence of a more profound artistic purpose behind the *Works and Days* than as a platform for a cantankerous peasant berating his greedy brother.

Those who can abandon the biographical reading of the Hesiodic poems, on the other hand, are free to observe the subtleties of thought and structural exposition that pervade the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, just as they do the work of Homer, Archilochus, and the other great archaic poets. Traditionalists will argue that the tone of the *Works and Days,* of the proem to the *Theogony,* and of the Hecate episode is too vivid and personal to have been created as a literary fiction. Yet few poems could rival the Neobule fragment from the Cologne papyrus of Archilochus in vividness and passionate intensity, and many scholars, most notably West, now believe that this poem and the others dealing with 'Lycambes' were composed on stock iambic themes.[121]

Archilochus, too, had a Hesiodic meeting with his (iambic) Muses, as we know from Mnesiepes' inscription, which suggests that to the ancients the poetry of Archilochus was not considered to be so very far removed from that of Hesiod. I join Griffith, Nagy, and the other exponents of the theory that Hesiod adopts a literary persona when he makes reference to 'himself' in their belief that an archaic first person singular is too dubious a construct to justify the biographical interpretation of the Hesiodic poems.

[121] West 1974: 28.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPLIED AUTHOR OF THE *THEOGONY*

The argument that Hesiod has composed his poems in an autobiographical framework is still widely endorsed by scholars, although with a new twist.[1] In her 1989 dissertation Elizabeth Stein argues that it was the invention and dissemination of writing that allowed Hesiod to assert his individuality in his works.[2] In the *Theogony* Stein sees examples of Hesiod's self-references in the '*Dichterweihe*' episode (22–34) and in the 'Hymn to Hecate' (411–52). In these passages she finds that ". . . Spüren einer individuellen Dichterpersönlichkeit nachzuweisen sind." Stein continues:

> The individual, who comes before his public with the speaking of his own name, expresses himself as proud of his creation, places himself on a par with the βασιλῆες, professes an entirely personal relationship with a goddess [*sc.* Hecate], possesses a pronounced consciousness of himself. He does not remain in the darkness of anonymity, nay, he ventures as an individual person into the light of publicity, albeit still unsure and at times rather hesitant. Yet his pride in his calling, in his performance, brings the Boeotian shepherd even to this, to speak of himself, of his faith, of his conception of poetry. That which in Homer remains unsaid and must remain so, becomes in Hesiod a revelation of a new attitude, which came about in conjunction with the establishment of writing.[3]

More recently, Stephanie Nelson argues that "there appears to be no particular reason for the poet of the *Theogony* or the *Works and Days* to choose the persona of a small but far from destitute farmer, unless he was just that."[4] Although she claims that "it does

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[1] Cf. Most 1991.

[2] Stein 1990.

[3] "Das Individuum, das mit Namensnennung vor sein Publikum tritt, sich stolz über sein Schaffen äußert, sich auf eine Stufe mit den βασιλῆες stellt, ein ganz persönliches Verhältnis zu einer Göttin [*sc.* Hecate] bekennt, besitzt ein ausgeprägtes Bewußtsein seiner selbst. Es bleibt nicht im Dunkel der Anonymität, nein, es wagt sich als einzigartige Person ins Licht der Öffentlichkeit, zwar noch unsicher und bisweilen etwas stockend. Doch der Stolz auf der Berufung, auf das Geleistete bringt den böotischen Hirten dazu, von sich selbst, seinem Glauben und seiner Dichtungsauffassung zu reden. Was bei Homer ungesagt blieb und bleiben mußte, wurde bei Hesiod zum Aufweis einer neuen Geisteshaltung, die im Zusammenhang mit der einsetzenden Schriftlichkeit aufkam." Stein 1990:23 24.

[4] Nelson 1998: 38.

not ultimately matter whether Hesiod was a farmer or not," Nelson's stated opinion is that he *was,* and in fact her entire thesis is based on her assumption that the views expressed by Hesiod in his poems are characteristic of farmers everywhere (an highly suspect assertion in itself), and that these views can explain difficulties in the poems.[5]

Hesiod is thus still perceived as the Boeotian shepherd, 'unsure' and 'hesitant' as to whether he ought to defy tradition and compose poetry in his own name—but the changing times and the availability of writing give him the courage to do so. While it is helpful and even necessary to compare Hesiod's style of composition with Homer's, the view that Hesiod is a peasant, albeit an enlightened one, who proudly asserts his individuality in his poems can tell us nothing about either himself or his poetry. Unfounded in itself, this claim even hinders further study of the Hesiodic poems by suggesting that this author, a peasant and thus (presumably) a mere novice in the art of composing poetry, has little artistic control over his poetic medium.

If, however, one entertain the possibility that the poems of Hesiod do not reflect the author's 'individuality' but are presented by a narrator who is himself a fictional character created by the author—i.e. that they are 'mimetic,' as Aristotle claims for the *Iliad*—new avenues open up for the understanding of Hesiod's artistic style and goals.[6] I believe that the methods of narratology, specifically as employed by Irene de Jong in her study of the *Iliad,* provide a much deeper understanding of how Hesiod manipulates his material to produce specific poetic effects in his works than the traditional autobiographical approach. If we permit ourselves to regard Hesiod's 'autobiographical' remarks as consciously included for a poetic purpose, we avoid running into the kind of baseless speculation that, in my opinion, inevitably leads scholars like Stein to a dead end. As de Jong puts it, "Narratology may prove capable of showing the complexities of a text reputed simple."[7] For Hesiod scholars narratology offers a systematic means by which the internal complexities of Hesiod's work can be revealed and

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[5] Nelson 1998: 37.

[6] Aristotle calls the *Iliad* "mimetic" in *Poetics* 1460a 5 11; see below for a discussion of Irene de Jong's interpretation of Aristotle's claim, and how it relates to Hesiod.

[7] de Jong 1987a: xi. Her most recent book (de Jong 2001), offers a detailed narratological analysis of the *Odyssey.*

analyzed, and by which the conception of these poems as simple or even naive in execution can be corrected.

Narratology is a way of speaking about and analyzing a text. Its primary virtue is that it is functional, i.e. it focuses on how a text 'works' without relying on an assessment of the author's personality. The field of narratology contains nothing that is in essence unfamiliar to the philologist accustomed to analyzing texts closely. As de Jong succinctly explains, "Narratologists are concerned with such issues as characterization, chronology, suspense, plot-structure, point of view and the role of the narrator."[8] None of these categories is intrinsically foreign to the Classicist, although perhaps the exclusive focus on these issues, which tend to be submerged beneath (or subtly intertwined with) the main events of a story's plot, would be new to some. The only difficulty lies in the somewhat convoluted terminology that narratologists have developed for the expression of their ideas, and in the regrettable fact that they persist in devising ever new terms and categories for narratological analysis, and rejecting those of one another. The result is that what Wayne Booth calls 'authoritative telling', de Jong calls 'γάρ-clauses', and Richardson calls 'commentary', and so on, with slight differences in meaning for each category but with the same basic concept in mind.[9]

In this book I do not concern myself with the different terminologies employed by each narratologist or invent new terms for narratological phenomena that have been defined very thoroughly already, but choose the methods that are best adapted for the study of Hesiod. The narratological model that is relevant to this study is that of Mieke Bal and Gérard Genette, as interpreted by Irene de Jong, and most of the terminology employed will be hers.[10] The work of other narratologists, such as Wayne Booth, Seymour Chatman, Scott Richardson, and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan will also be cited where appropriate, but for the most part the methods of de Jong, who has made a thorough analysis of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* are best suited to the study of the Hesiodic poems.[11]

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[8] de Jong 1987a: x.

[9] Booth 1966: 4; de Jong1987: 91 92; Richardson 1990: 140.

[10] Bal 1980 (trans. 1985); Genette 1980.

[11] Chatman 1978; Richardson 1990; Rimmon Kenan 1983. The main point of divergence between the narratological model of de Jong and that adopted in this book occurs in Chapter 7, where I employ Richardson's term "Commentary" to refer to passages in which the narrator explains, judges, or otherwise

Narratological Model of de Jong[12]

The narratological method employed by de Jong in analyzing the Homeric poems are useful to the Hesiodist for many reasons, not the least of which being that, since she has developed it for the specific purpose of analyzing the formulaic language of archaic Greek epic, her method is already adapted to the poetic style of the *Theogony.* The narratological concepts of most importance for the *Theogony* are the same as those explored by de Jong in the *Iliad*: 1) The actual presentation of the events: In narratological terms this element is divided into the three layers of 'fabula' (the 'raw data' of who said or did what), 'story' (the raw data arranged in logical and chronological sequence), and 'text' (the finished product that we read). 2) The way in which the events are told, or 'narration': Narration is always accompanied by an emotional coloration given to the fabula by the narrator, which is called the narrator's 'focalization', and the intended recipients of both the narration and focalization are termed 'narratees' and 'focalizees'. 3) The concept of 'embedding', in which a narrator can present the emotional reaction (focalization) of another character as if it were his own.[13]

These three main categories are the analytical tools that allow de Jong to examine the text of the *Iliad,* which is presented in three types of narrative situation: simple narrator-text, complex narrator-text (in which the embedding of focalization, narration, or both occurs), and character-text. 1) Simple narrator-text. In this situation the primary narrator-focalizer (Hesiod) relates the story to the primary narratee-focalizee (the audience). Thus simple narrator-text occurs in the *Theogony* when Hesiod relates information to his audience in the character of external narrator, without embedding direct or indirect speeches of characters or embedding their focalizations. 2) Complex narrator-text, in which the primary narrator-focalizer embeds the focalization of another character. This other character, whose point of view is embedded, then becomes an internal secondary focalizer, i.e. a character in the story who has an emotional reaction to a situation but who

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comments on his text.

[12] de Jong 1987a describes her narratological model in Chapter 2 of *Narrators and Focalizers.*

[13] de Jong 2001: xiii, offers a succinct definition of embedded focalization as "the representation by the narrator in narrator text of a character's focalization, i.e. perceptions, thoughts, emotions, or words (indirect speech)."

does not himself express the reaction in that instance (hence he is not a narrator). 3) Character-text, or speeches. In this situation the primary narrator-focalizer, Hesiod, embeds the speech and focalization of a character in his narration, thus turning that character into a secondary internal narrator-focalizer.[14] That is to say, Hesiod steps aside and allows a character to speak and focalize for himself. Of the concepts listed above (presentation of events, narration, embedding, simple narrator-text, complex narrator-text, and character-text), the first three can be considered the rudimentary concepts, while the second three are the ways in which these building blocks are used in the narratological method of de Jong,

While de Jong, in honing her method of analysis for the study the Homeric poems, has created a useful tool for a similar study of the *Theogony,* the Hesiodist attempting to use this model cannot but be aware of the differences in the narrative styles of these two poets. As de Jong observes, nearly half of the total text of the *Iliad* consists of character-text, the direct speeches of characters.[15] When these statistics are compared to the mere 34 lines of direct speech out of the 1022 lines of the *Theogony* (assuming that lines 963-1022 actually belong to this poem, which appears doubtful), and 12 out of the 825 lines of the *Works and Days,* it is clear that the narrative structure of the Hesiodic poems differs significantly from those of Homer, and requires the narratologist to approach them from a slightly different angle.

For example, one important divergence between the narrative styles of Homer and Hesiod that is linked to their respective uses of character-text is the amount of embedded focalization that can be detected in their poems. In keeping with his general desire to let his characters 'speak for themselves' and not to intrude his own emotional reaction to the events he narrates, Homer employs embedded focalization to a much larger extent than Hesiod. Embedded focalization allows the primary narrator-focalizer to present the emotional impact of a given situation on a character without having the character speak, as in *Il.* 10.463-64, where Andromache sees Hector's body being dragged 'ruthlessly' (ἀκηδέστως) towards the ships of the Achaeans.[16] It is clear that ἀκηδέστως represents Andromache's reaction to the sight, rather

[14] de Jong, 1987: 37.
[15] de Jong 1987a: x. She gauges the exact amount at 45% of the whole poem.
[16] de Jong's example, from de Jong 1997: 296.

than the narrator's judgment, from the presence of the 'shifter', νόησεν ('she saw'), and from the fact that emotional words like ἀκηδέστως constitute 'character language', i.e. the kind of language that in Homer is overwhelmingly reserved for character-text and avoided in narrator-text.[17]

Hesiod, however, does not follow Homeric usage in avoiding what would be for Homer 'character-language' in simple narrator-text, nor does he include enough character-text for us to form any opinion on whether the Hesiodic narrator has a different vocabulary from the Hesiodic character.[18] The few passages in which we may with confidence suggest that Hesiod employs embedded focalization will be treated below. The largely 'mimetic' or character-centered nature of the Homeric poems contrasts quite starkly with the 'diegetic' *Theogony,* which comes to us through the words of the narrator speaking in his capacity as narrator. Thus it is clear that Hesiod and Homer had widely differing perceptions of their roles as narrators. Homer seems to wish to 'intrude' his own judgments and opinions only rarely, whereas Hesiod seems determined to make us realize that he, and he alone, is the filter through which the Muse-granted knowledge of divine affairs can reach us.

The subject of the mimetic nature of the *Iliad* is important to de Jong's argument, and she explains at length her interpretation of the theories of Plato and Aristotle on the degree to which the *Iliad* can be called mimetic. Plato (*Republic* 3, 392c–394b) holds that all the speeches of the characters in Homer are mimetic but that the narrated portions are not.[19] Aristotle (*Poetics* 1448a 19–28 and 1460a 5–11), on the other hand, refers to all epic poetry as mimetic, singling out only the Proem of the *Iliad* as non-mimetic. In de Jong's words,

> If we briefly recall Plato's analysis:
> *diegesis haple*: poet speaks as poet
> *mimesis*: poet speaks as character
> Aristotle's refinement of this description (and his own analysis in 1448a 19–28) becomes visible:
> non-mimetic: proem: poet speaks as poet
> mimetic: narrator-text: poet speaks as narrator
> speeches: poet speaks as character

[17] de Jong 1997: 293 96; see these pages for a historical overview of the scholarship on this question. Cf. Griffin: 1986a.

[18] Cf. Griffin 1986a: 40:"…the Homeric poems have two vocabularies."

[19] de Jong 1987a: 2 5.

> If my interpretation . . . is correct, it was Aristotle who made the first step in distinguishing between author (poet) and narrator.[20]

De Jong thus argues that she has the support of Aristotle in regarding the act of narration itself as a form of mimesis. Having established this, she can then go on to argue that the narrator-text of the *Iliad* is not the result of what Homer 'the man' tells us of Achilles' wrath in a way that may reflect Homer's own personal views or moral stance, but that the narrator-text is itself the creation of a poet about whose personality we know nothing, and which has been carefully crafted to achieve a desired effect on the poem. This reasoning, which is an amplification of Wayne Booth's concept of the 'implied author', is important for de Jong's goal of showing the narrative complexity of the seemingly simple text of the *Iliad,* and is likewise critical for this book in dispelling similar beliefs about the 'simple' and 'idiosyncratic' narrative style of Hesiod.

The Implied Author

Narratologists distinguish between the author of a work and the narrating voice that he uses to relate the story. They regard the narrator[21] himself as a character in the story and thus no less a product of the author's creation than the characters in the plot. It is easy to understand their motives for doing so when one is faced with a 'dramatized' narrator, whom the author endows with a personality and who may play a part in the story himself. Since the narrator in these cases is given a recognizable personality, the reader immediately perceives that the narrator's point of view will color the events that he is relating: "In fiction, as soon as we encounter an 'I', we are conscious of an experiencing mind whose views of the experience will come between us and the event."[22] To use Booth's examples, readers of *Huckleberry Finn* are aware that the narrator's presentation of the events of his own youth is

[20] de Jong 1987: 7 8.

[21] For the sake of convenience I shall frequently refer to the primary narrator focalizer simply as 'the narrator' or 'Hesiod', except in places where my argument requires greater specificity. Every narrator is a focalizer, for the simple reason that it is impossible to relate something without coloring it with some kind of emotional reaction to the events narrated even if that reaction be to show no reaction.

[22] Booth 1990: 152.

shaped by his personality and worldview. Few readers would assume that Mark Twain had experienced the adventures that he ascribes to Huck Finn and is thus describing his own life through Huck's narration, although they may perceive that Twain is sympathetically inclined towards his protagonist.[23]

What more often escapes readers is the fact that even when a narrator is not given an *obvious* personality and does not play a role in the action of the story, he is still the author's creation, fabricated specifically for the purpose of narrating that particular work. An example of this type of non-dramatic narrator is found in the *Iliad* and in the *Theogony* from line 116 on (i.e. after the Proem). These narrators do have personalities, but narratologists contend that it is impossible to know whether the personality of the narrator reflects anything about the author of the work at all. Since the narrative voice is a creation of the author's just as surely as are the events described by that voice, narratologists do not assume that it reflects the personality of the author himself. What a non-dramatized narrator *does* reflect is the 'implied author,' the image of himself that the author chooses to project in that work. The implied author can only be perceived from the ways in which his representative, the narrator, presents and reacts to the events of the fabula.[24] For example, we know from the way in which Achilles is presented in books 22 and 24 of the *Iliad* that the implied author disapproves of the merciless slaughter of great numbers of men, and that he approves of the relinquishing of enemy dead for burial. By observing the narrator's use of descriptive adjectives, adverbs, and similes as well as by noting the result of Achilles' actions on others in the story, we can be reasonably certain of the implied author's opinion of these actions. What we cannot do is to extrapolate from this to what the author himself regards as good or evil conduct, or what sort of moral or behavioral code he follows in his own life:

> It is only by distinguishing between the author and his implied image that we can avoid pointless and unverifiable talk about such qualities as 'sincerity' or 'seriousness' in the author. . . . [W]e have only the work as evidence for the only kind of sincerity that concerns us: Is the implied author in harmony with himself—that is, are his other choices in harmony with his explicit narrative character? . . . A great work establishes the 'sincerity' of its implied author, regardless of how grossly

[23] Booth 1990: 159.
[24] Rimmon Kenan 1983: 87.

> the man who created that author may belie in his *other* forms of conduct the values embodied in his work.[25]

In the case of the *Iliad* and the *Theogony* the narrator is the direct representative of the implied author, i.e. we are given no reason to suspect that the narrator's focalization of the fabula is different from that of the implied author. Booth's term for this concordance between the moral and philosophical stance of the narrator and of the implied author is 'reliable narrator'.[26] An 'unreliable narrator,' in contrast, is one whose actions or self-image are silently repudiated or belied by the implied author, as in the case of Huckleberry Finn, whose status as an unreliable narrator is founded upon the fact that he considers himself to be desperately bad, while Twain clearly intends us to admire Huck for his virtues.[27]

The Self-Conscious Narrator in Simple Narrator-Text

The majority of the *Theogony* consists of simple narrator-text presented by a 'reliable' primary narrator-focalizer who remains outside of the action. His addressee is the primary narratee-focalizee who is external to the action—that is, the audience, whom Hesiod addresses when he is not addressing the Muses.[28] Thus when Hesiod says Ἦτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ'· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα / Γαῖ' εὐρυστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ / ἀθανάτων . . . ("Indeed, Chaos came into being first of all, but then broad-breasted Gaia, the firm stronghold of all the immortals forever" 116-18), he is playing the role of the omniscient external narrator, who has full knowledge of but no part in the events he relates. The focalization in these lines—which is evident in the reference to the safety and constancy of Gaia—is that of the narrator, who has been given knowledge of these matters by the Muses.[29] Lines 116-18, then, are an example of simple narrator-

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25 Booth 1990: 75.

26 Booth 1990: 158 59.

27 Booth's example, 1990: 159.

28 de Jong 1987a uses the abbreviations NF_1 for primary narrator focalizer, NF_2 for secondary narrator focalizer, $NeFe_1$ for primary narratee focalizee, $Nefe_2$ for secondary narratee focalizee, etc. I avoid these formulae for the sake of easier comprehension, although my doing so necessitates a frequent repetition of these unwieldy terms.

29 The question immediately arises whether Hesiod is not embedding the Muses' focalization here. The Muses would know with certainty that Gaia will never cease to be the firm stronghold of the gods, and so if the narrator is acting

text, which accounts for all of the post-Proemic *Theogony* except for the brief sections of character-text, i.e. when a character speaks either in direct or indirect discourse (Gaia's address to her children and Kronos' response 164-66 & 170-72; Ouranos' threats to the Titans 207-210; Zeus' promise to Styx 392-96 and Rheia's request for a vengeful trick 469-73 [both in indirect discourse]; the exchange between Zeus and Prometheus 543-44, 548-49, 559-60; the exchange between Zeus and the Hundred-handers 644-53, 655-63) and for those passages which display embedded focalization (most notably the 'monster catalogue,' 265-336).[30] If we are to understand how the passages that do not fall into this category differ from the majority of the poem, it is necessary first to explore how Hesiod employs the narrative voice in simple narrator-text.

A crucial question to answer when dealing with the nature of a particular narrative persona is whether or not the narrator is 'self-conscious'. The narrator who is *not* self-conscious simply relates information with no verbal sign of awareness that he is speaking or that his audience are listening. The Iliadic Catalogue of Ships (2.494–680), if taken *without* the re-invocation of the Muse (484–92) and *without* the narrator's announcement ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας (493) is a good example of un-self-conscious narration, for in it the narrator makes no reference to his role as teller nor to the narratee's role of listener. De Jong points out that the addition of the re-invocation of the Muses and the comment in 493 show that the Homeric narrator is indeed self-conscious, though only to a limited extent. Homer "reflects on, and thereby explicitly reveals, his own activity as a narrator and focalizer only when addressing the Muses."[31] The only times when the primary narrator-focalizer of the *Iliad* refers to himself as actually telling the events of his story, and in so doing interrupts the dramatic illusion that the story is unmediated and taking place before our eyes, is on the rare occasions when he makes a judgment

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as a mouthpiece of the Muses, rather than speaking as a mortal poet, he is giving their opinion and not his own. I will argue below that Hesiod never acts as the mere mouthpiece of the Muses in this poem, and that, in fact, the idea of his *distance* from the gods as a human being is fundamental to the whole poem purpose of the *Theogony*.

[30] The proem of the *Theogony* (1 115) presents its own narrative structure and so is omitted from the discussion of simple narrator text. The proem is treated in Chap. 3.

[31] de Jong 1987a: 42.

on a character or asks the Muses for aid. Upon the whole, Homer seems to wish to fade into the background of his story and draw as little attention to his own narrative role as possible. De Jong points to many other examples of passages where Homer consciously manipulates the presentation of events as a narrator, but this manipulation serves to mask the narrator's function and presence rather than to spotlight it.

The Homeric narrator is thus classified by de Jong as *external* (he does not play a role in the story), *omniscient, omnipresent, undramatized* (we know nothing of his 'personality'), and, for the most part, *covert* (he prefers to appear to 'fade into the background' while in fact actively directing the course of the narrative).[32] In contrast to the primary narrator-focalizer of the *Iliad,* the one employed by Hesiod in the *Theogony* is much more willing to draw attention to himself as the teller of the story. This tendency is especially marked in the Proem, where the narrator actually enters into the story that he is narrating and briefly becomes a dramatized, internal primary narrator-focalizer—a character in his own story—but it occurs in the main body of the poem as well. The Hesiodic narrator is thus both an external and an internal narrator in the *Theogony,* and his brief foray into characterhood, together with his widespread use of emotional language, support the conclusion that he is at least a partly dramatized narrator.[33] Hesiod does, however, share the Homeric narrator's quality of 'omnipresence,' since he describes what occurs both upon Olympus and in the depths of Tartarus.

The Hesiodic narrator's self-references in the *Theogony* fall into two categories. The first, by far the smallest, contains those passages where the narrator chooses to break rather violently the dramatic illusion that the events being narrated are occurring before our eyes. In these passages the narrator stops the progress of the story and openly discusses how he shall go about narrating it. This phenomenon occurs in the invocation and re-invocations of the Muses (1-20, 104-115; 965-68, 1021-22), and in the passage where he discusses the difficulty of naming all the Rivers (369–70). These passages all refer in some way to the narrator's ability to know the material that he is narrating, whether because

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[32] de Jong 2001: 5. She characterizes the narrator of the *Odyssey* as "more self conscious" than that of the *Iliad* (de Jong 2001: 6).

[33] The topic of Hesiod's "emotional language" will be treated in more detail below in Chap. 4.

he is asking for inspiration from the Muses, as in the invocation-passages listed above, or showing that he lacks knowledge. With the exception of the ‘Rivers’ comment (369-70) and the un-attributed φασί-statement in 306, Hesiod, like Homer, represents himself as an omniscient narrator.[34] The second, much longer, category of self-conscious material contains those passages in which the narrator, while not explicitly referring to his role as orchestrator of the text, nevertheless expresses things in such a way as to reveal his authoritative presence in the discourse. These subtle expressions of the narrative presence occur in a number of different ways, for different reasons, and with different results, but all point to the Hesiodic narrator’s willingness—or even insistence—to reveal himself as the guiding force behind the text.

Discussion of the first category, in which the narrator boldly breaks the dramatic illusion of the poem, will be delayed until the discussion on the Proem, since these passages address the subject of the mortal narrator’s relationship to the gods, and this is, in my view, the central theme of the Proem. I now begin my exploration of the second category of passages that show evidence of having been designed in such a way as to reveal the narrator’s presence in, and power over, the presentation of the story. In attempting to prove that Hesiod employs sophisticated narrative techniques to manipulate the audience’s reception of his text, I hope to show that his poetic style is more complex than might be expected from an untrained Boeotian shepherd/farmer, and thus to cast doubt upon the popular belief that the references to shepherding and farming in his poems are rooted in autobiography.

The first two lines of the *Theogony* proper contain a subtle yet significant intrusion of the narrator into the text:

> ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ’· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
> Γαῖ’ εὐρύστερνος. . . .
>
> Indeed, Chaos came into being first of all, but then—
> and only then—came broad-breasted Gaia. . . .
>
> 116–17

The formulation ἤτοι μὲν . . . αὐτάρ is a way of stating a strong contrast between one thing and another, as in the less emphatic

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[34] The Rivers comment and the appeal to rumor implicit in unattributed φασί, both of which are paralleled in Homer, are probably intended as a foil to show how extensive Hesiod’s knowledge of divine matters actually is. Hence they should not be taken as a sign that the Hesiodic narrator is not omniscient. This point is argued below in this chapter.

μὲν . . . δέ. The narrator here is insisting on the chronological framework that he has laid out—*first* Chaos, and *then* Earth—in a way that draws attention to himself as the self-conscious orderer of the fabula. If Hesiod had employed a simple μέν . . . δέ here, the narrator's role as manipulator of the discourse would not have been so evident, and the fact that these are the very first lines of formal theogonic material gives added emphasis to Hesiod's al-ready emphatic narrative presence.

The expression ἤτοι μέν, or even ἤτοι alone, occurs nowhere else in the *Theogony* and not at all in the *Works and Days.*[35] In contrast, Homer in the *Iliad* uses both ἤτοι μέν and ἤτοι quite frequently, especially as a means of shifting a train of thought from one topic or point of view to another.[36] West remarks *ad loc.* that μέν is often used after the invocation, citing two instances in the *Iliad* and one in the *Odyssey,* but does not remark on the specific function of ἤτοι μέν, and Denniston is also noncommittal on this point.[37] The phrase ἤτοι μέν is much more frequently used in Homer in the sense described above, i.e. for the purpose of redirecting the attention of the narratee-focalizee (whether the primary external narratee-focalizee, i.e. the audience, or an internal secondary narratee-focalizee, i.e. a character in the story) to a different idea. It is impossible to say with certainty whether Hesiod is imitating Homeric usage here or not, due to the phrase's unique status in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days,* but it is likely that he is, and that ἤτοι μέν is another proof of the Hesiodic narrator's self-consciousness.

Of the Iliadic examples cited above, all but 6.404 are said by one character in a speech to another. Ἤτοι μέν is thus associated in Homer with the forceful and emotional speech of the characters rather than with the more objective tone of the Iliadic primary narrator-focalizer in simple narrator-text. For example, Agamemnon, angry at the loss of Chryseis, uses ἤτοι μέν to change his tone from that of a blustering bully to that of a self-possessed commander:

> εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι
> ἢ τεὸν ἢ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος

[35] West 1966 corrects ἤτοι μεν ο to ἦ μέν τοι in 1004; Jacoby 1930 prefers ἥ τοι μὲν.

[36] For ἤτοι μέν cf. *Il.* 1.140, 3.168, 3.213, 4.18, 4.376, 5.809, 6.404, 8.364, 11.442 and elsewhere in the *Iliad.*

[37] Denniston 1970: 389 and 554 55.

ἄξω ἑλών· ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἵκωμαι.
ἀλλ' ἤτοι μὲν ταῦτα μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὖτις,
νῦν δ' ἄγε νῆα μέλαιναν ἐρύσσομεν εἰς ἅλα δῖαν. . . .

But if they do not give willingly, I myself shall come and seize
either your prize, or Ajax's, or Odysseus',
and take her and lead her away. And he will be angry, whoever
I visit. But indeed we will think of these things later,
but come now, let us drag a black ship down to the holy shore. . . .
Il. 1.137–41

This use of ἤτοι μέν to change the subject is paralleled in all of the other examples given above except for 6.404, and seems to be reserved in Homer for emotionally-charged situations in which a speaker wishes to change the subject or the direction of a conversation.[38]

If Hesiod is following Homeric usage in line 116, he employs ἤτοι μέν to shift the focus of the primary narratee-focalizee from the preceding Proem, with its complex narrative structure, to the business of the rest of the poem, which is dominated by the very different narrative style of simple narrator-text. The Hesiodic narrator can thus be seen as stepping into his story and redirecting the audience's attention in the same way as Agamemnon changed the subject from his petty wrath to the business at hand, and with the same degree of abruptness. Since in Homer this phrase is so closely connected with direct speech, it is possible that Hesiod intends by using it to imply that he is directly addressing the audience as a teacher, rather than retreating behind his words in the manner of an un-self-conscious narrator. A narrator who personifies himself is the definition of a self-conscious narrator. Thus the use of ἤτοι μέν, taken with the strong emphasis on the narrator's manipulation of the chronology of cosmic genesis, reveal that Hesiod in the very first lines of the Theogony proper wants to present his primary narrator-focalizer as aware of his own telling of the story.

Other places where the Theogonic narrator makes implicit reference to his narrative function are the passages in which he

[38] Although the example in *Il.* 6.404 does not occur within a character's speech, but the situation that contains it is emotionally charged: Hector smiles at Astyanax while Andromache weeps and tries to persuade her husband to protect them rather than go out and seek glory: ἤτοι ὁ μὲν μείδησεν ἰδὼν ἐς παῖδα σιωπῇ· / Ἀνδρομάχη δέ οἱ ἄγχι παρίστατο δάκρυ χέουσα (404 405). The reader's focus then shifts to Andromache as she addresses Hector in the following lines. Thus here, too, ἤτοι μέν announces a change of direction in an emotional conversation.

presents the reader with a strange or unexpected conclusion to an assertion that he makes. The first passage in which this *aprosdoketon* effect occurs is the one that describes the Hundred-handers:

> ἄλλοι δ' αὖ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο
> τρεῖς παῖδες μεγάλοι ⟨τε⟩ καὶ ὄβριμοι, οὐκ ὀνομαστοί
> Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς τε Γύγης θ', ὑπερήφανα τέκνα.
>
> And still others were born of Gaia and Ouranos
> Three sons, great and mighty, unable to be named,
> Kottos and Briareos and Gyges, overweening children.
>
> 147–49

Hesiod calls these monsters 'unnamable' or 'who ought not to be named,' and then blithely lists their names, creating a moment of confusion for the reader. If Hesiod was planning to name the Hundred-handers all along, why does he go out of his way to refer to them with a word that denotes either the unspeakability of those names or the inadvisability of speaking them? If he had merely wanted to comment on the dreadful nature of these names he could have rearranged the line to accommodate a form of δυσώνυμος, which he uses of Ouranos in line 171, or δύσφατος, or even οὔ τι φατειός, the phrase he uses of Kerberos in line 310. Instead he chooses to lay down an injunction for himself (and his narratee) specifically regarding the *names* of these monsters at the end of one line, only to break it by emphatically uttering these names at the beginning of the next. It is not likely that Hesiod, with his sensitivity to word etymologies would use a phrase like οὐκ ὀνομαστοί without being aware of the ironic effect produced by following it with a list of names.[39]

By the unsettling *aprosdoketon* of naming the unnamable Hundred-handers, the Hesiodic narrator subtly directs our attention

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[39] West 1966 *ad loc.* explains this apparent paradox as being due in part to Hesiod's superstitious fear: "One names a god in order to summon him; by the same token, a fearful creature must not be named, in case he is thereby conjured up. 'Talk of the Devil, and he will appear'. …This is the original point of this and similar expressions; *but the belief has faded, shown by the fact that the names are given in the very next line*" (italics mine). Ford 1992: 189 n. 29 guardedly agrees with West's explanation. West's approach here, as elsewhere, seems to treat Hesiod as incapable of using language to his own ends, as if the phrase οὐκ ὀνομαστοί were some sort of involuntary exclamation wrung from the anxious and superstitious poet rather than as an expression that he may have inserted quite deliberately into the text of his poem. West presents Hesiod as a poet unable to recognize when he has said something contradictory, a view that I find troubling.

to the fact that he is in complete control of the presentation of the story. If he chooses to give names, he will do so; he is, after all, the one who designates these monsters as unnamable, and he will defy that designation as he pleases. Moreover, the very fact that the narrator refers to the act of naming is an indication that he is aware (and wishes us to be aware) of his role as the teller of the story. More importantly, the device of naming the unnamable Hundred-handers reflects the uncertainty of their cosmic role at this point in the poem. It is not until these monsters aid Zeus that they gain an honorable and well-defined role in the Olympian hierarchy. Significantly, when the Hundred-handers are mentioned in the Titanomachy passage (644-63) the narrative emphasizes their strength and moral excellence (Kottos is ἀμύμων on line 654 and aware of his debt to Zeus), rather than on their monstrosity.

Two other passages in which the Hesiod uses a literary device to underscore his activity as narrator are those in which he refers to an unspecified third person plural subject as the authority behind his information. This occurs in the section describing Nereus (233-35), and in that describing Echidna (306-307). Since the *Theogony* contains only one example of a statement with unattributed φασί and one with unattributed καλέουσι, it will be helpful to examine the more abundant Homeric examples of indeterminate third-person plurals before analyzing how Hesiod uses them.

As de Jong's findings indicate, of the 34 occurrences of indeterminate φασί in the Homeric poems, only three are found in narrator-text. The other thirty-one occurrences are put in the mouths of human characters or, as in the case of *Od.* 1. 184 and 13.249, in the mouth of disguised gods who wish to hide their omniscience. These characters, who frequently combine their use of impersonal φασί with an explicit reference to the lack of knowledge that it is designed to replace, seem to be presented as exemplars of the limitations of human knowledge. Unlike the omniscient gods, mankind 'hear only a rumor' (*Il.* 2.486); φασί in Homer is the word that indicates this rumor.

Thus the great majority of the occurrences of φασί with indeterminate subject in Homer are put in the mouths of speakers that are either human or pretending to be human, and who are, in their ignorance, adducing hearsay as the basis of their knowledge of the subject under discussion. In three passages, however, Homer puts this word in the narrator-text, thus ascribing to 'himself' as

narrator the reliance on rumor that characterizes the rest of the human race:

> εἰν Ἀρίμοις, ὅθι φασὶ Τυφωέος ἔμμεναι εὐνάς
> Among the Arimoi, where they say the lair of Typhoeus is
> *Il.* 2.783

> πάντοσε παπταίνων ὥς τ' αἰετός, ὅν ῥά τέ φασιν
> ὀξύτατον δέρκεσθαι ὑπουρανίων πετεηνῶν
>
> Looking around in all directions like an eagle, which they say
> is the most keen-sighted of birds under heaven
> *Il.* 17.674-75

> Οὔλυμπόνδ', ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
> To Olympus, where they say is the seat of the gods, ever steadfast
> *Od.* 6.42

In these three passages Homer is pointing to his human failing to know all things, despite his privileged relationship with the Muses. In thus admitting the fallible nature of even his god-inspired knowledge, the Homeric narrator makes a self-conscious statement about his activity as narrator. For a brief moment he steps out of his role as omniscient, external primary narrator-focalizer and puts himself on the level of his characters, sharing their imperfect understanding of the world. It is significant that on one of these occasions the Homeric narrator steps so fully into the action of his story that he even addresses one of his characters, concluding his simile of the eagle with the comment ὣς τότε σοί, Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, ὄσσε φαεινὼ / πάντοσε δινείσθην πολέων κατὰ ἔθνος ἑταίρων, *Il.* 17.679-80. The Homeric narrator thus briefly defies his role as external, omniscient narrator and places himself on the level with both his characters and his audience. He immediately resumes his wonted narrative style, but by appealing to rumor with a φασί -statement he has markedly demonstrated the difference between a regular human being and a god-inspired poet.

The φασί of the Echidna passage constitutes the one use of unattributed φασί in the *Theogony.*

> τῇ δὲ Τυφάονά φασι μιγήμεναι ἐν φιλότητι
> δεινόν θ' ὑβριστήν τ' ἄνομόν θ' ἑλικώπιδι κούρῃ
>
> They say that Typhoeus mingled in love with her [sc. Echidna]:
> he, a terrible and lawless rapist; she, a glancing-eyed girl.
> 306–307

Following Homeric usage, Hesiod employs φασί to indicate the speaker's reliance on hearsay for the particular piece of information being related. The mingling of Typhoeus and Echidna is a subject on which the Muses cannot—or will not—enlighten him.[40] In light of the fact that Homeric usage overwhelmingly favors putting impersonal φασί into character-text, it is remarkable that Hesiod uses this device in the narrator-text. His purpose in doing so is quite clear, however. Hesiod, the mortal narrator, is the only human being who speaks (in) the *Theogony,* and therefore his is the only voice that would be subject to the mortal curse of unclear knowledge. The φασί-statement at *Th.* 306 is thus a significant expression of the narrator's self-consciousness and a means by which he comments on his narratorial function.

As Homer does in his three uses of unattributed φασί in narrator-text, in *Th.* 306 Hesiod reveals that he, while granted great knowledge by the Muses, is nevertheless still subject to some degree to the ignorance that characterizes the human race. The Muses made Hesiod a poet, not a god, and hence his knowledge, though greatly exalted above that of other men, remains limited. In pointing to the fallibility of his own knowledge, Hesiod thus points to his mortal status and emphasizes the wondrous paradox of the *Theogony*: it is a song about the gods sung by a mortal man, a description of the bipolar cosmos made possible by a miraculous bridging of the two poles in the person of Hesiod. This admission of the narrator's human limitations emphasizes the ineffable vastness of the gulf that normally separates divine from human knowledge, and in doing so it makes our awareness of the miracle of the *Theogony* more acute.

Whereas unattributed φασί is employed by Homer and Hesiod to indicate a lack of omniscience in the narrator (whether it be the primary narrator-focalizer of a secondary one, i.e. a speaking character), both poets use unattributed καλέουσι to indicate the superiority of the narrator's knowledge. Homer employs the third-person plural καλέουσι (both attributed and unattributed to a subject) a total of six times in the *Iliad* and twice in the *Odyssey.* Of these eight usages, four have subjects attributed to them: *Il.* 1.403,

[40] J. S. Clay 1993: 110 n. 24 suggests that φασί in *Th.* 306 "may indicate that the monstrous cannot even be vouched for by the Muses." Clay's comment is interesting in light of the fact that the unattributed φασί statement in *Il.* 2.783, cited above, also refers to Typhoeus. Perhaps there is something inherent in the nature of chaotic, uncategorizable Typhoeus, whose voices even the gods cannot fully understand, that resists human knowledge?

20.74; *Od.* 10.305, 12.61. Of these four passages, the first three are spoken by the primary narrator-focalizer, whereas *Od.* 12.61 occurs in a speech of the goddess Circe. In every instance of attributed καλέουσι in Homer, then, it is clear that the poet's goal is to reveal the special level of knowledge possessed by the speaker of the καλέουσι-statement, whether that speaker be the primary narrator-focalizer himself or Circe (who already possesses greater-than-human wisdom). When Homer uses attributed καλέουσι, in the narrator text, therefore, he legitimizes his own authority as poet.

The remaining four uses of καλέουσι in Homer are not attributed to a definite subject, and thus parallel the one καλέουσι-statement in Hesiod.

> ...ἔνθα τε μηρὸς
> ἰσχίῳ ἐνστρέφεται, κοτύλην δέ τέ μιν καλέουσι
> Where the thigh attaches to the hams; but they call it the hip-socket
> *Il.* 5.305-306
>
> Ἄρκτον θ', ἣν καὶ Ἄμαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσι
> And Arktos, which they also call by the name 'Wain'.
> 18.487
>
> ὅν τε κύν' Ὠρίωνος ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν
> Which they call by the name 'Orion's Dog'.
> 22.29
>
> μόρφνον θηρητῆρ', ὃν καὶ περκνὸν καλέουσιν
> a dark hunter, which they also call 'the Black'.
> 24.316

In these passages Homer uses unattributed καλέουσι to show that he has more specific knowledge than perhaps the average member of his audience may be expected to possess. Homer knows a *specific* name for the hip-joint and the type of eagle sent by Zeus, and he knows an *alternative* name for the constellations Ursa and Canis Major. Even if he does not claim to have this information directly from the gods (for, in the absence of anything to indicate that the subject of καλέουσι is 'the gods' we must assume that it is 'people'), the καλέουσι-statement, by giving a more specific or alternative name for the object in question, supports him in his character of omniscient narrator. Given the 'legitimizing' force of καλέουσι-statements as opposed to the self-undermining tendencies of φασί-statements, it is not surprising that Homer, who, like Hesiod, has an interest in presenting himself as a poet possessed of

divine knowledge, should employ the former in narrator-text almost three times more often as he employs the latter.

Hesiod's one use of unattributed καλέουσι occurs in the Nereus passage:

> Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος
> πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα,
> οὕνεκα νημερτής τε καὶ ἤπιος. . . .
>
> Pontos begat Nereus, honest and true,
> the eldest of his children. But they call him the 'old man,'
> because he is unerring and kind. . . .
>
> 233–35

As in the four examples of unattributed καλέουσι in Homer, καλέουσι in *Th.* 234 serves to highlight the narrator's wisdom, for he knows something about Nereus that we know not. Even if it was common knowledge among the Greeks of Hesiod's time that Nereus *was* an 'old man,' we rely on Hesiod for the privileged information that tell he was *called* 'old man,' and why it is that they called him that.[41] Furthermore, since Hesiod's poem deals primarily with the gods, it is possible or even probable that the subject of καλέουσι in *Th.* 234 is οἱ θεοί. If this be the case, then Hesiod's καλέουσι-statement offers an even more resounding affirmation of the narrator's privileged knowledge than the four unattributed καλέουσι-statements in the *Iliad,* whose subject is most likely mere human beings. If Hesiod can tell us what the gods themselves call Nereus, and why they choose this nickname for him, his knowledge of divine affairs is intimate, indeed.

Thus the φασί-statement in *Th.* 306, which highlights the Hesiodic narrator's human ignorance (never entirely remediable, even by the Muses), and the καλέουσι-statement in *Th.* 234, which displays his privileged knowledge, are merely opposite ways of achieving the same poetic end. Both devices are used to point the narrator's role in the text, for they make us aware of his knowledge and our dependence on his performance as it is occurring for access to the information that he alone of men possesses. In this respect the ostensibly self-undermining φασί-statement is just as effective a tool for making us aware of our reliance on the narrator as is the self-legitimizing καλέουσι-statement. As in a darkened room, which is made to seem even

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[41] West 1966 *ad loc.* notes that male marine divinities tend to be elderly in appearance. He also has a useful discussion of Hesiod's possible etymologizing of the name Νηρεύς from νημερτής.

darker when a bright light is flashed in rhythmic succession and then suddenly stops flashing, nothing sets off omniscience so well as a sudden lapse in omniscience.

By these self-conscious poetic devices Hesiod thus reinforces our awareness of both his mortal nature and the miracle by which he has been enabled to transcend his nature to sing of divine events that would otherwise be unknowable for humankind. The use of unattributed φασί and καλέουσι, therefore, are a means by which Hesiod presents his view of the cosmos as fundamentally divided between the divine and human realms, a division that only the inspired poet may span.

Certain types of words also indicate the self-consciousness of the narrator-focalizer and point to his performance of the poem as it is occurring. Chief among these is the demonstrative pronoun, which Hesiod frequently uses to introduce or summarize a list:

> ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι ’Ολύμπια δώματ’ ἔχουσαι
> Sing me these things, Muses who have your homes on Olympus…
> 114
>
> τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ Κητοῦς καὶ Φόρκυνος γένος ἐστί.
> This is the progeny born of Keto and Phorcys.
> 336
>
> αὗται ἄρ’ ’Ωκεανοῦ καὶ Τηθύος ἐξεγένοντο
> πρεσβύταται κοῦραι· πολλαί γε μέν εἰσι καὶ ἄλλαι·
>
> These are the eldest daughters born
> of Okeanos and Tethys. But there are still many others.
> 362–63
>
> ταύτην δ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τιμὴν ἔχει ἠδὲ λέλογχε
> μοῖραν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
>
> And this honor she has, which is her allotted
> share among men and immortal gods
> 203-204
>
> οὕτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς κουροτρόφος, αἳ δέ τε τιμαί
>
> Thus from the beginning she is a protector of children, and these are her honors.[42]
> 452

In these passages the narrator uses δείξις to point either forward or backward to a list, but his use of such ‘immediate’ language, to borrow a term from E. J. Bakker, also serves to underscore his own

[42] For the force of the demonstrative in τόνδε δέ με (*Th.* 24), see my discussion of the proem in Chap. 3.

narrating activity and the fact that he is presently narrating before an audience whose attention he can direct this way or that.

As Bakker has demonstrated, neither Homer nor Hesiod uses the demonstrative pronoun for simple anaphora, i.e. to refer in an unmarked way to something that has just been mentioned in the text.[43] The practice of using the demonstrative pronoun οὗτος anaphorically, he argues, is a Classical innovation, and replaced the use of the article for this purpose in archaic Greek.[44] Hence when Homer or Hesiod uses a demonstrative pronoun, they are 'pointing to' their text in a marked and vivid way. Thus when Homer concludes the Catalogue of Ships with the comment οὗτοι ἄρ' ἡγημόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν (2.760),

> the narrator addresses his audience directly, as if the object of reference is cut loose from the narrative, and is a reality before everyone's eyes; as if he is saying: "There you have them, those who were the leaders of the Danaans."[45]

Instead of simply listing the names of the river nymphs or letting Hecate's honors stand on their own, Hesiod points to them and says, "Here they are!" This draws attention to his role as orchestrator of the narrative, and proves that he is conscious not only of himself narrating the story, but also of the narratee's synchronous reception of it. The Hesiodic narrator employs the demonstrative pronoun in these two instances for the purpose of alerting his audience that the foregoing list (in both cases a lengthy one) has come to an end, and the narrative will now proceed to different subject matter. Indeed, in the case of the catalogue of river nymphs the narrator not only draws attention to the list that he has just recited, but even to the role that he has played in the selection of that list. By indicating that there are many nymphs whose names he does not include, Hesiod underscores his narratorial prerogative to disclose to us only what names he will.

Hesiod was, however, by no means forced to use the demonstrative pronoun in order merely to sum up or introduce a list; in the former case he might have used the anaphoric article to

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43 Bakker 1999a: 4 8.

44 Bakker 1999a: 5: "Homeric Greek gives us a glimpse of the earlier situation, in which οὗτος is still exclusively deictic and as such very different from ὁ." Bakker discusses the parallel Hesiodic usage on pp. 8 9 of this article.

45 Bakker 1999a: 8 9.

refer to preceding information in an unmarked way,[46] or, in the latter, he might have used one of several phrases or particles (such as ἤτοι μέν or αὐτάρ in the first line of the next section) to indicate an imminent change of subject. His use of the demonstrative in this summarizing way and his willingness to allow a suspension of the illusion that the events are 'telling themselves' reveals the narrator's awareness of himself as an element in the story separate from the material being narrated.

By employing δείξις in this way Hesiod emphasizes both his role as narrator and the audience's role as narratee. Deictic words insist upon the act of communication between speaker and addressee; they cannot be employed in archaic Greek poetry without vividly enacting the gesture of pointing out an object to a party who also 'sees' it. In the *Theogony* the demonstrative pronouns that occur in narrator text are remarkable in that they consist of the primary narrator-focalizer's act of pointing to the performance in which he is currently engaged, for the benefit of the audience. They are thus quintessential proof that the Hesiodic narrator is conscious of himself as narrator in the act of narrating, and that he intends his audience to be aware of his 'personality' as well.

In using the demonstrative pronoun to point something out to his primary narratee, the narrator allows his own voice to intrude into the story. Another situation in which Hesiod obtrudes his narrative presence occurs when he comments on the 'wondrous' nature of his material. The first of these occasions comes in the passage describing the Woman's adornment:

> τῇ δ' ἔνι δαίδαλα πολλὰ τετεύχατο, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι,
> κνώδαλ' ὅσ' ἤπειρος δεινὰ τρέφει ἠδὲ θάλασσα
>
> And on it he wrought many cunning things—wondrous to see!—
> all the terrible beasts that land and sea nurture. . . .
>
> 581–82

θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι is a shorthand way of saying, "If you were able to see this, you would be filled with wonder." By making this comment the narrator overtly seeks to manipulate the narratee's reaction to his words. Instead of relying on the inherently wondrous nature of the diadem and its carvings, Hesiod interjects a judgment his own voice to direct the audience's reaction, so that

[46] This is the normal Hesiodic usage. Cf. *Th.* 22, 137, 142, 150, 156, 167, 178, 182, 191, etc.

we will experience the correct emotion when we receive this information. The other passage that contains this sort of intrusion and emotional manipulation on the narrator’s part is that in which the voices of Typhoeus are described:[47]

> . . . ἄλλοτε μὲν γὰρ
> φθέγγονθ’ ὥς τε θεοῖσι συνιέμεν, ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε
> ταύρου ἐριβρύχεω μένος ἀσχέτου ὄσσαν ἀγαύρου,
> ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε λέοντος ἀναιδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντος,
> ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ σκυλάκεσσιν ἐοικότα, θαύματ’ ἀκοῦσαι,
> ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ ῥοίζεσχ’, ὑπὸ δ’ ἤχεεν οὔρεα μακρά.

> . . . For sometimes
> [Typhoeus’s voices] spoke so that the gods understood; at other times
> their might sent forth the voice of a loud-roaring bull, proud and ungovernable;
> at other times that of a lion whose heart knows no shame;
> and at other times they made noises like puppies—wondrous to hear!—
> and at other times hissing sounds, and the tall mountains reverberated beneath it.[48]
> 830–35

It is surprising to note that the narrator designates the puppy-voices rather than the god-comprehensible, bull, lion, or hissing voices as ‘wondrous to hear’. What Hesiod must be saying is not that the puppies’ yelping was in itself remarkable, but that it is perhaps wondrously incongruous that such a powerful being would make a sound like puppies. What makes this monster so dreadful is not only his terrible strength but his mixture of the comprehensible with the incomprehensible, the overtly threatening with the non-threatening, the foreign with the familiar.

Hesiod’s emphasis on the least frightening of Typhoeus’s monstrous voices is typical of his portrayal of monsters in the *Theogony.* The Chimaira (323), for instance, takes her name from

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[47] In line 500 Zeus is said to set up the stone regurgitated by Kronos in Delphi as a θαῦμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν. This instance of the word θαῦμα is not included in this discussion because it is not clear whether its focalization is that of the narrator or of Zeus, that is, whether Hesiod is telling us in the narrator’s own voice that the stone is wondrous or Zeus has set the stone up *for the purpose of being* a wonder to mortal men. If the focalization is that of Zeus, as seems likely, this use of θαῦμα does not represent the narrator’s intrusion into the text.

[48] The Typhoeus passage has been widely suspected by critics in the past, although more recent scholars tend to favor its retention. For a summary of the arguments brought against it see West 1966 ad 820 80 (West retains the passage). See also Blaise 1992: 349 70.

the most harmless third of her tripartite existence, being called after that portion of herself that is composed of a young she-goat (χίμαιρα), rather than after her leonine or ophidian characteristics.[49] It is likely that in the case of both Typhoeus and Chimaira Hesiod seeks to render his monsters the more bizarre by adding (and emphasizing) a commonplace element to the other, more threatening features of each.[50] A creature that is half-lion and half-serpent is a fearful thing, but with the addition of the mundane and domesticated she-goat it becomes grotesque, and hence all the more frightening to contemplate. Similarly the puppy-voices of Typhoeus that are so 'wondrous to hear' transform the monster from an awesome creature into an incongruous amalgam, a being that violates every category and almost defies imagination.[51] The Hesiodic narrator draws attention to the unexpected but banal element in Typhoeus by observing in his own voice that this element is 'wondrous,' as indeed it is, coming from a creature whose other 'voices' are so terrifying. Hesiod emphasizes the least threatening of the monster's voices in order to compel the audience to address the incongruities in Typhoeus's nature.[52]

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[49] Cf. J. S. Clay 1993: 111 on the Chimaira: "There is an almost comic incongruity in the combination of fierce lion and huge serpent with young female goat, hardly a terrifying beast and more appropriate as a sacrificial victim."

[50] Douglas 1966: 122, 160 defines the monstrous as that which is anomalous. Typhoeus and Chimaira are of course anomalies in and of themselves, being composites of various creatures, but they are made even more so by their possessing one commonplace element among their more fantastic ones. For a detailed discussion of Hesiod's monster catalogue and its role in the *Theogony* see J. S. Clay 1993 especially pp. 106 112.

[51] To bring a modern perspective to bear upon the question, one could imagine an effectively frightful monster composed half of Godzilla and half of a giant insect. This creature would be even more terrifying, however, if it contained an element that was normally innocuous or even positive in nature. Hence the Godzilla insect would be even more unnerving if it consisted of part Godzilla, part insect, and part, say, ice cream man. The Chimaira is terrifying because she defies all categories and forces us to regard the harmless and banal figure of the nanny goat as a threat.

[52] It is perhaps significant that the Woman's diadem also has a connection with the monstrous. What makes the diadem 'wondrous' in the narrator's eyes is its representation of "all the terrible beasts that land and sea nurture." Hesiod draws attention to this dark and threatening aspect of the representation of the Woman with his comment on the 'wonderful' aspect of the diadem, in much the same way as he draws attention to the incongruities of Typhoeus's puppy voices and Chimaira's nanny goatish proclivities. One could argue that the Woman, too, is depicted as a kind of monster, whose nature is a mixture of opposite characteristics and terrifying (because unpredictable) incongruities.

As with the comment θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι in the description of the diadem, Hesiod does not allow his audience to pass over elements of key importance in the *Theogony,* but directs their response by focalizing the event from his own point of view as narrator.[53] It is the hallmark of the self-conscious narrator that he is not content to lurk behind the events of the story as they are told, but comments upon and interprets them. In so doing he reveals his awareness of himself as narrator. I have adduced the foregoing examples in order to demonstrate the Hesiodic narrator's self-conscious involvement with his text preliminary to my analysis of his manipulation of the narratee's reactions in the rest of the *Theogony.*

As is the case with all implied authors, the implied author of the *Theogony* is revealed to us indirectly, through his manipulation of the fabula and of the primary narratee's reaction to it. He does this by selecting the *order* of events narrated, by rearranging the *chronology* of events with *analepsis* or *prolepsis,* by providing *explanations* for some of the material he relates, by his use of *attributive words* to describe figures or actions, and by allowing certain characters to make *speeches* while others are relegated to Indirect Discourse or mere silence.

Hesiod's purpose in the *Theogony* is not to tell the audience about the life or experiences of a man named Hesiod, but to describe the creation of the cosmos and divine order in a way that seems appropriate to him. A major element of Hesiod's cosmic view in this poem involves the difference between mortal and immortal and how this dichotomy is fundamental to the nature of the universe. The narrator of the *Theogony,* as Richardson says of the Homeric one, is a "fictional character of sorts, a metacharacter, who plays his role not on the level of the story but on the level of the discourse, the telling of the story."[54] The purpose of this role for the *Theogony*'s narrator is to describe the birth of the gods, but to do so in such a way as to emphasize the vastness of the gulf between them and human beings.

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[53] For the narrator's self intrusion in the form of σχέτλιος comments, see the discussion in Chap. 6.

[54] Richardson (1990) 2.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MUSES AND THE MORTAL NARRATOR

Up to this point my study has focused on the implied presence of the narrator in several post-Proemic sections of the *Theogony.* Before continuing with a discussion of how Hesiod uses character-text, embedded focalization, and other narratological devices in the main body of the *Theogony,* it is necessary to discuss a large portion of the Proem, the invocation of and prayer to the Muses and the so-called *Dichterweihe* scene.

The narrative structure of the Proem is considerably more complex than the simple narrator-text that predominates in the rest of the *Theogony.* The Proem contains a passage of rare character-text (the Muses' speech to Hesiod 26-28), explicit embedded focalization (the passage of indirect statement in which the Muses' orders are relayed to the poet 30-34), and a striking example of narratorial self-consciousness in the poet's self-representation as the character 'Hesiod' who enters briefly into the story and then abruptly vanishes (22-34). This insertion of the narrator into the story has the effect not only of drawing attention to the narrating process—significant in light of the fact that one of the main functions of the Proem is to comment on that process[1] and how Hesiod came to be entrusted with it—but also to place the 'timeless' realm of the Muses within the temporal framework of mortal reality. The Muses, whose actions in lines 2-21 and 36-103 are described omnitemporally (i.e. as being timeless, or always taking place), are briefly brought into contact with the linear temporal progression of 'Hesiod''s life in the *Dichterweihe.* The resultant temporal confusion is only resolved by an abrupt break in the narrative flow at line 35 (the infamous 'oak and rock' comment), at which point the narrative style reverts to the omnitemporality that dominates the rest of the poem.

Hence on many levels the 'Hymn to the Muses' and the *Dichterweihe* comprise quite a *tour de force* of narratological complexity, contrasting acutely with relatively straightforward narrative character of the *Theogony* proper, and so require an

[1] Specifically in the 'Kings and Singers' passage (80 103), for a discussion of which see Chap. 6.

investigation in their own right. In analyzing the Proem I hope to demonstrate that this complexity was employed by Hesiod in a deliberate effort to achieve a literary end. Hesiod uses these striking elements of narration to introduce the concept of the gulf separating gods from men, and to link that concept with that of his own legitimacy as poet. In so doing, Hesiod directs the listener's attention to the singular role that he himself plays as the emphatically *mortal* poet who has been so favored of the gods that he now possesses the ability even to know of their doings. Both of these points, as I shall argue, are of great significance for Hesiod's self-perception as a poet and the didactic goals of the *Theogony.*

In the Proem the implied author, speaking through the primary narrator-focalizer, invokes, describes, and then prays to the Muses with a passage that is fundamentally hymnic in form.[2] The hymnic narrative of the *Theogony*'s extended Proem sets it apart from the much shorter Muse-invocations that comprise the Proems of the Homeric epics. For this reason a brief comparison of the *Theogony*'s Proem with those of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* will be helpful in determining how Hesiod and Homer conceive of (or represent their narrators as conceiving of) their respective relationships with their patron goddesses.

The Proems of the Homeric epics are minimal, consisting of a short prayer to the Muse to begin singing about a specific subject and a few suggestions on where in the story to commence. Homerists, especially those interested in narratology, are concerned with identifying the nature of the relationship between Muse and poet in order to assess the implied author's degree of self-consciousness. Because Homer requests the Muses to sing, rather than asking for inspiration, some scholars argue that Homer presents himself merely as the medium through which the Muse transmits her voice, rather than a poet inspired to compose his own work.[3] Among narratologists who study Homer, this view is espoused by Rabel and Ahl/Roisman, who believe that the narrating voice of the Homeric poems belongs entirely to the Muse. Citing the opinion of Aristotle that Homer intrudes himself very little into his largely 'mimetic' poems, Rabel argues that Homer speaks as 'himself' only in the Proem and in the

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[2] For the hymnic elements in the *Theogony*'s Proem, see note 15 below.

[3] The idea of Homer as the Muses' 'mouthpiece' is strongly asserted by Lenz 1980: 27.

other brief Muse-invocations in the *Iliad*.[4] Thus Rabel asserts that the first eight lines of the *Iliad* are spoken by the poet himself: "The prooemium of the *Iliad is* a prayer, not the representation of a prayer."[5] It is after this section of the poet's speaking in his own voice that he introduces the Muse as the narrating persona.[6] Ahl and Roisman share the view that the Homeric narrator consists of the Muse: the poet of the *Odyssey,* after invoking the goddess, "vanishes from view and does not intervene again." [7] According to these scholars, Homer's intention in his poems is to introduce the narrating voice of the Muse and, having done so, to disappear from the poem.

Taking the opposite view of the question, de Jong argues that it is the primary narrator-focalizer (and not the 'poet himself') who invokes the Muses, and that the purpose of his doing so is to legitimize his role as a purveyor and interpreter of privileged information—in other words, to legitimize his role as primary narrator-focalizer.[8] In de Jong's view the invocation and prayer in the *Iliad*'s Proem issue from the narrator, not from the poet's own voice, and constitute one of the proofs for the self-consciousness of the Homeric narrator.[9] She argues that the Homeric narrator reveals his self-consciousness as such by directing the Muse to sing on a theme of his own selection, starting from a point in the story that he specifies. In doing so, de Jong believes, the Homeric primary narrator-focalizer is clearly demonstrating his intention to present the story of the *Iliad* in the way that seems best to him, rather than simply yielding all authority and artistic discretion to the Muse.[10] Richardson basically agrees with this assessment, adding his observation that the Homeric narrator is actually drawing attention to his own power over the story by requesting the Muse's aid in producing it:

> The Homeric narrator does not claim to have any difficulty in telling his story from want of cleverness. . . . He is, rather, making a comment on the nature of storytelling; just as the narratee has access to the story only through the narrator, so the narrator is admitted into the world of the story only through the intervention of the goddesses of narrative. . . .

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[4] Rabel 1997: 11 13. The Aristotle passage to which he refers is *Poetics* 1460a 5 11.

[5] Rabel 1997: 17.

[6] Rabel 1997: 19.

[7] Ahl /Roisman 1996: 27.

[8] de Jong 1987a: 46.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] de Jong 1987a: 46 49.

> He draws attention to himself most explicitly just when he is making the point that he is incapable of narrating except through divine aid.[11]

From Richardson's point of view, then, the Homeric narrator represents himself as being 'aided' by the Muses in order to heighten his own importance. De Jong's argument, while similar to Richardson's, does not support his radical assertion that Homer is using the Muse merely as a rhetorical construct to highlight his own efforts. Instead, she falls back upon the intermediate position between 'all-Muse' and 'all-poet,' which is held by the majority of Homerists, that there is not meant to be a 'precise dividing line' between narrator and Muse. The *Iliad* consists of a 'double presentation' of the story by a narrator-focalizer that is at once mortal poet and immortal Muse; we are not meant to distinguish between them.[12]

The same question of the Muses' role in producing poetry arises in the *Theogony* in a far more self-conscious and radical manner. Are the Muses invoked by the poet in earnest and given responsibility for the post-Proemic *Theogony,* or are they introduced merely to give legitimacy to the narrating and focalizing activities of the narrator, who then continues the poem without further divine interference? The answer to this question can be found by analyzing the relationship between Hesiod and the Muses as it is depicted in the Proem. Unlike the Homeric epics, the *Theogony* shows not only the narrator's attitude towards the Muses, but their reaction to him as well. The dynamics of this relationship between the mortal narrator and the immortal Muses are established in the Muses' address to Hesiod in the Proem and establish a theme that pervades the rest of the *Theogony*: the relationship of gods to men.

To ascertain whether the Muses of the *Theogony* are envisioned as actually narrating the story or not, we must examine the Proem for clues to their function in the work. These clues are found in the two sections of character text in the Proem: the *direct* speech of the Muses to 'Hesiod' (26–28) and those passages in which the Muses' words are *indirectly* related, as in the description of their songs (11–21, 36–52, 66–67) and their commands to Hesiod (31–34). The Muses' songs, as described at length in the Proem, differ substantially in both content and chronological ordering from the song that the narrator directs them to sing at the end of the Proem (105–115). As J. S. Clay observes:

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11 Richardson 1990: 181.
12 de Jong 1987a: 47.

> A comparison of the song of the Heliconian Muses with Hesiod's own reveals a number of striking differences. First and most obviously, the list in lines 11–21 generally proceeds backwards from the Olympians to earlier deities, whereas Hesiod begins ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Furthermore, except in the case of Athena, relations between the named divinities are not clarified. Any simple chronological scheme seems to be jettisoned in the catalogue's middle section, nor does any other clear principle of ordering emerge. . . . Finally, line 21 makes clear that this enumeration of gods remains incomplete, while Hesiod at least suggests that his is exhaustive.[13]

The narrator describes the Muses' Heliconian song at great length, and then proceeds to demand that they sing one that is markedly different from it.[14] This fact alone is enough to raise doubts as to whether Hesiod is surrendering control of his poem to the Muses —or even if he wishes to *seem* to do so, as de Jong argues is the case with Homer. On the contrary, Hesiod seems to be openly denying total reliance on the Muses by effectively rejecting their style of cosmogonic poetry for his own.

When compared to the Muse-invocations at the beginning of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey,* Hesiod's invocation of the Muses is more specific in its demands:

> χαίρετε, τέκνα Διός, δότε δ' ἱμερόεσσαν ἀοιδήν·
> κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
> οἳ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
> Νυκτός τε δνοφερῆς, οὕς θ' ἁλμυρὸς ἔτρεφε Πόντος.
> εἴπατε δ' ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα γένοντο
> καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος οἴδματι θυίων,
> ἄστρά τε λαμπετόωντα καὶ οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν·
> [οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο, θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων·]
> ὥς τ' ἄφενος δάσσαντο καὶ ὡς τιμὰς διέλοντο,
> ἠδὲ καὶ ὡς τὰ πρῶτα πολύπτυχον ἔσχον Ὄλυμπον.
> ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
> ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ εἴπαθ', ὅτι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν.

> Hail, children of Zeus, and grant me desirable song;
> sing the holy race of the immortals who exist always,
> who were born of Earth and starry Heaven,
> and of gloomy Night, and those whom briny Pontos reared,
> and say at first how the gods and the earth came to be
> and the rivers and the boundless sea, raging with waves,
> and the gleaming stars and the broad heaven above.

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[13] J. S. Clay 1988: 326.

[14] Although the Muses' Olympian song is somewhat more similar to the one requested by Hesiod, it contains mention of the ἀνθρώπων τε γένος κρατερῶν τε Γιγάντων (50), both of which are conspicuously absent from Hesiod's song.

And the gods who came from these, the givers of blessings`,
how they divided the wealth and how they apportioned their spheres of influence,
and how they first possessed many-folded Olympus.
Tell me these things, Muses who have your homes on Olympus,
from the beginning, and say whichever of these first came into being.

Th. 104–115

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
οὐλομένην, . . .
ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε
Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

Sing, goddess, the wrath of Achilles—
the destructive wrath. . . .
from the time when those two first quarreled,
the son of Atreus, lord of men, and godlike Achilles.

Il. 1.1–2 & 6–7

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, . . .
τῶν ἁμόθεν γε, θεά, θύγατερ Διός, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν.

Tell me of the man, goddess, of many devisings. . . .
Starting from some place or other in the tale, goddess, sing to us.

Od. 1.1 & 10

The *Iliad*'s invocation gives the Muse a general subject and a starting point for her song, while the *Odyssey*'s merely asks the Muse to sing of Odysseus without even directing her where to begin, other than that it should be after the destruction of Troy. Hesiod, in contrast, gives a detailed list of the divinities about whom he wants the Muses to sing (those born of Gaia and Ouranos, Night, and Pontos; the water and celestial deities and the Olympians). As for the point at which the Muses are to commence, here, too, Hesiod is quite specific. He demands that the poem begin ἐξ ἀρχῆς, from the very beginning of time, and that it account for the primal origins of the universe and how the Olympians brought the cosmos under their control.

If lines 105–115 comprised the entire Proem of the *Theogony,* they would still be remarkable for their specificity as compared with the more vague directions given to the Muses in the Proems of *Iliad* and *Odyssey.* Far from standing on their own, however, Hesiod's requests from the Muses follow many lines describing, in effect, how the Muses' own cosmogonic songs differ from what Hesiod would like them to sing. The choice of this particular format for the Proem is significant. Hesiod could have represented the Muses as singing

exactly the same song in exactly the same order as that which Hesiod requests in 105-115. If he had done so, he could then have depicted himself as handing the full responsibility for the poem over to the Muses in a way similar to Homer in his own Proems. That is, he could have said something like, "O Muses, you delight the mind of Zeus by singing *xyz* (where *xyz* stands for a brief but accurate summary of what later occurs in the *Theogony*); come now and sing the birth of the gods." Indeed, if Hesiod had chosen this method of addressing the Muses, the primary narrator-focalizer would have been able to minimize his human presence in the poem and attribute the song entirely to his divine patronesses, thus lending credibility to his story of creation.

Instead, as we have seen, Hesiod opts for precisely the opposite route and demands that the goddesses, who are accustomed to compose theogonic poetry in their own way, conform to the specifications of a mortal poet and sing what he wants them to sing. He makes his demand very reverently, but it is clear that he intends to take an active role in shaping the *Theogony,* and that he wants his audience to recognize this. The Muses are invoked to give general legitimacy to the poet's words—which, after all, deal with matters not normally within the sphere of human knowledge—but it is not their poem.

How the Muses' song is described in the Proem underscores the narrator's insistence on his presence in the poem. Instead of directly quoting the songs, the narrator chooses to relate it to us in his own words. At first glance, this may appear to be self-evident: The poet, in good hymnic style, gives a catalogue of the important attributes of the deities whose praises he sings. Since the Muses are goddesses of song, it makes sense that the poet should include in his 'hymn' a catalogue of the subjects about which they sing.[15] However, the 'list of attributes,' which in hymns often occurs as a series of relative clauses describing the god, is in this case unique in comparison to the Homeric Hymns in that the 'attributes' it describes are verbal utterances rather than physical characteristics.[16]

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[15] The hymnic nature of the Proem to the *Theogony* is widely recognized by scholars. See Friedländer, Walcot 1957; van Groningen 1960: 256 62; Minton 1970, Janko 1981: 20 22, and others.

[16] The Proem contains other descriptions of the Muses, of course, which do describe them in physical and geographical terms, putting special emphasis on the sound of their voices. The main part of the description, however, dwells on their songs.

This being the case, Hesiod could have represented the Muses themselves singing their theogonies in direct speech rather than reporting and summarizing the material in his own words. Direct quotation of a deity's speech is an extremely common convention in the Homeric Hymns, and Hesiod follows it when he quotes the Muses directly in 26–28. In describing the Muses' theogonic songs, however, Hesiod resorts to indirect speech. Instead of letting the Muses sing for themselves, then, the Hesiodic narrator speaks for them. Whenever a narrator chooses the indirect reporting of a speech over direct quotation, he is exerting control over that speech, deciding how much or how little of it to reveal to his audience, and often summarizing, interpreting, or otherwise leaving his mark on it.[17] Thus in the very act of relating what the Muses sing in his own words—and drawing attention to the fact that he does so—Hesiod is demonstrating his control over the text.

The narrator of the Proem deliberately sets himself up as the guiding force behind the poem and makes it clear that, while the Muses are his revered patronesses, he is to be considered substantially responsible for the *Theogony.* I do not believe that this conclusion is the result of laying too much stress upon the difference between the Muses' songs and the one that Hesiod requests. The descriptions of the conflicting theogonic songs of Hesiod and the Muses occur in the Proem and thus hold an automatic significance for, and relevance to, the rest of the poem. Hesiod has engineered the Proem so as to point to his own role in shaping the work (an argument supported by the much-discussed inclusion of the poet's own name), perhaps in direct response to the ostensibly more objective and unobtrusive narratorial stance of Homeric epic.

The poet's careful design of his programmatic Proem brings us to the other question raised earlier: Is the Proem of the *Theogony* a real prayer made by the poet himself before performance (as Rabel claims is true of the Iliadic Proem), or is it a fictional device containing characters and situations designed to achieve a specific artistic goal? If the poet has indeed shaped his hymnic invocations and prayer to the Muses in such a way as to show his own importance as a poet, it is not possible to regard the voice that speaks the invocation and prayer as that of the 'actual poet.' The very fact that they serve a rhetorical

[17] When the narrator quotes a speech directly he still has the ability to limit the extent of the speech, and thus affect it to some degree, but he relinquishes the power to summarize, interpret, or otherwise color it with his own focalization.

purpose forces us to regard them as literary constructs created for that purpose. This approach applies not only to the invocation/prayer section of the Proem, but also to the *Dichterweihe* scene, and all those passages that seem to have an autobiographical foundation. That is to say, the material does not suddenly lose its autobiographical nature—if it ever had any, which we cannot know—but it is the autobiography of the *implied poet*, not the poet himself. Hesiod wishes to present here an *image* of 'the poet Hesiod' for the purposes of the present work, and thus the image cannot be relied upon as a true reflection of his nature. What is at issue in the Proem is not whether Hesiod himself is actually praying to the Muses or whether he encountered them on Helicon, but what rhetorical purpose he achieves by including these details in his Proem.

Hesiod's emphasis on his own narrative role in the invocation and prayer is linked to his perception of himself as poet. In the *Dichterweihe,* arguably the most famous passage of the poem, Hesiod receives inspiration and a divine mandate to compose poetry. In the famous *Dichterweihe* passage of the *Theogony,* Hesiod receives inspiration from the Muses and a divine mandate to compose poetry. The cryptic nature of the Muses' address to Hesiod (lines 27-28) and its unquestionable importance as a statement of Hesiodic poetics have combined to make this scene a source of inexhaustible controversy, and debate continues to rage over its interpretation and programmatic significance for Hesiod's work. The similarity of *Theog.* line 27 to *Odyssey* 19.203 has led many scholars to believe that in this line Hesiod is referring to Homeric poetry or heroic poetry in general as the 'lies' of line 27, while his own poetry is represented by the 'truth' of line 28.[18] Other scholars focus on the precise meaning of the terms ἐτύμοισιν (line 27) and ἀληθέα (line 28) in an attempt to make sense of the Muses' riddling statement.[19] While the difference in meaning of the two words for 'truth' in this passage is certainly important for its

[18] Scholars who have made this argument recently include Verdenius 1972: 234 35; Murray 1981: 91; Puelma 1989: 75; Pöhlmann 1989; and Arrighetti 1996. Stein 1990: 11 and Rudhardt 1996: 30 believe that the main point of lines 27 28 is to assert of the superiority of Hesiod's own 'truthful' poetry. Nagy 1990: 44 47, on the other hand, believes that in these lines Hesiod attacks poets who perform non Pan Hellenic (and hence inferior) versions of theogonies.

[19] Extensive work has been done on the question of the Muses' veracity in this passage. For a discussion of the earlier scholarship see Svenbro 1976: 46 49; Stroh 1976: 90 97; Neitzel 1980; and the brief overview in Katz/Volk 2000: 122 24. See also Detienne 1967: 8 10; Pucci 1977: 8 44; Kannicht 1980; Thalmann 1984: 146 49; Ferrari 1988; Nagler 1992: 81 83; and Pratt 1993: 106 113.

interpretation, it is vital to perceive how the narrator, Hesiod, focalizes these words from a divine perspective to understand the passage. In the *Dichterweihe* we encounter the first instance of embedded character text in the *Theogony,* consisting of the Muses' unflattering address to the 'shepherd' Hesiod:

> τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
> Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
> "ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
> ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
> ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι."
> ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι·
>
> And to myself—me here![20]—the goddesses first spoke a word,
> the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus:
> "Field-dwelling shepherds, evil reproaches, nothing-but-stomachs,
> we know how to speak many lies indistinguishable from ἔτυμα
> and we know how, whenever we please, to utter ἀληθέα."
> Thus spoke the daughters of great Zeus with riddling words.[21]
>
> 24–29

This passage is one of the few in the *Theogony* where Hesiod embeds the speech of a character. In narratological terms, 'embedded speech' means any directly-quoted speech of a character that the primary narrator (in this case, Hesiod) temporarily the role of narrating and focalizing from the narrator 'Hesiod.' In narratological terms, 'focalization' is the act of 'seeing' an event of the story. The term 'focalizer' is defined by de Jong as "[t]he person (the narrator or a character) through whose eyes the events or persons of a narrative are 'seen'."[22] As René Nünlist explains,

> [S]trictly speaking, a narrator does not have eyes, only a voice. …The very process of perceiving the events is what narratologists call 'focalization.' The term focalization itself is a visual metaphor, similar to the older term 'point of view,' with which it shares many features: the focalizer is the agent from whose point of view the story is related.… Every single statement in a given text is made from a certain point of view and therefore has a focalizer, unnoticeable and discreet as he may be."[23]

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[20] The pronoun has strong deictic force. See Bakker 1999a: 10.

[21] The meanings that Hesiod assigns to ἔτυμος and ἀληθής are discussed below.

[22] de Jong 2001: xiv.

[23] Nünlist 2002: 446 47. Nünlist goes on to point out (447) that some Classicists seem to confuse the term 'focalization' with the concept of an author's 'focus', i.e. that aspect of an author's work in which his main literary interest lies, such as the main character of his story. I am grateful to John Marincola for bringing Nünlist's article to my attention.

Every narrator, then, whether the main narrator or a speaking character within the story, is a focalizer: his words reflect his 'seeing' or reaction to the events of the story. But not every focalizer is permitted to speak.[24] The primary narrator has his own focalization of the events that he narrates, but he may choose to present another character's point of view by means of indirect quotation. Alternatively, the primary narrator may adopt a character's point of view by allowing himself to 'see' through that character's eyes and narrate the events of the story as if he himself were that character. In such a case the primary narrator is said to 'embed' the focalization of one of his characters.[25]

By allowing the Muses to speak in their 'own voice' and express their reaction to the situation in which they find themselves (i.e. their reaction the Boeotian shepherd they have just *seen* or *encountered*), Hesiod, I would argue, draws attention to their act of *seeing,* or focalization. The fact that Hesiod yields his narrating and focalizing responsibilities to the Muses in this scene indicates that he considers their words and the tone in which they utter them to be important enough for direct representation. This intrusion of a secondary narrator-focalizer (the Muses) into the poem is all the more striking in that Hesiod resorts to the device of character-text (speeches made by characters) only sparingly in the *Theogony.*[26] Each instance of directly represented speech and focalization in this poem therefore stands out in importance, since it is only in these few passages that Hesiod

[24] de Jong 1987: 33.

[25] While it is possible for a narrator to *embed the focalization* of a character, such embedding is subtle and likely to be lost on at least some listeners. With embedded focalization it is not always clear whether the focalization belongs to the character whose words the narrator is indirectly relating or to the narrator himself. To give a simple example, "Tom said that he would turn off that annoying program," does not make it clear whether the evaluative word 'annoying' appeared in Tom's statement or not, i.e. whether 'annoying' represents Tom's focalization (in which case it is embedded focalization) or the narrator's own judgment. In a direct quotation, however, there is no doubt that it is the speaker who focalizes. Embedded focalization will not be further treated in this article; for a full treatment of this concept see Bal 1985, 100 118; de Jong 1987, 101 148 and the useful discussion in Nünlist 2001: 448 53. For possible embedded focalization in the *Th.* see Chapter 4.

[26] Besides the passage in the *Dicterweihe* currently under discussion there are three other scenes of character text in the *Theogony*: the Gaia/Kronos exchange 164 66, 170 72; the Zeus/Prometheus exchange 543 44, 548 49, 559 60; and the Zeus/Hundred Handers exchange 644 53, 655 63. These scenes of dialogue follow a pattern similar to that which I detect in the *Dichterweihe* of presenting emphasized material in direct speech and reporting less emphasized material indirectly. For Hesiod's use of direct and indirect speech see Chapter 4.

allows characters to speak in their 'own voices' rather than making it obvious that they speak through his narratorial mediation.

The Muses' speech to Hesiod is most striking of all, since Hesiod has not only marked it by presenting it in direct speech, but has even decided to report only *half* of their address in direct speech (26-28), relegating the other half to indirect speech (33-34). In quoting the first part (and only the first part) of their statement in direct speech, Hesiod draws attention to the fact that it is specifically the *Muses'* focalization that is being presented in those lines. In other words, it appears to be especially important to Hesiod that what the Muses say in 26-28 should represent unquestionably the point of view of the goddesses and not of himself. In contrast, the rest of the Muses' speech (33-34) is presented in indirect statement and in such a way as to deemphasize its focalization: καὶ μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, / σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν (33–35).[27] In sum, it would seem that the poet wishes to use direct speech to emphasize some aspect of lines 26-28 that is either not present or is not the main point of lines 33-34. I should like to suggest that it is the *focalization* of the Muses' words in 26-28 that Hesiod stresses in reporting them directly.

Hesiod makes a point of capturing the disdainful tone of voice with which the Muses confront him; he does not, however, give the same importance to the focalization of their later words to him. These last words are significant for what they say, not the tone in which they are uttered, and so their contents are summarized by the poet. Thus an analysis of the *Dichterweihe,* if it is to be accurate, must take into account not only the content of what the Muses say to Hesiod, but also the emotional coloration of their words, which the poet purposely emphasizes in one part of their speech and downplays in the other.

Scholars usually regard the main point of the Muses' epiphany as the *Dichterweihe* that occurs when they bestow upon Hesiod the laurel staff and endow him with the ability to compose poetry.[28] Yet, if this is the main purpose of the scene, why is it relegated to indirect discourse, when the rest of the scene is reported directly? Hesiod could have had the Muses end their address by saying something along the lines of, "Take this laurel staff and go compose glorious poetry," but he chooses not to illuminate the *Dichterweihe* with the

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27 While the verb ἐκέλοντο gives the impression of imperious command, the tone of 33 35 is nevertheless quite far removed from the emotional intensity of 26 28.

28 Cf. Nagy 1992: 119 30 and Collins 1999: 241 62.

same intensity that he uses for the Muses' description of themselves and their addressee. This is, of course, not to imply that the *Dichterweihe* is of minor importance to the scene, but simply to suggest that Hesiod intentionally places the narrative emphasis on the puzzling comments that he reports directly, rather than on the comparatively straightforward instructions that he summarizes in his own words.

An examination of the Muses' statement to Hesiod reveals that it contains two descriptions: one presenting the characteristics of 'shepherds' and the other, those of the Muses themselves. Without deigning to acknowledge the individual identity of their addressee, the Muses haughtily treat the character 'Hesiod' in this scene as if he were representative of the entire race of shepherds—much as human beings are wont to think of 'sheep' as a collective unit rather than individual animals. West regards the terms with which the goddesses accost Hesiod as 'typical' of the way in which divinities speak to humans,[29] but I would suggest that the pointedness of the Muses' abuse, as well as its coarse and unwarranted nature, goes beyond the typical.

In the *Hymn to Demeter,* for example, when Demeter reveals herself to Metaneira and rebukes her for noisily interrupting her attempted deification of the infant Demophoon, Demeter has good reason to be annoyed with the shrieking human (242–62). Nevertheless, she merely calls the woman 'ignorant', and her scorn is mixed with pity for the benighted condition of mankind.[30] In Hesiod's case, however, the Muses have no apparent reason for their harsh criticism; so far as we know, neither Hesiod nor shepherds in general have done anything to annoy or offend the Muses.

The epiphany of the Muses to Hesiod is of a different nature from that of the self-revelation of Demeter to Metaneira in the *Hymn.* Demeter berates Metaneira, but explains why she does so: if the woman had not intervened, her son would have become a god. In the

[29] West 1966: 158 62.

[30] "Νήϊδες ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφάδμονες οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθοῖο
αἶσαν ἐπερχομένου προγνώμεναι οὔτε κακοῖο·
καὶ σὺ γὰρ ἀφραδίῃσι τεῇς μήκιστον ἀάσθης."

Hymn to Demeter 256 58

Note that Demeter uses the same generalizing plural here as Hesiod's Muses do towards him. She does not regard Metaneira as an individual who has made a mistake, but as a symbol of the ignorance of the whole human race. For the theme of the separation of god and man as an important motif in *Demeter* cf. Clay 1989, 202 65.

Hymn to Aphrodite it is with a similar blending of contempt and pity that Aphrodite rouses Anchises from sleep after their union has been consummated.[31] West cites eight other epiphany scenes that show divinities addressing human beings with a degree of abuse that he deems comparable to that employed by Hesiod's Muses.[32] Yet when one examines these passages one finds that the criticism with which the divinity addresses mankind is reserved either for the inherent ignorance of the race, which the god regards with pity, or for some moral crime that has been committed.[33] To judge from their words, Hesiod's Muses criticize the race of shepherds neither because they are foolish nor because they have sinned, but simply because of what (according to the Muses) they *are*: field-dwelling, hungry, and base.[34]

Since the Hesiodic Muses, then, do not act in the way in which divinities are typically represented when meeting humans, and since their abuse seems extreme and unmotivated, Hesiod must have a specific purpose in mind in portraying them thus. What is the purpose of the Muses' abuse and riddling statements at their meeting with Hesiod? When one analyzes what they say to Hesiod, it becomes apparent that the goddesses are not there simply to reveal themselves to him, but to contrast themselves with him. For the Muses to call

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[31] Ὄρσεο Δαρδανίδη· τί νυ νήγρετον ὕπνον ἰαύεις;
καὶ φράσαι εἴ τοι ὁμοίη ἐγὼν ἰνδάλλομαι εἶναι
οἵην δή με τὸ πρῶτον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι νόησας;

Hymn to Aphrodite 177 79

There is something pitiful in the image of the sleeping Anchises, who is yet unaware that a dread goddess looms over him and that his life has been changed forever. Both pity and a certain degree of contempt can be detected in Aphrodite's tone as she prepares to put the mortal in his place. There is no sense of pity for Hesiod in the Muses' insults.

[32] West 1966: 160: Epimenides fr. 1, Isaiah 6.9, Parmenides 6.4 9, Empedocles 2, Ar. *Av.* 685 87, Ov. *Met.* 15.153, Orph. fr. 233, [Pythag.] *carm.* [*aur.*] 55 57.

[33] To compare another passage (not cited by West), in Aristophanes' *Birds* the Birds' scornful pity embraces both the ignorance of man and his physical wretchedness: ἄνδρες ἀναυρόβιοι, φύλλων γενεᾶ προσόμοιοι/ ὀλιγοδρανέες, πλάσματα πηλοῦ...ταλαοὶ βροτοὶ ἀνέρες εἰκελόνειροι (685 87).

[34] As West 1966: 160 points out, the speech of Hesiod's Muses is imitated closely in Epimenides fr. 1: Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψευσταὶ, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί. Epimenides has retained the abusive and largely physiological tone of the Hesiodic text but subordinates the physiological insults to a moral criticism: Cretans do not tell the truth, and for this reason they deserve the epithets 'nasty beasts' and 'lazy stomachs.' West indicates *Isaiah* 6.9 10 (in which God speaks indignantly of the blindness and folly of the errant Israelites) as a parallel example of an epiphany scene in which "the god…addresses mankind in strongly derogatory terms" (160), but in this case, too, there is moral justification for the divinity's abuse. Hesiod's Muses, however, do not have any apparent justification for their scorn other than the fact that their addressee is a shepherd.

Hesiod ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, and γαστέρες οἶον, implies, of course, that the goddesses themselves are neither 'field-dwelling', nor 'evil reproaches', nor 'nothing-but-stomachs', and that they pride themselves on this distinction.

Although Hesiod does not respond to the Muses' statement directly, his portrayal of 'himself' as narrator reveals that he agrees to some extent with their description of him. He implies that the character 'Hesiod' is a shepherd (ποιμαίνοντα, 23), and as such must spend his time out in the fields with his animals. This leaves him open to the charge of being ἄγραυλος, which is normally an epithet of beasts and is certainly indicative of the goddesses' disdain for his lowly state.[35] The Muses, in contrast, are described as Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι (114), and are hence the most extreme opposite of êgrauloi. The goddesses are also, by virtue of their divinity, the very opposite of γαστέρες οἶον, for they do not require nourishment in order to exist. Human beings, of course, *must* eat, and so this epithet suits them, but the term is clearly intended to equate humans with the lower animals and is therefore an insult.

The epithet κάκ' ἐλέγχεα is more vague; it is not clear what aspect of the addressee is being criticized by its application. The phrase is used three times in the *Iliad* of warriors who are perceived to be acting in a cowardly fashion and who need to be roused to heroic action.[36] It is possible that Muses use this epithet as another way to insult the humble occupation of shepherds, which is far from thoughts of aristocratic ἀρετή, but given the un-martial tenor of this poem it is more likely that κάκ' ἐλέγχεα is a general term of abuse that sums up the other two insults. Shepherds are equated with their flocks, who live out in the fields and do nothing but eat, and this makes them 'base reproaches.'[37] Thus the point of the abusive section of the

[35] Homer uses ἄγραυλος almost exclusively of cattle: *Il.* 10.155, 17.521, 23.684, 23.780, 24.81; *Od.* 10.410, 12.253, 22.403. In *Il.* 18.162, however, the phrase ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι occurs in a simile that likens the fight over the body of Patroklos to a struggle between shepherds and a hungry lion. Since this is the only occasion in Homer where ἄγραυλος is applied to a human being, it is likely that here Homer, too, uses the adjective to emphasize how closely the herdsman's life resembles that of his herd even to the point of sharing the risk of depredation by larger animals.

[36] *Il.* 2.235, 5.787, 8.228.

[37] The word ποιμήν is not in itself a negative term in either Hesiod or Homer; Homer uses ποιμήν λαῶν in the *Iliad* 42 times in only a positive sense. In the context of the insults of *Th.* 24 29, however, and the implicit comparison that the Muses draw between shepherds and themselves, ποιμήν takes on a pejorative connotation. From the Muses' perspective Hesiod as shepherd is only one step

Muses' address is to show that Hesiod and his ilk are very different from themselves.

Why do the Muses select these particular epithets for Hesiod and all shepherds? They do not openly accuse them of laziness or ignorance (although these faults are certainly implied by the term γαστήρ and the Muses' insistence on their *own* knowledge in lines 27-28), but reserve their express contempt for the fact that shepherds live out in the open and are primarily concerned with satisfying physical desires, especially that of hunger.[38] The brutal directness with which the Muses pronounce Hesiod inferior to themselves on the basis of these physiological reasons indicates that the real distinction being drawn here is that between gods and men. The Muses appear to Hesiod and instantly remind him with these well chosen insults that he is a mere human, and he had better not forget it. Their subsequent bestowal of the αὐδὴν θέσπιν (31–32) upon the poet is therefore made specifically within the context of the distinction so pointedly drawn between gods and men. This emphasis on the lowliness of humanity in comparison with the glory of the gods alone explains the unexpected insults and haughtiness of tone that characterize this remarkable epiphany scene.

The Muses address Hesiod with the generalizing plural, 'shepherds.' Since there is no indication that anyone else was present—and, indeed, Hesiod's emphatic τόνδε δέ με (24) implies that he was alone—we must assume that they are referring to him as representative of all shepherds. Because, however, the epithets they use clearly seem to contrast the human with the divine order, it is likely that they use the term 'shepherd' to refer to the entire human race. The shepherd is an excellent symbol for humanity in general, for he occupies a station that is in an obvious way both above that of the sheep he pastures and below that of the gods, while sharing certain aspects of each. Like the gods, the shepherd/ human possesses the power of reason and speech, but like the sheep he lives subject to the harsh elements, disease, and death, and is doomed to serve an unrelenting master: the insatiate belly.

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removed from the animals he pastures, and is hence described with the insulting term ἄγραυλος. It is thus only because ποιμένες is used here by the scornful goddesses to distinguish mortals from themselves that it becomes an insult.

[38] But cf. the discussion of Svenbro 1976: 50 59 and Thalmann 1984: 144 46, who regard the reference to the belly as having to do with the opposition of nonsocial behavior (represented by the negative term 'belly') to the organized social life of civilized communities.

The convenient pictorial metaphor of the shepherd as the symbol of man's intermediate position between god and beast occurs elsewhere in archaic poetry of Greece and the Near East, and appears to be a motif of extreme antiquity. Shepherds (and herdsmen in general) have always been used as symbols of a liminal state between wild nature and civilization. It is of shepherds that the wild man of Babylonian epic, Enkidu, learns to eat bread and drink wine preparatory to his introduction into civilized society in Uruk.[39] Homer, too, exploits the medial nature of the shepherd in his similes when he reverses the normal order of Man Dominates Beast to Beast Dominates Man, thus reducing the herdsman, terrified by some beast of prey, to the level of his herd.[40]

The liminality of the shepherd, however, is elsewhere employed not only to point the difference between man and beast, but also—as in the *Dichterweihe*—to represent man's medial position between god and beast. When god meets man in myth and poetry, those men are frequently depicted as shepherds. The most striking example of this useful metaphor for the mortal condition is found in the *Hymn to Aphrodite.* Aphrodite, having set her sights on the shepherd Anchises, is escorted to his rude dwelling by gamboling wolves, lions and leopards (70-72). Furthermore, the bed on which their love is consummated is strewn with the skins of bears and lions which Anchises himself has slain (159-60). Anchises greets Aphrodite with a speech indicative of his 'piety', i.e. of his awareness that men are beneath the gods (92-106). The description of this union of goddess and mortal man is thus strongly colored by an emphasis on the three types of creature, goddess, man, and beast, and on their respective places in the cosmic order.

This tripartite division is surely significant in light of the theme of this Hymn. The *Hymn to Aphrodite* describes how gods ceased to mingle in love with the race of men, and thus how the pecking-order of gods—men—beasts, no longer obscured by the production of demigods, came to be permanently established.[41] In making his point

[39] Before leading Enkidu to the shepherds, and again when she leads him from the shepherds to Uruk, the harlot adjures him, "You are wise, Enkidu, and now you have become like a god. Why do you want to run wild with the beasts in the hills? Come with me. I will take you to strong walled Uruk, to the blessed temple of Ishtar and Anu, of love and of heaven…." *Gilg.*I.iv.190 94; trans. Sandars 1972: 65.

[40] *Il.* 5. 137 42, 18.161 62: shepherd cannot fight lion off; 15.586 88: wild beast slays herdsman; 16.352 55: wolves snatch lambs from terrified shepherds.

[41] J. S. Clay 1989: 200 201.

about the new cosmic structure that will henceforth delimit what it means to be mortal, the Hymn poet has made full use of the man—animal imagery made possible by Anchises' identity as a shepherd. Anchises is the slayer of wild beasts and the protector of domestic animals but is helpless before the might of a dread goddess. Which is to say, he is a shepherd. As such he is the perfect representative of mankind in the abstract.

In an interesting parallel to the *Aphrodite,* the New Testament presents the moment of cosmic reorganization that announces a new relationship between God and mankind as a similarly miraculous meeting between immortal and mortal. The angel announces the glad news of Christ's birth not to the holy men, nor to the rulers, nor to merchants, but to shepherds. It would seem that when divinities announce a new status quo between god and man, the recipients of this annunciation are frequently depicted as shepherds. The image of the man towering above his flock but bowing before the god expresses with perfect clarity the place of man in the universe.

Other examples of the shepherd as symbolic of humankind are not as well developed, but they are compelling nonetheless.Homer twice relates how nymphs lay with shepherds (one of whose names was, significantly, Boukolion) and produced the heroic sons whose deeds (and deaths) the poet then proceeds to describe (*Il.* 6.21-28; 14.442-45). The point of these vignettes seems to be the poignancy evoked by the fact that not even a divine parent cannot shield a man from death; i.e. the mortal condition (represented by the shepherd-father) is inescapable. To take quite a different example, the curious vestiture of the Etruscan *haruspex,* whose *raison d'être* is to mediate between men and gods, was that of a shepherd.[42]

Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the ancient title 'shepherd of the people,' that was given to god-sanctioned kings such as Gilgamesh and Agamemnon, may have originated in the king's original role as head priest of his society. As such he would have been perceived as a mediator between his 'flock' and the gods, the means through which divine blessings might come to the people. One recalls that it is a *king*'s scepter that the Muses give to the *shepherd* Hesiod once they establish him as the mediating entity through which their divine song will enter the world of men.[43] In light, therefore, of the convenience of the shepherd as metaphor for the human race in its

[42] Bonfante 1975: 53 54. I am grateful to Nancy de Grummond for this reference.
[43] For the programmatic function of the βασιλεύς in the *Th.* proem see Chap. 6.

medial position between gods and animals, it seems likely that Hesiod has presented himself in the role of shepherd because of its symbolic value for his poetic purposes.[44]

In calling shepherds γαστέρες, the Muses thus hit upon this animal aspect of human nature, the part that divides human beings from the gods. As J.-P. Vernant observes, the term γαστήρ "indicates the human condition in its totality. . . . [It] represents the ardent, bestial, and wild element in man, that internal animality that chains us to the need for food."[45] While sharing his enslavement to the

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[44] For more examples of the theme of the shepherd's role as intermediary between the races of men and gods, see Dornseiff 1934 and Trencsényi Waldapfel 1955. It is interesting to note that shepherds in the Old Testament are consistently represented as being closer to God than their city reliant counterparts, farmers. As Kass 200: 129 313 convincingly asserts, farmers in the Old Testament represent the continuation of the hubristic self reliance that led to the Fall: "Because he mixes his labor with the earth, the farmer claims possession not only to [*sic*] the crops but also to the land itself. For the same reason, he is even inclined to regard himself as responsible creatively as maker for the produce itself. On this view, the farmer is an audacious and self assertive character. The shepherd, in contrast, lives a simple and by and large artless life. ...Though he wanders the earth as he pleases, the shepherd has no illusions of self sufficiency; indeed, he is likely to feel acutely the dependence of his entire life on powers not under his control and processes not of his own creation. The settled farmer seeks to design his life, the wandering shepherd allows his life to be designed by the world" (Kass 2003: 130 31). Thus shepherds, who 'know their place,' are more attuned to the voice of God than farmers, who erroneously suppose that their success is the product of their own actions. As I intend to argue in a forthcoming book, it is precisely this hubristic self sufficiency of the farmer that characterizes the narrator of the *Works and Days*. It strikes me as no coincidence that the right thinking narrator of the *Theogony* is presented as a shepherd, while the wrong minded (as I shall argue) narrator of the *Works and Days* is cast as a farmer.

[45] Vernant 1989: 59. Cf. Leclerc 1994, 169: "Le γαστήρ est en effet l'organe qui rapproche le plus les hommes des bêtes: le terme désigne à la fois l'organe des hommes et celui du boeuf dépecé par Prométhée, alors que le ventre des dieux, qu'il s'agisse de celui qui engloutit d'autres dieux ou de celui qui enfante, est appelé νηδύς, et ce mot n'est pas employé pour les hommes." For an extended discussion of the use of γαστήρ in archaic Greek epic, see Svenbro 1976: 50 59. According to him, however, the stomach stands not so much for hunger in archaic epic as it does for laziness and dependence on others. Thus Svenbro argues that the shepherds designated as 'nothing but stomachs' represent poets who compose false and flattering genealogical poetry to please their aristocratic patrons by linking them to heroic ancestors. Hence, he argues, the 'ψεύδεα πολλὰ ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα' of 27 refer to the compositions of these inferior poets, while the ἀληθέα of 28 refer to Hesiod's own poetry. In a recent article Katz and Volk 2000 argue that γαστέρες οἶον is a reference to those who practice ἐγγαστρίμυθος, 'belly prophecy' such as that of Eurycles (mentioned in Aristophanes *Wasps,* 1019 20). Since the stomach was regarded as a potential source for inspired speech, K. and V. believe that the Muses call Hesiod a 'mere belly' in order to emphasize his role as the receptacle of their poetic inspiration. Once filled with their divine knowledge, Hesiod could then

belly with the sheep he tends, however, the shepherd is also superior to them as their ruler and protector. If Hesiod had chosen to represent himself as a farmer in this scene (as he later does in the *Works and Days*) instead of as a shepherd, the image of the human as occupying a position halfway between god and animal would not come across so clearly.

Several factors, then, combine to make this confrontation between Muses and 'shepherds' an allegorical comparison between gods and men. First, the Muses are described with a double epithet asserting their divinity (Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο, 25); second, they scornfully emphasize Hesiod's human similarity to the sheep he tends; and third, the Muses then make a statement about themselves and their own superior knowledge in contrast to Hesiod's limitations. Furthermore, Hesiod represents all nine of the goddesses addressing him, and they, in turn, also address him in the plural. The fact that both sides are referred to in the plural suggests that Hesiod is setting this scene as a confrontation between representatives of the race of gods and that of men.

The Muses' address to Hesiod as representative of the entire human race is framed by the passage in which it occurs. The five-line paragraph begins and ends with a statement and restatement of the Muses' divinity: Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο (25); ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι (29). The double affirmation of the Muses' divine status (25 and 29) surrounds the thrice-repeated statement of Hesiod's mortal status (ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον 26). Once this framing structure is noted, the epithets describing the Muses take on greater significance and should no longer be regarded as merely formulaic. Thus in the narration and focalization of the Muses as well as in the manner in which their words are framed in the text, the poet constructs a situation that is defined by the polarization of the mortal and the immortal. The programmatic statements about 'truth' which follow the opening address of the Muses to Hesiod must therefore be understood as operating within the framework of the distinction between man and god.

Once we recognize how lines 25 and 29 (which affirm the Muses' divinity) frame and define line 26 (which underscores Hesiod's mortality), it becomes possible to unravel the enigma of lines 27 and

produce poetry by becoming the instrument through which the goddesses transmit their song, just as a prophet prophesies when s/he is 'full of' the god.

28. What are the Muses saying when they claim to know how to tell many lies that are like ἐτύμοισιν, and they are also able to speak ἀληθέα? The key to this statement lies in the Muses' address to Hesiod in the specific capacity of divinities addressing a mortal and in the meaning of the phrase τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα (32), which is what they instruct Hesiod to sing. The Muses give Hesiod the laurel *skeptron* and breathe into him a 'divine voice':

καί μοι σκῆτρον ἔδον, δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον
δρέψασθαι θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν
θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

And they plucked and gave me a scepter, a branch of luxuriant laurel,
a thing of wonder; and they breathed into me a voice
divine, so that I might sing of the things that will be and were before,
and they ordered me to hymn the race of blessed gods that are always,
and ever to sing of themselves first and last.

Th. 30–34

J. S. Clay has suggested that the material the Muses instruct Hesiod to sing (τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, 'the things that will be and were before') is not the same as what they themselves later sing on Olympus: εἰρεῦσαι τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, 'uttering the things that are and the things that will be and were before' (38).[46] Clay persuasively interprets 'the things that will be and were before' (i.e. Hesiod's song) as 'eternal things,' and 'the things that are and those that will be and were before' (the Muses' song) as 'both mortal *and* eternal things.' She argues that the phrase 'things

[46] Given the similarity between this phrase and *Il.* 1.70, we must consider the possibility that Hesiod is responding to or otherwise commenting on Homer. The Iliadic reference is to the seer Calchas ὃς ᾔδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα. Calchas knows 'the things that are and those that will be and those that were before.' In the *Iliad* this phrase may merely refer to present, future, and past (which is how it is usually translated), but if we take it in what I believe is the Hesiodic sense, it would mean that Calchas possesses the kind of knowledge that Hesiod reserves for the gods i.e. knowledge that embraces both mortal reality (τά τ' ἐόντα) and eternal, unchanging cosmic reality (τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα). This makes sense, for Homer wishes to present Calchas as the intersection between the divine and the human, whereas Hesiod seeks to underscore the distinction between the two realms. I follow the majority of Hesiod scholars in believing that Hesiod came after Homer. Although I find it likely that Hesiod composed with Homer in mind and sometimes referred to his text (*Th.* 27 = *Od.* 19.203 and *Th.* 38= *Il.* 2.70 are two examples). I do not subscribe to the belief that Hesiod 'polemicizes' against Homer or epic poetry in *Th.* 27. A notable proponent of the opposite argument, that Hesiod *preceded* Homer, is West 1966: 46 47.

that will be and were before' indicates things that never perish and are thus eternal, whereas the phrase 'things that are' indicates things that exist in the present time and then perish, hence mortal things.[47] By this interpretation the Muses have the ability to sing not only about the gods but about mortals as well, whereas to Hesiod—who, by virtue of his mortal status already has the ability to sing of mortal affairs—they grant only what he lacks: the power to sing of the gods.

Accepting Clay's interpretation of these riddling statements, that the Muses sing both of mortal and immortal things while they order Hesiod to sing only of immortal things, why do they employ two different words for 'truth' in their direct speech to Hesiod? They are able to tell 'many lies indistinguishable from ἐτύμοισιν' and 'ἀληθέα.' Because Hesiod himself in this poem uses etymologies (real or fictive) as a means of explaining why certain things are the way they are in the cosmos, it is possible that in this case he has decided upon an etymology for the words ἔτυμος and ἀληθής that renders them capable of expressing different kinds of truth.[48]

Hesiod appears to etymologize the word ἀληθέα as deriving from λανθάνω, and to understand it to mean 'that which is not forgotten.'[49] Lines 54-55 and 102-103 make it clear that Hesiod

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[47] Clay 1988: 330 (Clay credits D. Mankin for this translation). She continues, "One should, however, note that the expression in line 32 does not refer to two distinct categories, 'the things that will be and the things that were before,' which would require the repetition of the article (cf. Soph. *Aj.* 34f, τά τ' οὖν πάρος τά τ' εἰσέπειτα; Pl. *Ti.* 37E, τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται). The Hesiodic phrasing refers to *one* category of things that both will be and were before." (Clay 1988: 330, n. 31). Cf. Walsh 1984: 35 n. 36, who also observes that "Hesiod's Muses seem to have omitted the present from their song [*sc.* the song with which they inspire Hesiod] intentionally."

[48] West 1966 ad *Th.* 77 lists some examples of Hesiod's etymologizing tendencies and points out the extended wordplay of 603 606. Hesiod often etymologizes names, as in *Th.* 195 200 (Aphrodite), 207 210 (Titans), 243 64 (Nereids, cf. esp. 252), 299 (Echidna), 775 76 (Styx), and 901 903 (Horai). The effect of this etymologizing is to augment the legitimacy of the narrator, who knows not only the names of gods but even *why* they are so named.

[49] Cf. Detienne 1960: 27 35 and 1967, 24 27. Some scholars define ἀληθεία as 'that which is not hidden' and consider it a quality associated with speech as opposed to the mental process of remembering. Cf. Cole 1983 esp. p. 12. For Krischer 1965, ἀληθεία is a quality that describes a verbal account of something seen: "Die ἀληθείη ist der Bericht, der die Dinge darstellt, wie sie der Sprechende erlebt hat, ohne daß dabei etwas unbemerkt bleibt….Der Anwendungsbereich von ἀληθής ist im wesentlichen auf den Augenzeugenbericht beschränkt…" 167. For a discussion of the meaning of ἔτυμος and ἀληθής see Levet 1976 and Leclerc 1993: 68 71. For the semantic range of ψευδής see Luther 1935: 80 90 and Leclerc 1993: 72 and 118. The reader should note, however, that this article is not concerned with establishing the

connects the root ληθ-/λησ- with forgetfulness, specifically the sort of forgetfulness that the Muses bring to careworn mortals:

> τὰς ἐν Πιερίῃ Κρονίδῃ τέκε πατρὶ μιγεῖσα
> Μνημοσύνη, γουνοῖσιν Ἐλευθῆρος μεδέουσα,
> λησμοσύνην τε κακῶν ἄμπαυμά τε μερμηράων.
>
> And Memory, who rules the hills of Eleutherai, bore [the Muses]
> in Pieria, having lain with father Zeus,
> as a forgetting of evils and a rest from cares.
>
> 53-55
>
> αἶψ' ὅ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ τι κηδέων
> μέμνηται·
>
> And immediately he forgets his troubles, nor does he remember
> any of his griefs.
>
> 102-103

The striking juxtaposition of Μνημοσύνη, with λησμοσύνην at the beginning of 54-55 underscores the relationship of these words (or at least Hesiod's perception of this relationship) and supports the conclusion that Hesiod regarded λησ-/ληθ- as the opposite of μνησ-/μνηθ-.[50] This conclusion is further supported by 233-36, where the word ἀληθής is used of the god Nereus. Here again Hesiod carefully etymologizes the word for us: Nereus is ἀληθής because he οὐ λήθεται.[51]

If something 'is not forgotten,' then presumably it is always there, and so something that is 'true' in the sense of ἀληθής is true for all time. I would argue that this kind of truth represents for Hesiod the 'eternal truth' of the cosmos, the sort of knowledge that only gods can have unless they specifically choose to bestow it on a mortal. The word ἔτυμος, on the other hand, seems to be treated by Hesiod as a derivative of εἶναι. As such he uses it to represent 'that which really is' in the sense of 'that which exists.'[52] Hesiod uses the extended form

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true etymology of ἀληθής and ἔτυμος, but with exploring how *Hesiod* chose to etymologize and define them for the specific purposes of his poetry.

[50] Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος
πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα,
οὕνεκα νημερτής τε καὶ ἤπιος, οὐδὲ θεμίστων
λήθεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαια καὶ ἤπια οἶδεν:

233 36

[51] As Ford 1992: 126 notes, Hesiod so closely relates μνημοσύνη to λησμοσύνη "because the poetry of the past must make its audience forget its own present…."

[52] This meaning of ἔτυμα as derived from εἶναι is adopted by Boisacq 1938, Pokorny 1959, vol. 1, 342, Frisk 1960, Chantraine 1968 80, s.v. ἐτεός. Hesiod's usage of ἔτυμος seems to correspond more or less to Homer's, with the difference

of this word (ἐτήτυμα) in line 10 of the *Works and Days* to refer to the decidedly mundane material of that poem, and to oppose it to the concerns of Zeus:

Μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν, ἀοιδῇσι κλείουσαι,
δεῦτε, Δι' ἐννέπετε, σφέτερον πατέρ' ὑμνείουσαι,
ὅν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε
. . . .
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
κλῦθι ἰδὼν αἰών τε, δίκῃ δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας
τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.

Pierian Muses, who bring glory with your songs,
come hither, sing of Zeus, hymning your father,
through whom mortal men are made both unknown and famous
. . . .
High-thundering Zeus, who dwells in loftiest halls.
Give heed, both seeing and hearing, and direct the laws with justice;
you do that; but *I* shall utter ἐτήτυμα to Perses.

Op. 1–3, 8–10

The adversative force of τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ is extremely pronounced, giving line 10 the effect of a priamel: "Zeus, take care of your concerns (since only gods have power over these things), while I, on the other hand, concern myself with the sorts of truths that mortals

being that Hesiod uses the word to refer to things, while Homer tends to use the word in relation to statements. As Levet 1976: 161 63 demonstrates, the six occurrences of this word in Homer support the conclusion that it indicates a 'truthful' statement in the sense that what it says can be proven to be identical to *that which exists*. "La vérité d' ἔτυμος est celle qui résulte d'une identité entre une certaine presentation du réel et la réalité elle même" (162 63). Cf. Pucci 1977: 12, who defines ἔτυμα in Hesiod as 'the things as they are.' In the *Hymn to Demeter* the word ἐτήτυμος occurs twice: the first time of the refusal of anyone "to tell her [Demeter] the facts" (ἐτήτυμα μυθήσασθαι 44), and the second time with reference to the refusal of the birds to be "a true messenger" (ἐτήτυμος ἄγγελος 46) to her of the whereabouts of Persephone. It might seem that in the second instance the Hymn poet is diverging from the Hesiodic/Homeric sense of ἐτήτυμος, since a bird sign would be considered the vehicle for divine rather than human 'truth.' But as Levet 1976, 184 points out, the phrase ἐτήτυμος ἄγγελος in Homer signifies a messenger whose words correspond to *that which is,* in the sense of that which is manifestly, provably, and actually true. Hence it is not the *source* of the bird sign that is being described by the poet with the adjective ἐτήτυμος, but the content of the bird's *message*: the message does not reflect actuality, hence the bird is not an ἐτήτυμος ἄγγελος. In the *Hymn to Apollo* ἐτήτυμος also occurs twice: first of the 'true' praise that the singer promises to render the Delian maidens (176), and then of the 'correct information' requested by the Cretan priests (467). These usages seem to correspond to the Hesiodic/Homeric sense as well, since both refer to actualities of the physical world.

know."[53] It is interesting to note that here Hesiod alters the Homeric formula ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι (*Il.* 6.382, *Od.* 14.125, 17.15, 18.342) to ἐτήτυμα μυθήσασθαι. The deliberate substitution of ἐτήτυμα for the more usual ἀληθέα in *Op.* 10 suggests that Hesiod's usage of ἀληθέα differs from Homer's.[54] From Hesiod's usage of the terms ἀληθής and ἔτυμος it can be seen that, regardless of whatever the real etymologies of these words may be, Hesiod regarded the former as springing from the idea of 'not forgetting' and connected it with the Muses, while the latter he regarded as denoting a specifically earthbound type of reality. If one may identify ἀληθέα with the 'truth' of 'the things that will be and were before' (eternal things), then by a similar step τὰ ἔτυμα can be seen to represent the kind of 'truth' implied in 'the things that are' (mortal things). Understood this way, the two words for 'truth' employed by the Muses to designate the subject matter of their song correspond to the two categories of which they sing: mortal things and immortal things.

The traditional interpretation of the Muses' statement is, 'We know how to tell many lies like the truth, and we know how to speak the truth, whenever we please.' The problem with this translation is that it places too much emphasis on the juxtaposition of truth to falsehood while ignoring the difference between the two words used for 'truth': the mortal, perishable 'realities of the physical world' (ἔτυμα), and the 'unforgettable' and hence 'eternal' truths (ἀληθέα). What the Muses tell Hesiod is not that they know how to tell lies and truth, but that they can sing both of 'lies indistinguishable from physical realities' (which, being mortal and thus subject to constant change and eventual death, are, from the gods' perspective, 'lies'), and of eternal truths (which never change or perish).

If, however, the contrast between falsehood and truth (of whatever sort) be not the most significant aspect of the goddesses' statement, why is it there at all? If the Muses mean merely that they can sing both mortal and immortal truths it would have been far more straightforward of them simply to say, "We know how to speak both

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[53] It is likely that Hesiod in the *Works and Days* is using ἐτήτυμα in the same sense as he uses ἔτυμα in the *Theogony,* since his famous 'correction' of the earlier poem with regard to the genealogy of Eris shows that he wanted his audience to approach the *Works and Days* with the *Theogony* in mind. Cf. Nagler 1992: 88, who also translates ἐτήτυμα as 'earthly truth' and equates it with the Muses' ἐτύμοισιν of line 27.

[54] Cole 1983: 21 remarks that Hesiod's use of ἀληθέα in *Th.* 28 "is certainly not Homeric."

ἔτυμα and ἀληθέα.” Yet if they had done so, the audience would be likely to assume that the Muses were simply saying the same thing twice (as is not uncommon in epic language): “We know how to speak truth and verity.” By causing the Muses to distinguish the one kind of truth from the other, Hesiod forces us to realize that there are, indeed, two kinds of truth being mentioned here. Mortal truths (ἔτυμα) are different from immortal ones (ἀληθέα) in that they are not true for all time, hence they are similar to lies.

Another reason why Hesiod employs the peculiar phrasing of line 27 may be because he wanted to echo *Odyssey* 19.203: ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα. In this scene the disguised Odysseus is lying to Penelope and making his lies more believable by mixing them with ‘actualities.’ In the Hesiodic context, however, the ‘lies indistinguishable from things-that-are’ refer not to distortions of actual events or realities from the human perspective, as in the case of *Od.* 19.203, but to the false-ness and mutability of the mortal world from the gods’ pers-pective. Hesiod thus retains much of the wording of the Homeric passage but alters its meaning by changing its context and focalization. The phrase which in the emphatically human (ἄνδρα, *Od.* 1.1) context of the *Odyssey* means one thing resonates on quite a different level when uttered by Hesiod’s emphatically divine Muses. By changing the focalization of the line in this way, Hesiod underscores the concept of the separation of gods and men that is central to the *Dichterweihe.*

Seen in this light, the Muses’ riddling statement is perfectly in keeping with the rest of the passage that surrounds it. After stress-sing the divinity of the Muses (25), the poet has them address Hesiod as if he represented the whole race of mortals (26). The Muses then apply the contrast that they have just drawn between god and man to the subject of truth, distinguishing between ephemeral mortal ‘reality’ and unchanging immortal ‘truth’ (27–28). In line 29 their divinity is again emphasized, so that the affirmation of Hesiod’s mortality is framed by the two lines asserting the Muses’ immortality. The entire passage is thus shaped and informed by a fundamental duality: the difference between god and man.

Having in this way firmly established the status of the mortal poet and contrasted themselves with him, the Muses proceed to grant Hesiod the power of song so that he may sing ‘eternal things’ and

'hymn the race of blessed gods who exist always.'[55] Although the interpretation of the Muses' riddling statement that I here suggest is indeed subtle, I do not believe that it is over-ingenious, or that its complexity would have posed too great a challenge the mental powers of Hesiod's audience. They were, after all, accustomed to riddles, and as Pratt 1993, 110 observes, it is precisely in the form of a riddle that the Muses address Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe.* Pratt argues that the reason why Hesiod has the Muses speak this riddle about 'lies and truth' is to make a statement about the nature of Hesiod's poetry and the sort of mindset that the audience must have in order to understand it fully:

> The ambiguous epithet [*sc.* ἀρτιέπειαι] suggests a context for understanding the Muses' comment within which both precision and deception are equally appropriate, in other words, an enigmatic context, a context within which words are meaningful if subject to the right interpretation, but also slippery, evasive, difficult to grab hold of.[56]

Although I disagree with Pratt over her interpretation of what 'lies' and 'truth' mean in this passage, she is quite right to emphasize the intentionally cryptic nature of the Muses' comment and the implications that it has for the audience's intended reception of this statement. Hesiod's programmatic statement about the nature of his

[55] The Muses breathe a 'divine voice' into Hesiod, but there is no indication that this removes him from his mortal state in any way. The αὐδὴν θέσπιν represents a 'bridge' between the divine and the mortal realms, the paradoxical linking of the two opposite poles of the universe that, as Ford 1992, 173 astutely observes, is almost inconceivable: "…if *audê* is normally the human voice, *thespis audê,* 'divine human voice,' approaches oxymoron." On the 'divine voice' see also J. S. Clay 1974: 129 36. As Ford 1992: 173 80 shows, the word αὐδή is used in Hesiod and Homer to denote specifically the human voice. The striking enjambment of the adjective θέσπιν to line 32 supports the argument that Hesiod is making an emphatic point about the normal state of separation between the human αὐδή and things that are θέσπις, and how in this one miraculous moment that vast gulf is bridged. Significantly, in the *Hymn to Hermes* the words φωνή (426) and ὄσσα (443) are used to describe the voice of Hermes, never αὐδή. Even Apollo's question at 440 42, which is clearly modeled on *Th.* 29 32, replaces Hesiod's oxymoronic αὐδὴ θέσπις with the less controversial ἀοιδὴ θέσπις. There may be a question in Apollo's mind whether Hermes ought to be numbered among the Olympians or not, but the hymn poet has no doubt whatsoever, and so he uses the appropriate word for the god's voice. Conversely, the 'divine human voice' bestowed by the Muses upon Hesiod gives him the knowledge of the gods that he naturally lacks, and without which he would not be able to sing with authority of the origins of the cosmos, but it is still a *human* voice. The goddesses' emphatic confirmation of Hesiod's human limitations in line 26 is meant to permeate the *Dichterweihe* scene, not to melt away once they inspire Hesiod with divine knowledge.

[56] Pratt 1993: 110.

own poetry is presented to us in the form of a riddle (identified as such by the epithet ἀρτιέπειαι). Moreover, in case we may have missed the riddling nature of the Muses' words, Hesiod closes the *Dichterweihe* scene with yet another riddle, the cryptic and much disputed 'oak and rock' comment of line 35. Whatever the meaning of line 35 may be, the one thing that can be said about it with certainty is that it is intentionally obscure.[57] I would suggest that at least one of its functions is to alert the audience to the riddling nature of the preceding statement of the Muses and thereby cause us to realize that a certain amount of clever interpretation will be required of us if we are to appreciate this poem fully.

In light of the emphasis placed in the *Dichterweihe* on the distance separating man from the gods, it makes a certain amount of sense that the Muses should speak riddlingly to Hesiod. That is how gods are usually represented as speaking to men; the distance between them is commonly portrayed as being too great for un-mediated contact. Hence the need for the priests at Delphi and Dodona, whose hexameter translations of the oracular responses were themselves famously ambiguous. Thus the riddling nature of the Muses' speech to Hesiod is itself symbolic of their distance from him in his state of mortal ignorance prior to his inspiration.

The Muses' enigmatic words in the *Dichterweihe* are not the only place where Hesiod may be using the technique of the riddle to make a statement about his poetics. Hesiod makes an explicit statement of the need for audience interpretation in the *Works and Days,* a poem in which the loosely related genres of riddles (in the form of one-word kennings), myths, gnomai, and an *ainos* play a large role:

> οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει,
> φρασσάμενος τά κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ᾗσιν ἀμείνω·
> ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ καὶ κεῖνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται·
> ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
> ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.
>
> This man is best of all, the one who figures out everything himself,
> considering both what is better at the present time

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[57] The 'oak and rock' comment has long been a matter of controversy. Nagy 1990: 181 99; Hofmann 1971, Schmoll 1994, O'Bryhim 1996, and West, 1966 *ad loc.* who believes (wrongly, I think) that the word περί here must have a spatial rather than a metaphorical meaning. In support of the metaphorical translation 'about, concerning' cf. *Il.* 24.444: per‹ δόρπα πονέοντο and *Od.* 4.624 and 24 and 412: περὶ δεῖπνον ἐνὶ μεγάροισι πένοντο. I follow Nagy 1990: 199 in taking the phrase τίη μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῦν ἢ περὶ πέτρην to mean something like, "Why have I lingered at the beginning of beginnings?"

and what is better at the end;
and he, too, is good, who obeys a man who speaks well.
But he who neither figures things out for himself nor, heeding
another, stores his precepts in his heart, he is useless indeed.
Op. 293-97

While on the level of the poem's story this gnomic statement may be taken as advice to Perses, who, if he cannot figure things out for himself, should at least listen to Hesiod, on the level of the discourse it implies that the ideal audience for the *Works and Days* is one that can 'figure things out for itself,' i.e. solve the riddles posed by the poem. Hesiod thus employs in the *Works and Days* a riddling γνώμη to make a programmatic statement about how his poetry should be received, and this makes it likely that the riddle of the Muses' statement in the *Theogony*'s Proem, which also concerns the nature of Hesiod's poetry, is likewise intended as a sign that the audience will need to interpret the Muses' words carefully, and perhaps even 'cleverly.' I submit that we are expected to figure out, following the clues provided to us by the text, that Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe* represents humankind rather than 'the race of shepherds,' and that the Muses, in bridging the immense gulf that separates god from man, have brought Hesiod knowledge of divine matters, which were otherwise inaccessible to him.[58]

Hesiod may thus be understood to include this idea of the distance sundering god from man in the Proem of the *Theogony* because it has fundamental significance for his understanding of how the cosmos—and the human condition—came to be the way they are. It is surely significant that he chooses to reveal this important theme in that portion of the Proem that concerns his own poetic abilities, the *Dichterweihe.* Yet how can the idea of a divided cosmos be understood to relate to the Hesiod's presentation of his own poetic abilities?

Hesiod connects the 'gulf between man and god' theme to that of his own attainment to poetic ability as part of a narrative strategy to give himself more authority as a singer. By emphasizing the great distance between man and god in the *Dictherweihe,* Hesiod heightens

[58] This juxtaposition of the divine with the human, and the hugeness of the space that comes to be inserted between them, is taken up again in the 'Hymn to Hecate' (411 52), which describes how Hecate can permit men's prayers to be heard by the gods and thus bridge the divine human gulf via sacrifice, and in the Prometheus passage (535 616), which tells of how men came to be separate from the gods and how sacrifice is now the only means of communication between them.

the importance of the remarkable act of communication by which he, as Muse-inspired singer, bridges that divide. The emphasis that Hesiod lays upon the singer's 'connective' role causes the Hesiodic presentation of the ἀοιδός to differ significantly from the depictions of Homeric singers, such as Demodokos and Phemius.

Rather than regard the singer as a tentative bridge between god and man, similar to the 'bridge' of sacrifice that may or may not achieve its goal, Homer stresses the change that is wrought in the ἀοιδός whom the Muse has chosen. Phemius, for example, regards himself as worthy of the respect shown to priests (αἴδεο 22.344, cf. *Il.* 1.23 αἰδεῖσθαι θ' ἱερῆα) because of his singing ability, and Demodokus is θειός (*Od.* 8.43, 47, 87), περίκλυτος (8.83), and even ἥρως (8.483) by virtue of the god's gift.[59] He can summon the Muse's gift of song 'whenever his heart urges him' (8.45), a condition that arises, apparently, after he has had a good meal (8.69-72). In exchange for this marvelous power, however, the Muse has reft from him what is generally considered the most precious of physical capabilities—the power of sight (8.63-64). It is as if the Homeric singer were physically transformed in acquiring the gift of song, incorporating the divine gift into his physical being to such an extent that another physical process must be displaced in order to make room for it.[60]

Homer seems to deny the quasi-divine nature of the bard in *Il.* 2.485-86 and 12.176, but these apparent admissions of human ignorance and inability are in fact narrative devices designed to prove exactly the opposite point. When the Homeric narrator says, "You Muses know, but we know nothing" (2.485-86), and "It would take a godlike person to describe this" (12.176), he is not undermining his own authority but actually making a very puissant statement about the intimacy of his relationship with the Muses. As a normal human being, the bard 'knows nothing.' But *unlike* normal human beings, such as those of us in the audience, Homer can call upon the Muse for information, as he does in 2.484, and expect an immediate and flawlessly accurate answer. Similarly, although Homer protests that it would require godlike ability to describe the scene of fire and battle in *Il.* 12.176, he then demonstrates that he, through his relationship with

[59] For other examples of the 'quasi divinity' of Homeric singers see *Il.* 18.604, *Od.* 4.17, 13.27, 16.252, 17.385, 23.133, 23.143.

[60] For the Homeric singer cf. Schadewaldt 1959: 66 86; Fränkel 1962: 6 27; Maehler 1963: 21 34; Marg 1971; Svenbro 1976: 16 45; Thalmann 1984: 157 84; Poetscher 1986, de Jong 1987a: 44 53, Goldhill 1981: 49 68; Murray 1981; Ford 1992: 90 130; Segal 1992, and Doherty 1995: 69 74.

the Muse, in fact *possesses* that godlike ability by proceeding to describe that very scene (12.177-80). These apparent admissions of failure are thus cleverly manipulated by the Homeric narrator to show that he, as an inspired singer and the intimate associate of the Muse, possesses more than the mortal share of wisdom. Hesiod, however, in a passage that clearly parallels the Homeric ones, does precisely the opposite: stating that to know all the names of the Rivers is difficult for a mortal man, he accordingly refuses to list them (*Th.* 369-70). This statement, taken together with the Muses' insults in 26, suggests that Hesiod saw the singer's role as more 'human' and potentially fallible than Homer did. Yet Hesiod's admission of fallibility has, in the end, precisely the same effect as Homer's: the greater distance that Hesiod interposes between the human bard and the divine Muse paradoxically heightens his authority to sing rather than undercutting it. For the greater the distance between bard and Muse, the greater the act of divine grace by which that distance is bridged.

In contrast to the quasi-divinity of the Homeric ἀοιδός, Hesiod presents us with a singer who is emphatically, and even contemptibly, mortal. By doing so he underscores the impossibility of the kind of union of man with god that the Homeric bard seems to represent. According to Hesiod's view, in the post-Promethean cosmos so close and permanent a union is inconceivable; even the Muses who grant him the power of song imply that they can withhold their gift at will (εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν 28), and the other means of gaining access to the gods that Hesiod mentions, i.e. sacrifice as mediated by Hecate, is similarly subject to divine caprice.[61] Dwelling on the vastness of the gulf separating man from god in the *Dichterweihe,* then, has the effect of greatly augmenting the legitimacy and prestige of the poet Hesiod. The quarrel between Zeus and Prometheus has resulted in a universe so irreversibly divided between the divine and mortal realms that any bridging of this chasm can only be the result of a miracle of astonishing power. The fact that the Muses have granted Hesiod the power to know divine ἀληθέα *despite* his mortal status elevates our perception both of the distance between man and god and the value of the gift that bridges that distance.

In a sense, then, Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe* actually presents himself as a sort of mortal Hecate, upon whose bridging function we are dependent for knowledge of the divine realm even as fishermen, herdsmen, et al. depend upon the mediation of Hecate for the

[61] Cf. *Th.* 411 52. For the 'willfulness' of Hecate see J. S. Clay 1984.

fulfillment of their prayers. Homeric singers seem to claim union with the god, but in Hesiod's conception of the universe such union is impossible. By dwelling, then, on the singer's ability to manifest divine truth through the gift of song and denying, in effect, the Homeric conception of the quasi-divine ἀοιδός, Hesiod secures greater legitimacy for his own narrative voice.

It is interesting to note in passing that this concern for establishing the legitimacy of the authorial voice occurs also in the *Hymn to Hermes,* despite the fact that the singer, the baby Hermes, is himself a god. Indeed, it is just this question of 'legitimacy' that Hermes seeks to answer by singing his theogony (425-35), which is clearly modeled on Hesiod's poem.[62] The legitimacy that he seeks to establish for himself, however, is not that which merely allows him to sing with authority of the Olympian gods, but to claim his place among them.[63] It is perhaps no coincidence that, following the Hesiodic model, Apollo's first words to Hermes are at least mildly (albeit quite justifiably) insulting: Βουφόνε μηχανιῶτα (436), and his chief concern is to find out from Hermes whether he was born with his θέσπιν ἀοιδήν, or whether one of the gods gave it to him (442), i.e. to learn whence comes his *authority to sing.* What Apollo is really asking here is if Hermes is a god (and hence has his wonderful voice ἐκ γενετῆς 440) or if he is a mortal, to whom such a voice could only come as a divine gift.

Thus the question of legitimacy to sing as it appears in Hesiod is evoked and modified in *Hermes* to reflect the other kind of legitimacy that the young god seeks for himself. As we the audience know, Hermes does indeed have his gift 'from his birth,' and has not needed another god to grant it to him. In this he differs dramatically from the mortal Hesiod, whose only authority comes from the Muses.

If the gulf between divine and mortal existence and the two kinds of 'truth' that define them be in fact of such central importance to the *Theogony,* why is it that Hesiod presents this idea in the form of a riddle? If one accept that the point of the Muses' directly-quoted words is to contrast gods and divine truth with men and mortal reality, it becomes clear that they could have spoken in no other way. So great

[62] Hermes sings of the allotment of divine prerogatives (428; cf. *Th.* 74); he sings of Mnemosyne first (429; cf. *Th.* 1); by his singing he "gives γέρας to" the gods (ἐγέραιρεν ἀοιδῇ 429; cf. *Th.* 44: κλείουσιν ἀοιδῇ); and he makes a point of singing in chronological order (431; cf. *Th.* 115).

[63] Clay 1989: 100 151 explores the theme of Hermes' quest for Olympian τιμαί as the central issue of the hymn.

is the division between man and god, in Hesiod's view, that all information passing over this gulf must be interpreted or otherwise mediated before its meaning can be perceived by the intended audience. Men must accompany their prayers with sacrifices and invoke the mediating goddess, Hecate, in order to make contact with the divine realm; and gods, in their turn, speak darkly to men.

Divine truth is so different from mortal reality that the only way it can be expressed to a human being is through interpretive media, such as riddles, omens, and bird signs. Hence the need for the priests at Delphi who interpret the Pythia's words, as well as for prophets and οἰωνοπόλοι, who also clarify the god's will. Insistence on the 'gulf' idea requires that the abyss separating man from god be not easily traversable, even by words. Thus when the Muses speak to the mortal Hesiod on the very subject of the division between man and god (26-28), they do so in riddling wise, even as Loxias does at Delphi and Zeus at Dodona. We the audience are left to play the role of the interpreter and figure out both what the passage means and what relationship it may have to the rest of the work. The purpose of the *Dichterweihe* is thus not only to show that Hesiod is a poet favored by the Muses, but to express Hesiod's view of the relationship of gods to men, and to indicate that this relationship has programmatic significance for the rest of the *Theogony*.

The complexity of the poem's subject matter—which superficially concerns the birth of the cosmos, and on a deeper level, the distance between men and gods, set forth in the *Dichterweihe* scene—is matched by the narratological complexity of this part of the Proem. In this section the primary external narrator-focalizer suddenly makes himself a character in his own story, briefly becoming a primary *internal* narrator-focalizer. As such he then proceeds to embed the character-text (and the focalization it contains) of the Muses, causing them to become internal secondary narrator-focalizers. For the brief space of lines 22–34, Hesiod has the double narrative identity of primary internal narrator-focalizer (the teller of the story) and secondary internal narratee-focalizee (the character who is addressed by the Muses).[64] We the audience are thus receiving

[64] Needless to say, nothing of this sort occurs in Homeric epic. Given the unobtrusive nature of the implied author of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it would be unthinkable for the primary narrator of these works to enter into his texts and be addressed by Achilles or Odysseus. Homer's invocations of the Muse are quite different from this, for they refer to his role in the *performance* of the epic without

Hesiod the poet's narration of the Muses' focalization of Hesiod the character, leaving us vaguely confused about who is actually telling us this story.

The poet seems to be aware of the narratological complexity of this scene, for he abruptly breaks it off with the puzzling statement, ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῦν ἤ περὶ πέτρην; Τύνη, Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα. . .(35-36). With this mysterious 'oak and rock' comment, which must mean something like, "Why am I beating around the bush?" the primary narrator-focalizer removes himself from the unusual situation of being simultaneously both primary focalizer and secondary focalizee, narrator and narratee, external and internal to the plot, and returns to being the primary external narrator-focalizer, as is traditional for the epic narrator.[65]

Hesiod's short-lived placement of himself into the story, and his sudden breaking of that narrative strand to return to his original role, is rather jarring to the audience. It is designed to force us to think about the narrator and what his narrative standpoint is. If a narrator begin as an external narrator and remain one throughout his story, as Homer does, the reader does not have to think about who it is that is telling the story. Likewise, if a narrator begin and end as an internal narrator, as is the case with Huckleberry Finn, the reader is confident that he knows who is narrating, and can therefore concentrate on the story being told. Hesiod, on the other hand, uses his 'oak and rock' comment to disrupt deliberately and violently the activity of the current (internal) narrator and abruptly reestablishes his role as the external narrator with no regard to the maintenance of a seamless narrative continuity. In so doing he causes confusion in the audience regarding the narrator's identity and situation, and so draws attention to his role once again. Once again the attention is shifted onto the poet as he creates his poem and away from his patron goddesses.

A final oddity about this break in the narrative flow is how to understand the second person reference τύνη and the first person

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implying that he also has a role in *story itself.* Hesiod's innovation lies in the intersection that he has made between the two roles of storyteller and character.

[65] Translation suggested to me by J. S. Clay. The riddling 'oak and rock' comment has long been a matter of controversy. See Nagy 1990 esp. 181 99; Hofmann 1971: 90 97; Schmoll 1994: 46 52; O'Bryhim 1996: 131 38; and West 1966 *ad loc,* who provides an helpful overview of the different interpretations that have been made of this phrase. West believes (wrongly, I think) that the word περί here must have a spatial rather than a metaphorical meaning. In support of the metaphorical translation 'about, concerning' cf. *Il.* 24.444: περὶ δόρπα πονέοντο and *Od.* 4.624 and 24 & 412: περὶ δεῖπνον ἐνὶ μεγάροισι πένοντο.

plural ἀρχώμεθα in line 36. These words are spoken by the primary *external* narrator-focalizer, who has been speaking since his interruption of his primary *internal* counterpart in line 35. West notes *ad loc.* that the word τύνη often carries a "peremptory or contemptuous tone," but does not seem to find it remarkable that the narrator should address himself in this fashion. The use of the second person pronoun is significant in light of the fact that the narrative has just shifted from an external Hesiod to an internal one, and then back again to the external Hesiod. In a sense, there are two 'Hesiods' on stage at the moment, and the one is calling to the other to join him (ἀρχώμεθα) in starting the poem anew.

It is interesting to note that the "peremptory or contemptuous tone" in which Hesiod addresses himself is reminiscent of the tone of the Muses' address to him. The Muses, too, speak to Hesiod in a scornful and imperious way, and they, too, treat him as if he were a plural entity. In thus addressing himself and using the first person plural in 'let us begin from the Muses,' Hesiod recalls the salient features of the programmatic *Dichterweihe* before moving on to the rest of his poem and makes certain that the audience's attention is firmly focused on himself and his role as narrator. This self-conscious emphasis on the narrator's role in the *Theogony* is in direct contrast with what de Jong identifies as the careful attempts of Homer to conceal his narrative presence in the *Iliad.* Whether Hesiod was actively striving to create a different kind of epic narrator from Homer's is impossible to say, but his continual efforts to draw attention to his role as narrator distance him from Homer in this respect.

Hesiod seems to show an awareness of the difference between Homer's perception of the narrator's role and his own in his comment about the rivers. In lines 337-64 Hesiod names twenty-six rivers and forty-one of the nymphs who dwell in them and sums up his lengthy enumeration with an admission of imperfect knowledge:

> τρὶς γὰρ χίλιαί εἰσι τανίσφυροι Ὠκεανῖναι,...
> ......
> τόσσοι δ' αὖθ' ἕτεροι ποταμοὶ καναχηδὰ ῥέοντες,
> υἱέες Ὠκεανοῦ, τοὺς γείνατο πότνια Τηθύς·
> τῶν ὄνομ' ἀργαλέον πάντων βροτὸν ἄνδρα ἐνισπεῖν,
> οἳ δὲ ἕκαστα ἴσασιν, ὅσοι ἂν περιναιετάουσι.

> For there are three thousand slender-ankled Oceanids...
> ......
> and just as many other noisy-flowing rivers,
> sons of Oceanus, whom queenly Tethys bore.

> It is difficult for a mortal man to recite the names of all these,
> but those who dwell around them know the names of each one.
> 364, 367-70

To remind his audience that their narrator is a human being, rather than an infallible voice that recites lists of names, the poet has him interject this comment pointing to his own human shortcomings. The comment is strikingly similar to one in Book 12 of the *Iliad*:

> Ἄλλοι δ' ἀμφ' ἄλλῃσι μάχην ἐμάχοντο πύλῃσιν·
> ἀργαλέον δέ με ταῦτα θεὸν ὣς πάντ' ἀγορεῦσαι·
> πάντῃ γὰρ περὶ τεῖχος ὀρώρει θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ
> λάϊνον: . . . .
>
> And men were fighting, some at some gates, others at others:
> But it is difficult for me to tell all these things like a god:
> For around the whole wall there rose the godlike, destructive fire. .
> *Il.* 12. 175-78

Homer then proceeds to describe the fight. In discussing this passage, Richardson attributes Homer's comment to the poet's desire to remind the audience that "he is incapable of narrating except through divine aid."[66] Because Homer is the mouthpiece for the Muses, Richardson contends, he can speak of things about which a normal human being does not have access.

Hesiod's statement about the rivers appears to be quite similar to Homer's, even sharing with it the pivotal adjective ἀργαλέον, but in fact the Hesiodic narrator is making precisely the opposite point. Homer says, "it is difficult for a mere mortal to speak of these things," and then goes on to show that he *is* able to do it, presumably because he has the Muse's help. Hesiod, on the other hand, refuses to speak further on a subject of which he has imperfect knowledge. Being merely (and emphatically, as we found in the Proem) a mortal man, Hesiod is not able to name all three thousand rivers. Moreover, he fails to claim divine assistance that would give him access to this privileged information. Instead, he refers the audience not to the Muses but to *other humans* if they want to discover the names of the omitted rivers. In short, Homer draws attention to his human weakness in order to show that he benefits from divine aid, while Hesiod does so in order to show that he does not benefit from it.

The similarity of the wording and context of the Hesiodic and Homeric statements, which is too strong to be coincidental, suggests that Hesiod may be 'correcting' Homer's view of the nature of the

[66] Richardson 1990: 181.

relationship between poet and Muse. As was evident in the Muses' speech in the Proem, Hesiod regards the gods as immeasurably higher than mortals. While the mortal poet may be sanctioned or legitimized by the Muses, he does not have so close a rapport with them that he can call upon them at will for specific details.[67] It is likely that Hesiod included his statement about his inability to name all the rivers for the purpose of responding to Homer. Hesiod could have easily omitted to mention that there were three thousand rivers, or, even if he mentioned it, he could simply have left it at that and gone on to the next subject—as he in fact did with the river nymphs a few lines earlier. Instead, he goes out of his way to make a comment that serves to underscore the distance between human and divine knowledge, and the fact that even a poet sanctified to his calling by the Muses is unable to transcend this immutable boundary.

Hesiod's comment about the rivers is one example of how the message of the fundamental difference between gods and men, first expressed programmatically in the Muses' direct statement in the Proem, recurs throughout the *Theogony.* Not only does this gap between the mortal and the divine recur several times in the poem (most notably in the Prometheus and Hecate sections), it also forms the basis of Hesiod's view of the distant relationship between poet and Muse. Since humans are immeasurably distant from the gods, the mortal narrator of the *Theogony* cannot simply be considered a 'mouthpiece' for the Muses or the medium through which their songs are transmitted. In Homer's case, as de Jong argues, there is no strict dividing line between the primary narrator-focalizer and the Muse,[68] but for Hesiod the very opposite is true. One of the main points of Hesiod's epiphany scene is to show that the Muses do *not* 'sing through' the narrator, who is, after all, ἄγραυλος, κακὸν ἔλεγχος, and γαστὴρ οἶον, but that they have endowed him with the inspiration to sing his own words. The Hesiodic narrator's independence and separation from the Muses is demonstrated by his requesting a different song from those that the Muses usually sing and by his inability to call upon them for help in naming the rivers. Just as Homer sets himself on the level of his god-assisted heroes by

[67] There are two more Muse invocations in the *Theogony* (965 66 and 1021 22), but neither one asks for specific details or names. In this respect the Hesiodic invocations are quite different from Homer's invocation of the Muse before giving the Catalogue of Ships in Book 2 of the *Iliad.* Hesiod uses these last two invocations (which are very similar) as a general means of introducing new subject matter.

[68] de Jong 1987a: 50 52.

claiming the help of the Muse, Hesiod reminds us that his own narrative remains a human one in the *Theogony* by showing that he receives nothing more than legitimacy from his Muses.[69]

[69] This legitimacy consists of the 'persuasive voice' granted to Hesiod by the Muses and the particular ways in which he is to use it. See my treatment of the 'Kings and Singers' passage in Chap. 6.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHARACTER-TEXT, ATTRIBUTIVE DISCOURSE, AND EMBEDDED FOCALIZATION

Character-Text in the Prometheus Passage

Of the four instances of directly-represented character-text, or direct speech, in the *Theogony,* Hesiod devotes the two most prominent to this question of the relationship of humankind to the gods. The first is, as we have seen, the *Dichterweihe* scene and the speech of the Muses that it contains. This scene, highlighted in importance because of its placement in the Proem, however, refers to the lowly condition of mankind as an established fact without explaining how it came to be. It is in the second passage of prominent character-text, the Prometheus passage, where we learn of the reasons behind mankind's relegation to a status inferior to that of the gods.

The use of dialogue to mark a scene of a cosmic 'division' in the *Theogony* is not restricted to the Prometheus passage. The other two passages of dialogue in this poem also concern separations of crucial importance to the formation of the cosmic order: the exchange between Gaia and Kronos (164-72) and that between Zeus and the Hundred-handers (644-63). The division that results from the Gaia/Kronos dialogue is no less than that of earth from heaven, a step necessary for the further differentiation of the universe. The scene with Zeus and the Hundred-handers concerns (albeit indirectly) the great split between the Olympian gods and the Titans, another division of crucial importance for the universe. Thus the three main divisions that take place in Hesiod's *Theogony* are all marked by directly represented character-text in dialogue form: the separation of gods from men (Muses/Hesiod 26–28; Zeus/Prometheus 541–49), of heaven from earth (Gaia/ Kronos 164–72), and Olympians from Titans (Zeus/Hundred-handers 644–63). Homer, it will be recalled, uses directly represented character-text for nearly half the *Iliad*: Hesiod's avoidance of direct speech contrasts markedly with Homer's practice. Therefore it is all the more striking that Hesiod uses dialogue in those passages where major cosmic divisions take place.

To return to the Prometheus passage, Vernant offers a thorough analysis of the Prometheus narrative in the *Theogony,* which can be briefly summarized. Vernant interprets the story of the first sacrifice

as the means by which Hesiod explains how humankind fell away from a previous state of virtual equality with the gods and became subject to all the ills of the human condition:

> What is at issue in the conflict pitting the Titan's craftiness against the Olympian's faultless intelligence is, in the final issue, the mode of existence characterizing humanity. Sacrificial practice is presented as the first result and most direct expression of the distance created between men and gods on the day that Prometheus started his road to rebellion. The myth connects the ritual of sacrifice to primordial events that have made men what they are, mortal creatures living on earth in the midst of countless ills, and accompanied by female spouses. In other words, men have become a race of beings completely separated from those to whom at the outset they were very close—the Blessed Immortals, residing in heaven and fed on ambrosia, toward whom now rises the smoke of sacrificial offerings.[1]

The Prometheus section reflects and expands upon the *Dichterweihe* scene in several ways. First, it accounts for the opening of the great gulf between god and man upon which the Muses insist so strongly in their speech. Second, the Prometheus story also draws the connection between man's enslavement to the γαστήρ and his separation from the gods. As Vernant observes: "by eating the edible pieces men, even as they reinvigorate their failing strength, recognize the inferiority of their mortal condition and confirm their complete submission to the Olympians. . . ."[2] The story of Prometheus' attempt to get a better share of food for mortals thus explains why the Muses scornfully equate human beings with stomachs, and the ensuing rivalry between Prometheus and Zeus provides insight into the reason for their contemptuous tone of voice on first addressing Hesiod.

The third way in which the Prometheus passage recalls the *Dichterweihe* scene is in its use of character-text as the mode of expressing the separation of man from god. The character-text of the Prometheus scene is even more prominent than that of the Proem, being both longer than the Muses' speech and presented in dialogue form, rather than as an unanswered statement. The very form of a dramatic dialogue between two characters, especially when it suddenly interrupts a long sequence of simple narrator-text, is intrinsically appropriate for describing a division. The one voice of the primary narrator-focalizer is split into the two voices and two focalizations of the secondary narrator-focalizers Zeus and

1 Vernant 1989: 24.
2 Vernant 1989: 25.

Prometheus, just as the once cohesive group of gods and men splits into its two—suddenly very different—components. Thus the choice of dialogue as the medium through which the division is communicated itself literally reflects that division.

In addition to the dialogue format, whose two-sided nature lends itself to scenes of division, Hesiod uses the very words spoken by Zeus and Prometheus in this scene as a means of illustrating the schism between gods and men as it is taking place. After Prometheus sets out the unequal portions of meat, Zeus addresses him with heavy irony:

> δὴ τότε μιν προσέειπε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε·
> "Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων,
> ὦ πέπον, ὡς ἑτεροζήλως διεδάσσαο μοίρας."
>
> Then the father of gods and men addressed him:
> "Son of Iapetus, most renowned of all the lords,
> my dear fellow, in what a biased way you have divided the portions."
>
> 542-44

Prometheus' mocking reply mirrors the semantic form of Zeus' statement almost exactly:

> "Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων,
> τῶν δ' ἕλευ ὁπποτέρην σε ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἀνώγει."
>
> "Zeus most glorious and greatest of the ever-living gods,
> choose whichever of them the heart in your breast desires."
>
> 548-49

Imitating the grammatical structure of Zeus' comment, Prometheus opens his address with an epithet composed of a superlative and a partitive genitive, and ends with a statement about the portions. By making the two sides of this brief dialogue almost formally identical, Hesiod emphasizes their antagonistic character.

The nature of the 'trick' played by Prometheus against Zeus in this scene has long been a matter of debate. What Prometheus has done is to set unequal portions before Zeus. This action itself begins the process of separation of gods and men, as before, presumably, gods and men had feasted together on an equal footing. By making one of the portions appear more honorable than the other, Prometheus introduces a hitherto unknown hierarchy into the communal feast: the rules of the Homeric δαῖς. According to these rules,

> …the *dais eise* involves two distinct kinds of apportionment: the first is a division into strictly equal parts (*moirai*) that affirms the communal bonds and mutual obligations of *philia* for all those admitted to

> participate in it; the second constitutes the portion of honor, the *geras,* assigned in recognition of particular excellence or esteem.[3]

In her discussion of the Prometheus scene, Clay argues that Prometheus "inverts the proper hierarchy of gods and men" by apportioning to men the edible, and hence more honorable, portions of the ox. In so doing, he challenges Zeus' supremacy by usurping his role as distributor of τιμαί. Zeus, who is aware of the difference between the two share set before him, then goads Prometheus into making his fateful invitation that Zeus choose whichever portion he may desire.[4] Zeus then, she concludes, in his anger at the insulting challenge that has been offered him, chooses the wrong μοῖρα on purpose. He is only too happy to give Prometheus enough of the proverbial rope with which to hang himself. Having goaded Prometheus into offering him a choice, Zeus selects the wrong portion in order so that he may visit punishment upon men, whom Prometheus has dared to honor more highly than Zeus.

Both Clay and West believe that the less desirable-looking portion containing the good meat is that which is first set before Zeus, and that it is this share's unappetizing appearance that causes Zeus to complain of the partiality of the division. Prometheus "has stealthily attempted to allot the better portion to human beings by making it appear inferior."[5] In fact, however, it does not matter which portion is placed before Zeus, or which one he chooses. Prometheus' trick is much more clever than is generally recognized; its beauty lies in the fact that Zeus cannot choose either portion without losing face.

Prometheus knows that Zeus must abide by the rules of the δαίς, by which the most honorable portion of meat is awarded to whoever has the greatest τιμή. He sets the portions before Zeus even though Zeus (who cannot be fooled, as the narrator assures us) knows that the more desirable-looking, fat-covered portion is actually the less

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3 J. S. Clay 2003: Chap. 4.

4 Clay thus rejects the argument of West (1966 ad loc. and 1961: 137 38) that Zeus is fooled by Prometheus into taking the wrong portion, despite Hesiod's repeated assurances to the contrary (550 51 and 613). West maintains, however, that in lines 550 51 Hesiod is simply attempting to make Zeus look better, and that the poet does not or will not realize that the statement in 551 52 contradicts what happens in the plot. F. Solmsen 1949: 49, agrees with West on this point.

5 Clay 2003: Chap. 4. Concern over which portion was first set before Zeus led West 1966 to emend the text from the MSS' τῷ μέν...τῷ δ'αυτ' in reference to the two portions to τῷ μέν 538, referring to the less desirable looking portion as set before Zeus, and τοῖς 540, referring to the more desirable looking portion as set before men. See Clay's discussion of this emendation *ibid.*

desirable one, and even though Prometheus himself is aware that Zeus knows this. Why, then, does Zeus choose it and thus play into his antagonist's hands? Zeus has no choice but to claim the more desirable-seeming of the two portions, for, as the ruler of the gods, his τιμή is greatest. If he had chosen the μοῖρα of meat that appeared to be less desirable (even though he knew it contained the better meat), his action would have been tantamount to denying his supreme status—which is precisely what the crafty Prometheus, a potential successor Zeus, wishes him to do. Thus Zeus must lose either way: if he chooses the portion that appears to be worse, he seems to admit that his honor is less than that of Prometheus/mankind; and if he chooses the portion that only appears to be better, he looks as if he has been fooled by Prometheus/mankind. Thus he chooses the latter course and plots revenge for the insult.[6] It is in this vindictive state of mind that Zeus makes his sarcastic address to his newfound enemy.

Keenly aware of the affront implicit in the two portions of meat before him, Zeus subtly insults Prometheus in his address to him. The grandiloquent sound and prominent placement of the epithet Ἰαπετιονίδη underscores the Titan's obscure family connections, as nothing is known about Iapetus except for his parentage and the ill fates of his sons. Hence the resounding, multi-syllabic patronymic at the beginning of the line can be taken as a sarcastic commentary on Prometheus' status even while it seems to be praising him. Zeus' next 'compliment' to Prometheus, πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων, is similarly ironic and ambiguous in nature. Zeus is either calling him 'most glorious of all the gods,' which is a ridiculously hyperbolic and hence ironic statement, or else 'most glorious of all the mortal kings,' which is an insult. The word ἄναξ means 'ruler', and can be used of the gods, but it is also often used of human kings. In Homer, for instance, ἄναξ is used of a god only 42 times, almost always as part of a larger epithet, while it is used of mortal kings over 120 times.[7]

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[6] Zeus' ultimate revenge, it is worthwhile to note, contains the same element of ineluctability as Prometheus' sacrifice trick. Just as Zeus could not choose one of the portions of meat without losing some of his status, his revenge, the Woman, is also an inescapable liability for men. Hesiod tells us that the man who refuses to take a wife fares as badly as, if not worse than, the man who marries (602 607). Men, who are constantly linked with their champion, Prometheus, in this section, are the victims of the same kind of unsavory choice as that which Prometheus offers to Zeus. Just as Zeus had no real choice between the two portions, so man has no choice in taking a wife. In this way Hesiod shows us that Zeus is the Titan's match in wits.

[7] Cf. West 1966 *ad* 543. In addition to the occurrence in line 543, Hesiod uses ἄναξ to refer to gods 8 times in the *Theogony* (347, 486, 493, 543, 660, 843, 859,

The plural of ἄναξ is never used in Homer or elsewhere in Hesiod to mean 'gods'; the closest Homer comes is *Od.* 12.290, where we find the odd phrase θεῶν ἀέκητι ἀνάκτων. Homer, who routinely uses the plural to indicate human kings, feels compelled to add the word θεῶν here in order to clarify that he means gods. Hence in calling Prometheus πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων, Zeus takes advantage of the ambiguity of the word ἄναξ, especially in the plural. Since there is no word present in Zeus' statement to specify that the 'rulers' among whom Prometheus is chief are mortal or immortal, it is possible that Zeus is once again giving his rival a false compliment, implying that Prometheus is on a level only slightly higher than that of a human king. This ironic 'compliment' carries with it the sting of faint praise, for it implies that Zeus can find nothing better to say of Prometheus than that he is chief among the pitiful human creatures that he has befriended. Once again Zeus is belittling the status of the impudent Titan who seeks to challenge the authority of the king of the gods. It can hardly be coincidental that Zeus' insult, which is transparently disguised as a compliment exactly corresponds to Prometheus' offer of a dishonorable portion inadequately disguised as an honorable one.

Prometheus acknowledges Zeus' subtle dig with a smile (ἐπιμειδήσας 547), and responds with equal irony. In answer to Zeus' sneer at the Titans' lack of divine prestige, Prometheus addresses Zeus as κύδιστε μέγιστε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων, as if to say, "You call yourself the greatest and most glorious of the gods, but you cannot choose one of these portions of meat without losing some of your prestige." Prometheus knows that he has put Zeus into a position where his supremacy can be challenged, and so his ostensibly flattering reference to that supremacy is in reality a sarcastic jeer.

Thus not only the 'sacrifice trick' itself, but even the words that are exchanged between Zeus and Prometheus on that occasion reveal the existence of a new division between gods and men. Zeus refers to his rival with ambiguous terms, implying that Prometheus, in his eyes

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932, 985), and uses the verb ἀνάσσω twice, also of gods (491 and 837). The one occasion on which he uses the word of a mortal occurs in line 985, where he refers to Emathion, the son of Eos and Tithonos, as ἄναξ. The relative scarcity of human ἄνακτες in this poem does not prove, however, that Hesiod equates the word ἄναξ with 'god,' merely that he has more occasion to speak openly of gods than of men in the *Theogony,* which, indeed, is no surprise. At any rate it would seem that Hesiod uses the word in a slightly different sense from Homer: West 1999, 15 observes that in the *Iliad* the word ἄναξ "occurs in the plural only of horses' 'masters', whereas chieftains in a group are always *basilees.*"

a nonentity among the gods, is at best the chief among the humans, and by no means a match for Zeus.[8] Prometheus responds with mock humility, acknowledging Zeus' position as the most powerful among the gods even as he seeks to topple him from that position. Prometheus places Zeus in the camp of the gods, while Zeus places Prometheus in the camp of the humans, and the schism caused by their bitter rivalry will be reflected in the relationship between gods and men for the rest of time. From this point on, gods will always be alert to detect and punish human hubris, while generations of humans will vainly try to usurp privileges reserved for the gods.

The antagonism between Zeus and Prometheus, which Hesiod describes as a conflict between the divine and the mortal interests, reflects and is the ultimate source of the antagonism evident in the Muses' address to Hesiod in the Proem. It is unclear why Prometheus has leagued himself with mankind, but his 'sacrifice trick' (which assures that men will retain the edible portions of meat when sacrificing to the gods) and his theft of fire make it clear that, though a god himself, he is acting on behalf of mankind. Certainly Zeus understands him as such, for he first sends the woman, the incarnation of the human enslavement to the belly, as punishment for Prometheus' crimes.

Taken together, the *Dichterweihe* scene and the Prometheus passage both address the subject of man's inescapable inferiority to the gods. True, one may argue that in the *Dichterweihe* Hesiod the mortal is elevated to a higher status when the Muses breath the 'divine voice' into him, and that Hesiod is therefore telling us that poets can transcend some human limitations. This is certainly true to some extent, [9] as Hesiod implies that, due to their connection with the

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[8] J. S. Clay 2003: Chap. 4 makes the interesting suggestion that Prometheus has leagued himself with mankind in order to challenge Zeus, just as Zeus has formed valuable military/political alliances with the Hundred handers and Cyclopes. He is thus not at all a 'champion' of mankind in Hesiod, but a meddling opportunist who has brought ruin upon the unhappy human race in his hubristic lust for power.

[9] The distance is not, however, impossible for humans to bridge on certain occasions. J. S. Clay 1984: 27 38 offers an interpretation of the historically misunderstood Hecate passage (411 52). Instead of following the traditional argument, espoused by West 1966: 278, that Hesiod wrote the 'Hymn to Hecate' because of his ardent personal devotion to this goddess, Clay makes the point that the function of Hecate in the *Theogony* stems from Hesiod's etymologizing of her name as the goddess "by whose will ἕκητι prayers are fulfilled" 1984: 35. Thus whereas the Prometheus story explains why humans are so far beneath the gods, the Hecate passage tells how men can (at least temporarily) close up the gulf by prayer and sacrifice. The very act of sacrifice, however, which also resulted from the

Muses, poets are privileged above normal human beings, but the main emphasis of both the *Dichterweihe* and the Prometheus passage remains on the wretched lowliness of humanity as compared to the gods. Poets may be higher up on the scale than non-poets, but the distance separating them from the divine remains immense.

Other Character-Text in the 'Theogony'

As we have seen, the *Dichterweihe* and Prometheus passages use directly represented character-text to emphasize the concept of division—in both these cases, the division of men from gods. Unlike the Prometheus scene, the scene with the Muses does not utilize the agonistic format of the dialogue to illustrate this separation, but it is nevertheless a scene in which character-text is used to indicate distance between speaker and addressee. Indeed, the fact that 'Hesiod' the character does not respond to the Muses' taunting words can itself be taken as a response, one that indicates humble acquiescence. I would argue, therefore, that even the speech of the Muses to Hesiod is a dialogue, despite the fact that Hesiod does not speak, to the extent that any speech from one character to another indicates a situation in which duality is highlighted and the presence of an 'other' is necessary. The 'other' may agree or disagree, and may or may not voice his opinion, but the very fact of his being addressed establishes an environment in which, instead of the single viewpoint of the primary narrator-focalizer, two different focalizations exist.

The next passage of direct speech that I shall discuss occurs earlier in the poem, again at a 'division' on the cosmic scale: the separation of Gaia from Ouranos, earth from heaven. The conflict in the Gaia/ Kronos dialogue is expressed differently from that between the Muses and Hesiod and that between Zeus and Prometheus. Instead of using the dialogue format to pit one side against the other, in the Gaia—Kronos scene the dialogue is between Gaia and her son Kronos as they plot against the hubristic Ouranos.

> "παῖδες ἐμοὶ καὶ πατρὸς ἀτασθάλου, αἴ κ' ἐθέλητε

Zeus/Prometheus conflict, reinforces man's inferiority to the gods. The meal of flesh that follows a sacrifice reminds man of his inescapable link to eating and death, and that the gods have no part in either (Vernant 1989: 35). Just as the Muses do not bestow the 'divine voice' on Hesiod without first reminding him of his inferior status, humans are not permitted access to the gods through prayer unless they perform the ritual that reinforces their awareness of their inferior mortal status.

πείθεσθαι· πατρός κε κακὴν τεισαίμεθα λώβην
ὑμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μήσατο ἔργα."

"Children of mine and of a reckless father, if you wish
to obey [me], let us pay back the evil deed of your father;
for he was the first to plot shameful deeds."

164-66

Although the division between earth and heaven is not literally played out before us with a duel of words, Hesiod makes the agonistic element clear in every line of Gaia's address to Kronos. The three lines of Gaia's speech contain within themselves a division which roughly corresponds to the beginning and end of each line: line 164 contrasts 'my children' with 'a reckless father'; line 165, begins with the concept of obedience to Gaia and ends with that of paying back Ouranos, and 166 contains the contrastive element 'πρότερος' in the accusation that Ouranos was the first to act unjustly. The idea in this last line is that Ouranos has committed crimes whereas Gaia did *not,* hence a strong contrast is implied. Although there is no definite dividing line between the two ideas present in each verse, they are all informed by a strong feeling of polarity, as Gaia opposes her own interests to those of Ouranos in an effort to gain her children's support.

The response of Kronos echoes the bipartite structure of speech of Gaia:

"μῆτερ, ἐγώ κεν τοῦτό γ' ὑποσχόμενος τελέσαιμι
ἔργον, ἐπεὶ πατρός γε δυσωνύμου οὐκ ἀλεγίζω
ἡμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μήσατο ἔργα."

"Mother, I will undertake to accomplish this deed, since I do not respect our ill-named *father:* for he was the first to plot shameful deeds."

170-72

Line 170 contains the contrastive idea of obeying the mother by promising to wreak vengeance on the father; line 171 contrasts the respect that he does not have for his father with the respect that he implicitly *does* have for his mother; and 172 repeats Gaia's last statement word for word. In this way Hesiod uses the speeches themselves to reflect literally the division between Gaia and Ouranos, once again utilizing the inherently agonistic nature of dialogue to highlight an important division in the cosmos.

The dialogue in the Hundred-handers scene is the longest passage of direct speech in the poem, containing a 10-line speech of Zeus (644-53) and a 9-line response from Kottos (655-63). It is similar to

the exchange between Gaia and Kronos in that it portrays a beleaguered god requesting aid from other divinities for the purpose of effecting or finalizing a separation of vital importance to cosmic development:

> “κέκλυτέ μευ, Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
> ὄφρ’ εἴπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει.
> ἤδη γὰρ μάλα δηρὸν ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισι
> νίκης καὶ κάρτευς πέρι μαρνάμεθ’ ἤματα πάντα
> Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐκγενόμεσθα.
> ὑμεῖς δὲ μεγάλην τε βίην καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους
> φαίνετε Τιτήνεσσιν ἐναντίον ἐν δαΐ λυγρῇ,
> μνησάμενοι φιλότητος ἐνηέος, ὅσσα παθόντες
> ἐς φάος ἂψ ἀφίκεσθε δυσηλεγέος ὑπὸ δεσμοῦ
> ἡμετέρας διὰ βουλὰς ὑπὸ ζόφου ἠερόεντος.”

> “Listen to me, glorious children of Ouranos and Gaia,
> so that I may say the things that the heart in my breast commands me.
> Indeed, for a very long time we have fought against each other
> over victory and power continuously,
> the Titan gods and we who were born of Kronos.
> But show forth your great force and irresistible hands
> against the Titans in the grievous battle,
> remembering our kind friendship, and how many things you suffered
> before you came back into the light from painful bondage
> and from gloomy darkness, by our plans.”
>
> 644-53

The cosmic division that occurs in this scene is stated in line 648, “The Titan gods and we who were born of Kronos,” where once again we see Hesiod emphasizing the separation of the two sides with a physical separation of the words at roughly opposite sides of the verse. This polarizing technique is employed again when Zeus reminds the Hundred-handers of how he rescued them from Tartarus: in line 652, the word ‘light’ is opposed to ‘painful bondage’, to emphasize the difference between how the Titans treated the Hundred-handers, and how Zeus now treats them.

Polarizing word order recurs in the response of ‘blameless’ Kottos:

> “δαιμόνι’, οὐκ ἀδάητα πιφαύσκεαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ
> ἴδμεν, ὅ τοι περὶ μὲν πραπίδες, περὶ δ’ ἐστὶ νόημα,
> ἀλκτὴρ δ’ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀρῆς γένεο κρυεροῖο,
> σῇσι δ’ ἐπιφροσύνῃσιν ὑπὸ ζόφου ἠερόεντος
> ἄψορρον ἐξαῦτις ἀμειλίκτων ὑπὸ δεσμῶν
> ἠλύθομεν, Κρόνου υἱὲ ἄναξ, ἀνάελπτα παθόντες.
> τῷ καὶ νῦν ἀτενεῖ τε νόῳ καὶ πρόφρονι θυμῷ

ῥυσόμεθα κράτος ὑμὸν ἐν αἰνῇ δηιοτῆτι
μαρνάμενοι Τιτῆσιν ἀνὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας."

"Divine one, you speak of things not unknown, but even we ourselves
know that your understanding and knowledge is surpassingly great,
and that among the immortals you are a protector against chilly war.
And by your plans from shadowy gloom
we came back again, returning from pitiless bonds,
lord, son of Kronos, enjoying what we had not even hoped for.
Wherefore now with steadfast mind and well-disposed
we shall assist your power in the dreadful fighting,
fighting against the Titans in the mighty battle."

655-63

Lines 658-59 contain the polarizing statement: "And by your plans from shadowy gloom / we came back again, returning from pitiless bonds." Here the plans of Zeus are contrasted with the shadowy gloom from which they have rescued the Hundred-handers, and the idea of returning is contrasted with that of bondage. Although the ideas above are not all true opposites in a literal sense, they are nonetheless stand for opposing concepts: for the Hundred-handers, 'returning into the light' is the most extreme opposite of the 'painful bondage in gloomy Tartarus' that they had been forced to endure.

Thus the three main divisions that take place in Hesiod's *Theogony* are all marked by directly represented character-text in dialogue form: the separation of gods from men in the speeches of the Muses to Hesiod and Zeus to Prometheus; the division of heaven from earth in the exchange between Gaia and Kronos, and of Olympians from Titans in the speeches of Zeus and Kottos. It appears, then, that Hesiod links the two sections of dialogic character-text that deal with the concept of human versus divine (the *Dichterweihe* and Prometheus scenes), and between the two that concern a schism among the gods themselves (The Gaia/ Kronos and Zeus/Hundred-handers scenes). Thus the three main divisions that take place in Hesiod's *Theogony* are all marked by directly represented character-text in dialogue form: the separation of gods from men, of heaven from earth, and of Olympians from Titans. The many similarities shared by these passages, as well as the remarkable absence of directly represented character-text elsewhere in the poem, suggest that Hesiod intended the audience to regard these four passages as different manifestations of the single concept of cosmic division.

In comparison with Homer, Hesiod uses direct speech very sparingly. For Hesiod, unlike Homer, direct speech is not the normal

mode of carrying the action forward. Rather, Hesiod exploits it to highlight crucial moments and situations of fundamental cosmic divisions: the primal separation of earth from heaven, the critical battle for supremacy between the Olympians and the Titans, and finally and most critically, to emphasize the vastness of the gulf between gods and men, both in the accounts of the origin of that separation and in their manifestation in Hesiod's encounter with the Muses.

Attributive Discourse in the 'Theogony'

Closely related to the primary narrator-focalizer's presentation of character-text is his use of descriptive phrases or epithets to introduce and occasionally cap the speeches of individual characters. In de Jong's narratological model these phrases are termed 'attributive discourse' and represent one of the more unobtrusive ways in which the narrator steers the narratee towards the emotional reaction that he wishes to arouse with a passage of character-text.[10] Depending on whether the narrator wants us to receive a character's speech in a positive or a negative light, he may present that character with an epithet or other descriptive phrase that indicates the implied author's opinion of what is about to be said—or, in some cases, of what has just been said. Attributive discourse is an accurate reflection of the implied author's opinion of his characters in the *Theogony* because the narrator of this poem is 'reliable.' In other words, if a character's speech is introduced with a positive epithet in the *Theogony,* we can be relatively certain that Hesiod wishes us to think well of the speech that is to follow.[11]

The first example of attributive discourse in the *Theogony* occurs in the Proem, where it introduces the first passage of character-text. The short, abusive speech of the Muses to Hesiod is both introduced and capped by a line highlighting some characteristic of the Muses that the narrator wishes us to keep in mind as we listen to their words:

> τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
> Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
> "ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,

[10] de Jong 19987a: 198 200.

[11] In works utilizing an 'unreliable narrator', however, the attributive discourse may be used to indicate the very opposite of what the implied author wants his audience to believe about the following speech.

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι."
ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι·

And to myself—me here!—the goddesses spoke a word,
the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus:
"Field-dwelling shepherds, evil reproaches, nothing-but-stomachs,
we know how to speak many lies indistinguishable from mortal things,
and we know how, whenever we please, to utter eternally true things."
Thus spoke the daughters of great Zeus with riddling words.

24–29

The two lines of attributive discourse in this passage (24 and 29) serve to introduce and cap the goddesses' brief address. As I remark above in my analysis of this passage, the narrator's purpose in 25 is to emphasize as strongly as possible the divinity of the speakers. This line of attributive discourse underscores the Muses' status in four ways: 1. Their divine name, Μοῦσαι, is given; 2. They are described as 'Olympian,' and so dwell among the other gods; 3. They are the daughters of Zeus; 4. Zeus is himself given an epithet indicative of his supreme status in the Universe (αἰγιόχοιο). Zeus is not described, for example, as 'son of Kronos', or 'wise in counsel,' or 'cloud-gatherer,' epithets that emphasize other aspects of Zeus (his place in the divine succession, his wisdom, and his might, respectively), and which could be made to fit into the metre with minimal changes, but as 'aegis-bearer,' which underscores his supreme royal power among the gods. Hesiod is thus quadruply careful to ensure that the audience reacts to the Muses' speech that follows specifically in light of their divinity.

The content of the Muses' speech is so dependent on the fact that they are immortals addressing a mortal that the narrator resorts to attributive discourse to point this out once again in line 29. Here the narrator once again stresses the divinity of the Muses by associating them with 'great Zeus,' but then he bestows on them a new epithet, ἀρτιέπειαι, 'with riddling words', or possibly 'smooth-talking'[12] This epithet is applied to the Muses not because of some general tendency of theirs to speak obscurely, but in direct acknowledgement

[12] I translate ἀρτιέπειαι according to its apparent meaning in *Il.* 22.281: ἀλλά τις ἀρτιεπὴς καὶ ἐπίκλοπος ἔπλεο μύθων, where I take it to refer to someone who bends words to serve his own purposes. This interpretation also applies to the positive use of the term in *Il.* 14.92 93: ὅς τις ἐπίσταιτο ᾗσι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν / σκηπτοῦχός τ' εἴη (but note that the speaker here is Odysseus, who is most likely to represent self serving speech in a positive light). Cf. West, *Theogony,* ad 29. The translation 'smooth talking' was suggested to me by J. S. Clay.

of the riddling nature of the statements about truth that they have just made. The attributive discourse in 29 thus reemphasizes the Muses' divinity and hints to the audience that the Muses' confusing statements about truth should be analyzed carefully. With ἀρτιέπειαι the narrator admits that the Muses have spoken a kind of riddle, and riddles, though confusing, usually have answers. Thus Hesiod utilizes attributive discourse in this passage in such a way as to steer the audience towards the interpretation of the Muses' speech that he wishes us to make.

Due to its perplexing nature, the speech of the Muses required the use of attributive discourse to steer us in the right direction. By contrast, the Hesiodic narrator gives less attention to manipulating the audience's reaction to the straightforward speech of Gaia to her children:

> εἶπε δὲ θαρσύνουσα, φίλον τετιημένη ἦτορ·
> "παῖδες ἐμοὶ καὶ πατρὸς ἀτασθάλου, αἴ κ' ἐθέλητε
> πείθεσθαι· πατρός κε κακὴν τεισαίμεθα λώβην
> ὑμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μήσατο ἔργα."
> ὣς φάτο· τοὺς δ' ἄρα πάντας ἕλεν δέος, οὐδέ τις αὐτῶν
> φθέγξατο. θαρσήσας δὲ μέγας Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης
> αἶψ' αὖτις μύθοισι προσηύδα μητέρα κεδνήν·
> "μῆτερ, ἐγώ κεν τοῦτό γ' ὑποσχόμενος τελέσαιμι
> ἔργον, ἐπεὶ πατρός γε δυσωνύμου οὐκ ἀλεγίζω
> ἡμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μήσατο ἔργα."
> ὣς φάτο· . . . .
>
> And she, troubled, fearful in her mind, said,
> "Children of mine and of a father blinded by *ate*, if you will
> be persuaded, let us pay back the evil deed of your father;
> for he was the first to plot unjust actions."
> Thus she spoke. But fear gripped all of them, nor did any one
> of them speak. But great crooked-counseling Kronos took heart
> and immediately addressed his respected mother with words,
> "Mother, I promise to accomplish this deed,
> since I have no love for our ill-named father;
> for he was the first to plot unjust actions."
> Thus he spoke….
>
> 163-73

Gaia's speech is introduced with a line emphasizing her mental anguish and fear at what she is plotting, which, when added to the physical anguish of being prevented from giving birth (159-60), completes the emotional portrait of the goddess at this critical moment. Hesiod does not consider it necessary to cap Gaia's speech with any further attributive discourse, signaling the completion of her

character-text by a mere 'ὣς φάτο.' The less insistent use of attributive discourse in connection with the Gaia speech arises from Hesiod's confidence that his audience will correctly interpret Gaia's motives and state of mind from the information that he has already given. The attributive discourse in 163, taken in conjunction with the description of Gaia's distress in 159-60, is sufficient to show that the implied author wants us to react to her speech with sympathy for her desperation, if not necessarily with approval of her means of revenge.

Similarly with Kronos' response, it is clear enough from the fact that he has to 'take heart' that he, too, feels fear at the prospect of confronting Ouranos, and that we are to understand his ensuing character-text as influenced by this state of mind. Once again, the primary narrator-focalizer is able to accomplish his task of directing the audience's perception of the speech with only an introductory line of attributive discourse, capping the speech, as he does Gaia's, with nothing more descriptive than ὣς φάτο.

Hesiod reverts to the more intensive use of attributive discourse that characterized the Muses' speech in the Prometheus passage. In this dialogue each speech is doubly attributed, i.e. both introduced and capped with verses designed to affect how we react to those speeches.

> δὴ τότε μιν προσέειπε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε·
> "Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων,
> ὦ πέπον, ὡς ἑτεροζήλως διεδάσσαο μοίρας."
> ὣς φάτο κερτομέων Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς.
> τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης,
> ἦκ' ἐπιμειδήσας, δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης·
> "Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων,
> τῶν δ' ἕλευ ὁπποτέρην σε ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἀνώγει."
> φῆ ῥα δολοφρονέων· . . . .
>
> Then the father of gods and men addressed him:
> "Son of Iapetus, most renowned of all the lords,
> my dear fellow, in what a biased way you have divided the portions."
> Thus spoke Zeus, who knows imperishable counsels, sarcastically.
> But crooked-counseling Prometheus answered him
> with a smile, and he did not forget his deceptive skill:
> "Zeus most glorious and greatest of the ever-living gods,
> choose whichever of them the heart in your breast desires."
> Thus he spoke, plotting tricks. . . .
>
> 542-50

Zeus' first reaction to the two unequal portions of meat before him is introduced with a reference to him as 'father of both gods and men'

(542). Not only does this epithet suggest, as I argue above, that the following exchange will be concerned with the newly changed relationship of gods and men, it also serves to remind us of Zeus' ultimate power and authority at a time when both are about to be challenged. His heavily ironic statement is capped by ὣς φάτο κερτομέων Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς (545). Zeus' sarcasm is evident in his excessive 'politeness' to Prometheus, as well as in the mock-naïveté with which he remarks on the inequality of the portions. The nature of sarcasm, however, is such that it can easily be mistaken for its opposite by an audience that either does not expect it or fails to recognize it in the speaker's tone of voice. In order to avoid any ambiguity on the score of Zeus' sarcasm here, then, the narrator follows it with 545, a line of attributive discourse directly stating that Zeus is speaking in a provocative manner.

Not content with merely noting the sarcasm in Zeus' speech, the narrator reinforces the κερτομέων with the epithet ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς, which implies that Zeus, who 'knows imperishable counsels,' is aware of the insult being offered him. Although the two Zeus-epithets that frame his address (πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε and ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς) may seem to be standard epic formulae used here—as often also in Homer—as a convenient way to end a line of hexameter, Hesiod's use of them here goes beyond mere metrical convenience. With a minimal adjustment Hesiod could have switched the two epithets, referring to Zeus as 'knowing imperishable counsels' *before* his address to Prometheus, and 'father of gods and men' *after* it. If he had done so, however, the effect of the respective lines of attributive discourse would have been destroyed.

The force of κερτομέων in 545 is emphasized and its meaning is clarified by the additional information that Zeus knows what Prometheus is trying to do (ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς), and the assertion of Zeus' authority (πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε) is most effective where it is in line 542, right before he addresses the character who is challenging that authority. It is therefore highly unlikely that Hesiod employed these epithets merely for the sake of their metrical value and without regard to their relation to the character-text to which they are connected. In an effort to make certain that his audience will catch the sarcastic tone of Zeus' voice as he addresses Prometheus, the primary narrator-focalizer adds these two framing lines of attributive discourse to indicate that sarcastic tone. By no means are we to think that Zeus is naïve or ignorant of the trick being played on him.

Having distinguished Zeus' first address with a double attribution, the narrator now extends the same honor to Prometheus:

> τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε Προμεθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης,
> ἦκ' ἐπιμειδήσας, δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης·
> "Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων,
> τῶν δ' ἕλευ ὁπποτέρην σε ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἀνώγει."
> φῆ ῥα δολοφρονέων· . . . .
>
> But crooked-counseling Prometheus answered him
> with a smile, and he did not forget his deceptive skill:
> "Zeus most glorious and greatest of the ever-living gods,
> choose whichever of them the heart in your breast desires."
> Thus he spoke, plotting tricks. . . .
>
> 546-50

Prometheus' response is introduced by a triple reference to his scheming nature (ἀγκυλομήτης, ἐπιμειδήσας, δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης), with the result that we are prepared to receive his speech as one of consummate deception. The speech is capped with yet another reminder of the speaker's craftiness (δολοφρονέων). The purpose of this double attribution of Prometheus' speech may simply appear to balance the double attribution of Zeus's speeches and imply that Prometheus is nearly Zeus' equal in μῆτις, but in fact it has a further purpose. By emphasizing Prometheus' deception both before and after his character text, in which he offers the choice of portions, Hesiod prompts the audience to analyze the nature of the trick itself, and specifically how Prometheus' offer of a choice to Zeus could be part of the trick.

Zeus' final response to Prometheus, after he 'discovers' what he has known all along, that the portion that appeared to carry the greater τιμή is actually the less honorable one, is also flanked by a double attribution:

> τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὀχθήσας προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς·
> "Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων πέρι μήδεα εἰδώς,
> ὦ πέπον, οὐκ ἄρα πω δολίης ἐπελήθεο τέχνης."
> ὥς φάτο χωόμενος Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς.
>
> Then, greatly vexed, cloud-gatherer Zeus addressed him,
> "Son of Iapetus, clever beyond all others,
> my good man, you never forgot your guileful art."
> Thus spoke angered Zeus, who knows imperishable counsels.
>
> 558-61

The attributive discourse in 558 describes Zeus as 'greatly vexed' at the dishonor being shown him by Prometheus and mankind, and as

'cloud-gatherer.' This epithet, like the two other epithets for Zeus used in his first address to Prometheus, has been specially chosen for its effect on the audience. Learning that Zeus has been made angry by the trick, we are then presented with a reminder of Zeus' terrible weapon, the thunderbolt, in his epithet νεφεληγερέτα. It is with thunderbolts in mind, then, that we approach the speech of Zeus. Instead of a violent tone, however, Zeus resorts again to exaggerated, sarcastic politeness, pretending to compliment Prometheus on his cleverness (πάντων πέρι μήδεα εἰδώς), and remarking ominously on his persistence in trying to show it off. His final comment carries a veiled threat, as if he were saying, "You just don't know when to stop, do you?" It is precisely the cleverness in which Prometheus takes such pride that will destroy him.

Just in case we misinterpret the sarcasm of the preceding lines, the speech is capped by a statement that Zeus, despite his soft words, is angry (χωόμενος), and we are again reminded that it is Zeus whose powers of thought are supreme and imperishable (ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς). Hesiod does not emphasize Zeus' sarcasm by means of attributive discourse here as starkly as he does in Zeus' first address. He does not need to do so, for the form of Zeus' address in both cases is quite similar: with sarcastic false intimacy he addresses Prometheus as ὦ πέπον, 'compliments' him, and makes a statement. Rather than demonstrating the sarcasm in Zeus' tone, the attributive discourse can instead be used to highlight Zeus' strength and wisdom, which serves to remind us once again who it is that Prometheus has had the temerity to insult.

The last instance of attributive discourse in the *Theogony* surrounds the exchange between Zeus and the Hundred-handers (645-65). In both the speech of Zeus to the Hundred-handers and in Kottos' reply the attributive discourse is limited, as it was in the Gaia/Kronos exchange, to a single line introducing the speaker. There are no 'capping' phrases; each speaker is described at the end of his speech merely as having spoken (ὥς φάτο 645 and 665). The speech of Zeus is introduced only with a reference to him as 'father of both gods and men': δὴ τότε τοῖς μετέειπε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε 643. This description emphasizes Zeus' ultimate authority in the cosmos, but while reminding us of Zeus' status it does not have a very marked effect on how we react to the following speech.

Similarly, not much meaning can be attached to the epithet 'blameless' applied to Kottos as he gives his response: τὸν δ' αἶψ' αὖτις ἀμείβετο Κόττος ἀμύμων 654. The attributive word

ἀμύμων in this case does little more than guide us to accept Kottos' response as the 'right' one, i.e. the response of which the implied author approves.[13] By designating Kottos as 'blameless' while giving this answer the attributive discourse indicates that his response is itself appropriate and 'blameless.' Beyond emphasizing Zeus' authority in 643 and implying approval of Kottos' loyalty to Zeus in 654, the attributive discourse has no other function in this passage.

A possible reason for the muted nature of the attributive discourse surrounding these two speeches is their exceptional length. Zeus' speech extends to ten lines in this passage, while that of Kottos fills nine lines. In contrast, all the other speeches in the *Theogony* comprise a mere two or three lines each, but are accompanied by more extensive attributive discourse.[14] It is probable that in the case of these longer speeches Hesiod is confident that the audience will be capable of forming the correct opinion of what Zeus and Kottos say from the speeches themselves, without the need of extensive attributive discourse to guide us. The meaning of these speeches is straightforward and easily grasped, lacking the riddling nature of the Muses' speech and the sarcasm of the Zeus/Prometheus exchange. These two latter exchanges rely upon carefully orchestrated attributive discourse to ensure that the audience is able to understand the character text correctly, but in the Gaia/Kronos exchange and especially in the one between Zeus and the Hundred-handers, the primary narrator-focalizer is less concerned that we will misunderstand what is being said, and so intrudes himself less. The fact that Hesiod does not use attributive discourse consistently in the *Theogony* but varies his application of it according to the nature of the character text with which it is associated shows that Hesiod is keenly

[13] Of course, the word ἀμύμων is also used of Aigisthos in *Od.* 1.29, where Homer explicitly rejects his behavior. However, in light of the fact that this passage praises Orestes for avenging a wrong against his family, it is possible that Homer wishes to imply by this epithet that Aigisthos was blameless in his desire to avenge his family. The blamelessness of his goal does not extend to his actual behavior in refusing to desist from its pursuit when the gods warn him.

[14] The Gaia/Kronos speeches are accompanied by only single lines of attributive discourse, but in each case the capping ὥς φάτο is followed by a sentence describing the emotional effect of the speech. Gaia's speech proposing revenge on Ouranos is capped by ὥς φάτο· τοὺς δ' ἄρα πάντας ἕλεν δέος, and Kronos' response is similarly followed by a statement of Gaia's reaction: ὥς φάτο· γήθεσεν δὲ μέγα φρεσὶ Γαῖα πελώρη. Although these descriptive phrases are not attributive discourse and do not necessarily reveal the implied author's opinion of what has been said, they serve a similar purpose in that they establish the *mood* of the scene in which the speech has occurred.

aware of his influence over the audience's reception of the poem, and that he carefully gauges how much of that influence to exert in each narrative situation.

Embedded Focalization in the 'Theogony'

Midway between simple narrator text, in which the primary narrator-focalizer recounts the story from his own perspective, and character text, in which the characters speak in their own right and from their individual points of view, lies what de Jong terms 'complex narrator-text,' or 'embedded focalization'. The concept of embedded focalization is one of the most intriguing contributions that narratology has made to the study of literature. It is also, not surprisingly, one of the most controversial.[15] Embedded focalization occurs when the primary narrator-focalizer adopts a character's focalization of a particular event and vocalizes it in the narrator-text as if it were his own reaction to or assessment of the situation at hand. Using embedded focalization the narrator is able to put himself into the emotional position of a certain character and to switch temporarily to narrating the story through that character's eyes. This technique is useful as a way to reveal how characters react emotionally to events without having to employ actual character text, which, as we have seen, Hesiod reserves for situations in which some kind of division is emphasized, and whose bipolar characteristics are enhanced by the intrinsically 'divided' or dualistic nature of dialogic speech.

A readily comprehensible example of embedded focalization occurs in Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* where a troupe of rustic actors entertains the court of King Theseus with a performance of *Pyramus and Thisbe.* The Lion's opening words are, "You ladies, you, whose gentle hearts do fear / The smallest monstrous mouse that creeps on floor…" (V, i). It is clear to us that neither the Lion, in his character as Lion, nor the lubberly Snug the Joiner who plays him considers mice to be at all monstrous, but that he expects the high born ladies whom he addresses to regard them as such. Hence the word 'monstrous' is an example of the ladies' emotional reaction (focalization) embedded in the speech of a narrator. This kind of embedded focalization is what de Jong refers to

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[15] On embedded focalization see Bal 1985: 100 118. de Jong 1985: 101 148 provides an extensive treatment of embedded focalization in the *Iliad*.

as 'explicit' embedded focalization, because it is introduced by a 'shifter', in this case a verb of feeling ('do fear'), and contains the emotional word 'monstrous' which is clearly meant to refer to the emotional state of the ladies rather than the speaker's own.

The reason why the Lion's comment is effective as a piece of embedded focalization is because we the audience are sufficiently familiar with the fearless character of lions to realize that the speaker must be adopting the mental outlook of his addressee in calling mice 'monstrous'. In the case of Homer and Hesiod, however, whose character as narrators is not as readily apparent as that of a Lion, the narratologist who claims to find a character's embedded in a passage of narrator-text must demonstrate that the embedded 'emotional' word is not one that usually occurs in narrator-text. This problem is not as acute for Homer as it is for Hesiod, as it has long been recognized that Homer for the most part avoids 'emotional' speech in his narrator-text, saving it for the speeches of characters.[16] A brief review of de Jong's findings on embedded focalization in Homer will be helpful in determining how Homer differs from Hesiod in his use of this narrative device.

Explicit embedded focalization, according to de Jong, is introduced by a verb of perceiving, thinking, feeling, or speaking.[17] She provides the following Iliadic quotations to illustrate each of the four categories of explicit embedded focalization listed above:

> Perception:
> And they (the Trojans) rejoiced, when they saw him (Hector)
> approach, alive and unharmed, having escaped the vigour
> and the irresistible hands of Ajax.
> *Il.* 7.307-309

Verbs of perception, such as 'they saw' in this passage, frequently introduce explicit embedded focalization in Homer simply because a perception can produce strong emotions in the person who perceives. These emotions, once their cause has been thus indicated to the audience, can then be expressed by he narrator by means of embedded focalization. In the passage above the embedded focalization consists of the word 'irresistible' (ἀάπτους), 'an emotion-

[16] Cf. Griffin 1986: 36 37 for a review of the early scholarship on this question and de Jong 1997: 293 96 for a review of the later developments that led to her own theory. Griffin 1986a and de Jong 1997 are the two seminal articles on the question of Homeric narrator language vs. character language.

[17] The following four examples and their English translations are taken from de Jong 1987: 102 118.

ally colored word' that reflects the Trojans' awe and gratitude that their hero has been saved from such a terrible foe.[18]

> Thoughts/emotions:
> But Achilles continued weeping, remembering his dear companion . . . yearning for the manliness and valiant vigour of Patroclus, and all the actions he had seen to the end and the hardships he had suffered with him.
> *Il.* 24.4-8

The word 'remembering' (μεμνημένος) introduces a section of explicit embedded focalization in which what is remembered is colored by Achilles' own emotions, rather than the assessment of the primary external narrator-focalizer. The emotional words 'dear companion' and 'valiant vigor' belong to the character-language and should be understood as the focalization of Achilles rather than that of the narrator.

> Speaking (indirect speech):
> And they exhorted each other to take hold of the ships and drag them to the bright sea.
> *Il.* 2.151-52

All indirect speech is thus a form of explicit embedded focalization, for every narrator is also a focalizer, and so when Homer employs indirect speech, he includes both the narration of the speaker and the speaker's emotional stance at the time of speaking.

Explicit embedded focalization, then, is introduced by 'shifter' verbs of perceiving, thinking/feeling, or saying. When a passage containing transferred emotion is *not* introduced by one of these words, the result is termed 'implicit embedded focalization.' Because it lacks the signpost words that could identify it, implicit embedded focalization is a much more subtle literary device, discernible only from the semantic value of the passage in question. If in describing a situation the primary narrator-focalizer uses emotional words that are out of character with his narrative persona and more appropriate to the specific character whose reaction he is describing, one should suspect implicit embedded focalization.[19] One example of implicit embedded focalization, as provided by de Jong, is the passage in which Hector steels himself to do battle against Ajax:

> And also for Hector himself his heart beat in his breast:
> but he could not in any way retreat or retire back into

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[18] de Jong 1987a: 103.
[19] de Jong 1987a:118 19.

> the crowd of the people, after he had issued the
> challenge, by reason of his fighting spirit.
>
> *Il.* 7.216-18

As de Jong argues, this passage reveals the thoughts going through Hector's mind as he struggles with his own fear before Ajax, rather than the primary narrator-focalizer's assessment of the situation.[20] The audience is already aware that the reluctance to incur shame among his countrymen comprises a large part of Hector's psyche from his earlier speech to Andromache in Book 6. Thus when the narrator states here in this passage that Hector could not retreat from his challenge he is not stating the facts as they are, but the facts as they are from Hector's point of view. Homer uses implicit embedded focalization to allow us to see not only Hector's action but the psychological causes of that action, with the result both that Hector's character is more vividly portrayed and that the narrative continues at a more profound, emotional level.[21]

De Jong concludes that Homer, while he prefers to use character text as the primary means of revealing the emotions and motivations of his characters, occasionally uses embedded focalization for this purpose as well. Homer's predilection for direct speech as a vehicle for character-portrayal is logical in light of his unobtrusive narrative presence in the *Iliad.* Although the Homeric narrator is very much in control of how his audience perceives the characters and events of his poem, for the most part he chooses to conceal his presence and minimize his effect on the story by letting his characters speak for themselves and avoiding first-person commentary.

The notion of embedded focalization allows us to gain valuable insights into Homer's narrative style. As de Jong makes clear in her recent work on narrator-language and character-language, however, the fact that Homer employs a different vocabulary in narrator-text than that which he uses in character-text is an important factor in deciding what actually is an embedded focalization and what is the narrator's own emotional reaction to his story. In the case of Hesiod, this vital distinction is lacking. As I note briefly in Chapter Two, Hesiod uses character-text so sparingly in comparison to Homer that it is impossible to determine whether he employs a different vocabulary for speakers than he does for his own narratorial voice. What is certainly clear is that Hesiod consistently uses emotional

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[20] de Jong 1987a: 121.
[21] de Jong 1987a: 122.

words in the narrator-text that Homer almost always confines to the character-text or to passages of embedded focalization (which amount to the same thing).[22] Among the most frequent 'emotional' words used by the Hesiodic narrator are those describing gods or things as 'lovely' and 'desirable'; 'sweet'; 'evil', 'terrible', 'destructive' and 'grievous'.[23]

In describing things with these and other 'emotional' terms, Hesiod takes on the verbal characteristics of a Homeric character rather than adopting the relatively unemotional stance of the Homeric narrator. One might contend that the very nature of Hesiod's material forces him to use these words, since in the *Theogony* he is concerned with describing beautiful goddesses and horrible monsters, but this would be to miss the point. Hesiod did not have to put these emotional words into 'his own' mouth as narrator; in fact, if he had wished to follow the Homeric model he would have taken quite the opposite course and included a great deal more direct speech, where these emotional words would have been more appropriate (from a Homeric point of view, that is). Since he does not take this course, we must assume that he has deliberately chosen to avoid the 'split vocabulary' of the Homeric style. The result is that Hesiod, in narrating the events of the *Theogony,* speaks as if he were a Homeric character instead of the Homeric narrator.

The possible implications of this narratorial stance will be explored at the end of this chapter, but for now we must address the quandary into which it puts the narratologist. If the Hesiodic narrator speaks the 'same language' as his speaking characters, how can it be ascertained when he is embedding a character's focalization? With regard to *implicit* embedded focalization, the answer must be that it cannot, at least not with any certainty. One might have the feeling that when Hesiod says Φοίβη δ' αὖ Κοίου πολυήρατον ἦλθεν ἐς εὐνήν, the adjective 'much-desired' is the embedded focalization of the eager bride, but given the great preponderance of words connoting

[22] Cf. de Jong 1988: 188 89.

[23] Lovely/desirable: ἐρατός and congeners: *Th.* 67, 70, 136, 259, 353, 355, 642, 879, 909, 970; ἱμεροείς: 8, 104, 359, 919; χαριείς: 129, 247, 260.

Sweet: ἡδύς: *Th.* 40; γλυκύς: 97, 83, 206; μείλιχος: 84, 92, 206, 406, 408, 763.

Evil/terrible: δεινός: *Th.* 138, 155, 221, 299, 307, 320, 324, 334, 670, 678, 743, 744, 759, 769, 776, 825, 829, 856, 925, 933, 935; κακός: 158, 219, 512, 570, 585, 595, 600, 602, 609, 612, 798, 876.

Destructive/ grievous: ὀλοός: *Th.* 224, 326, 501, 604, 757; λυγρός: *Th.* 276, 304, 313, 650.

πῆμα: *Th.* 223, 232, 329 592, 792, 874,.

desirability and loveliness in the Hesiodic narrator-text there is no way to be sure that it is not simply Hesiod himself who applies this emotional word to the loving union he describes.

This being the case, there are a few passages in the *Theogony* in which *explicit* embedded focalization may be detected. When the narrator describes the reaction of Ouranos after he has been castrated, he describes the furious reaction of the god in a passage of indirect discourse:

> τοὺς δὲ πατὴρ Τιτῆνας ἐπίκλησιν καλέεσκε
> παῖδας νεικείων μέγας Οὐρανός, οὓς τέκεν αὐτός·
> φάσκε δὲ τιταίνοντας ἀτασθαλίῃ μέγα ῥέξαι
> ἔργον, τοῖο δ' ἔπειτα τίσιν μετόπισθεν ἔσεσθαι.
>
> But these children their father kept calling by the name "Titans,"
> great Ouranos railing at the children—whom he himself begat!
> And he kept saying that they, pushing too far in their madness, had wrought an outrageous deed, for which there would be vengeance some day in the future.
>
> 207-210

The emotional words ἀτασθαλίῃ, 'madness' and μέγα, 'outrageous' should be taken to constitute explicit the embedded focalization of Ouranos, since they appear after the shifter φάσκε and constitute indirect speech. They serve to characterize the god in his angry and vengeful frame of mind.

The presence of this explicit embedded focalization in 209-210, however, raises the possibility of an occurrence of *implicit* embedded focalization with the phrase μέγας Οὐρανός, οὓς τέκεν αὐτός in 208. Line 208 opens with another statement of explicit embedded focalization, παῖδας νεικείων, which can be identified as such by the presence of the shifter-verb νεικείων. Yet the words that follow in this line, μέγας Οὐρανός, οὓς τέκεν αὐτός, can also be interpreted as a highly emotional statement of Ouranos' wounded dignity and sense of betrayal. If we take these five words as the implicit embedded focalization of Ouranos, these words can be seen to reproduce the sputtering, incoherent anger of the railing god. It is as if he were saying, "I, the great Ouranos! I am treated thus by the children whom I myself begat!" The emotional nature of οὓς τέκεν αὐτός, in particular, seems more appropriate as the implicit embedded focalization of Ouranos than as the observation of the narrator, and the fact that 208 both begins with and is immediately followed by the *explicit* embedded focalization of this god suggests that we should consider it as such.

Hesiod uses explicit embedded focalization to characterize Rheia as well:

> . . . τότ' ἔπειτα φίλους λιτάνευε τοκῆας
> τοὺς αὐτῆς, Γαῖάν τε καὶ Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα,
> μῆτιν συμφράσσασθαι, ὅπως λελάθοιτο τεκοῦσα
> παῖδα φίλον, τείσαιτο δ' ἐρινῦς πατρὸς ἑοῖο
> παίδων ⟨θ⟩οὓς κατέπινε μέγας Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης.
>
> ...Then she kept beseeching her parents,
> her own parents, Gaia and starry Ouranos,
> to devise a plan so that she might secretly give birth
> to her dear son, and so that the Fury of her father might take vengeance
> for the children whom great, crooked-counseling Kronos swallowed.
> 469-74

With these words we are told unequivocally of the concerns motivating Rheia to plot Kronos' downfall: fear for her children, especially Zeus (παῖδα φίλον); desire for vengeance (τείσαιτο δ' ἐρινῦς); and anger at the crime that Kronos is able to commit over and over again with impunity (παίδων ⟨θ⟩οὓς κατέπινε μέγας Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης). Significantly, this same pattern of characterization by explicit embedded focalization echoes that in the Gaia/Ouranos passage, where Ouranos is portrayed via his embedded focalization of 207-210. The vengeance foretold by Ouranos in *his* section of indirect speech is the very same that Rheia herself is plotting to achieve in *her* passage of indirect speech. Hesiod thus links the two episodes of the Succession Myth not only by content, as scholars have long recognized, but by narratological patterns of characterization as well.

To return to the question of Hesiod's use of emotional 'character language' in the narrator-text, it is clear that the Hesiodic narrator's abundant use of this type of language is one of the main ways in which he differs from his Homeric counterpart. This difference in narratorial focalization becomes even more marked in the *Works and Days,* where the narrator not only talks *like* a character, he even talks *to* a character, Perses, and presents himself as playing a role in the poem both on the level of the story (i.e. his role in the legal dispute) and on that of the discourse (i.e. the poem is presented as a didactic address to his errant brother). In fact, however, although the mimetic nature of the *Works and Days* makes the narrator's role as character more obvious, the narrator of the *Theogony* is no less characterized. The narrative persona that Hesiod adopts in the *Theogony* is that of a mortal man singing about the gods, and, as such, most closely

resembles the persona of the hymn poet. It is his adoption of this persona, I would suggest, that causes him to use what Homerists (following de Jong) would refer to as 'character language.'

The hymnic nature of the *Theogony*'s Proem and Hecate passage have long been noted.[24] What has gone largely unremarked, however, is the large amount of emotional language employed by the Hesiodic narrator even outside of these 'hymnic' passages. In addition to words denoting desirability, sweetness, dreadfulness, and bane the Hesiodic narrator uses many other emotional words to a degree unparalleled by the narrator of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey.* This marked use of emotional language in the narrator-text, while uncharacteristic of Homeric epic, is paralleled in the Homeric Hymns, where words of praise and admiration are appropriate to the genre. Hesiod seems to have made a self-conscious decision to adopt the emotive narrative mode of the hymnist rather than the more emotionally detached focalization displayed by Homer.

The reason behind Hesiod's deliberate choice to follow the hymnic style of narration rather than that of Homeric epic lies, I suggest, in Hesiod's emphatic self-portrayal as a human being singing of the gods. As I argue above in Chapter Three, the Hesiodic narrator, whose conception of the cosmos is strongly polarized between the divine and mortal realms, intentionally presents himself as a mortal man who is given the ability to bridge the gap between the world of the gods and that of men. He thus rejects the stance of the Homeric narrator, who for the most part prefers to stand back from (or appear to stand back from) the events of his story and let his characters 'speak for themselves' and provide the emotional reactions to the events that he narrates.

By adopting, via his use of emotive language, the narratorial persona of the hymn-poet, Hesiod firmly locates himself in the realm of the human, as opposed to the quasi-divine status of the 'mouthpiece of the Muse' that Homer seems to claim for himself.[25] No poet could be more aware of the division between god and man than the poet of a hymn, and the inherently dualistic and dialogic nature of the hymnic genre makes it an appropriate narrative model for Hesiod's poetic exposition of his bipolar conception of the universe. Far from being a 'mouthpiece' of the gods, Hesiod presents

[24] For the hymnic nature of the proem see W. Minton (1970) and J. S. Clay 1988. For the 'Hymn' to Hecate see West1966 *ad loc.* Cf. the bibliography cited above Chap. 3, n. 15.

[25] For Homer as the mouthpiece of the Muse see above Chap. 3, n. 3.

himself as a mortal bridge between gods and men, and to do so he imitates the narratorial persona most suitable to his connective function: that of the hymnic poet.

Hesiod's use of character text, attributive discourse, and embedded focalization clearly reveal him as a self-conscious poet actively striving to achieve specific rhetorical effects in his poetry. He presents us with a narrator who is acutely conscious of the cosmic division between mankind and the gods, and who uses the speeches of his characters to highlight this schism. Although the characters seem to speak for themselves from the standpoint of their own focalization, the narrator carefully orchestrates which characters are to speak, what they say, and what impression their words are given by the accompanying attributive discourse. The Hesiodic narrator merely gives the impression of standing back and letting his characters take over; in fact, as we have seen, their words are carefully contrived to illustrate the principle of separation and cosmic differentiation that is the fundamental concept upon which the *Theogony* is built.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANACHRONY IN THE *THEOGONY*

One of the ways in which Hesiod controls the reception of his story is by manipulating the order in which he narrates the events that make it up. By means of carefully placed 'flashbacks' (analepses) and 'flash-forwards' (prolepses) the narrator is able to influence our reception of a certain passage or episode by insuring that we approach it in light of the anachronous material associated with it.[1] Anachrony is thus another type of attributive discourse in that it urges us to react to a specific episode of his text from the perspective of other information that the narrator selects for us. Analepsis occurs only four times in the *Theogony,* whereas prolepsis occurs sixteen times.[2] While analepsis is not the chief vehicle for Hesiod's use of anachrony, it constitutes the first occurrence of anachrony in the poem.

In addition to being used attributively, temporal distortion can be employed to retard the pace of the story (a device that Richardson, Bal, and others term 'Pause') in order to highlight certain aspects of his story.[3] Since the anachronous presentation of events is so clearly a contrivance of the narrator's to achieve a certain effect, one would expect to find anachronies most thickly clustered around passages of the greatest narrative moment, as Rood finds is the case with the Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition, for it is likely that the author would wish to guide our reactions to these 'purple passages' most closely.

We are justified in examining chronological manipulation in the *Theogony* not only by the demands of thorough narratological analysis but by the Hesiodic text itself. At the end of the most overtly programmatic section of the Proem, lines 104-115, the primary narrator-focalizer specifically requests of the Muses that they sing the material that he requests 'from the beginning':

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[1] Cf. Rood 1998: 129: "Temporal displacement…suggests perspectives to readers…."

[2] Analepses: 22 34, 463 65, 617 20, 894 96. Prolepses: 120, 154 210, 204, 223, 231, 284, 347, 416 49, 453, 459 506, 490, 500, 512, 521, 624 819, 820 85. These passages are discussed below.

[3] Richardson 1990: 34 69 and passim; Bal 1985: 74.

ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ εἴπαθ', ὅτι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν.

Speak these things to me, Muses who have your homes on Olympus,
from the beginning, and tell which of them was first.

114-15

Emphatically placed at the beginning of the line and reinforced four words later by πρῶτον, the narrator's demand for adherence to chronological sequence draws attention to the subject of order and alerts us to pay attention to the poet's treatment of time in this work. In light of the emphasis on temporality present in the last line of the Proem, it is even possible that the formulaic ἀρχώμεθα in the first line, whose first-person subject identifies it as the human poet's own words, is itself designed to reveal a mortal's imposition of a linear time frame onto divine material. To say "let us begin" requires, after all, the concept that there be a beginning point, and that it is both possible and desirable to frame one's song in terms of beginning, middle, and end. The Muses, however, for whom Time is not necessarily restricted to the same rules that govern it among men, are apparently unmoved by such human prejudices, are content to begin their cosmogonic song at its culmination, with the establishment of the rule of Zeus, and to end where they began (11, 47-48).

By using this time-oriented language in the Proem the narrator is drawing marked attention to the role that time will play in this poem, as well as to his own role in manipulating the order of events. It is not going too far to infer from the extremely marked placement of this statement at the culmination of the catalogue of subjects for the *Theogony* that Hesiod intends us to understand that the subject of Time itself will be one of the topics of his poem. In fact, the poet says as much in unambiguous language: "speak these things…and tell which of them was first." With their two parallel imperative clauses lines 114-15 clearly indicate that the *order* of the cosmogonic events to be treated is of equal nar-rative importance with the events themselves. We are thus warned by this programmatic statement to regard any deviation from chronological order as a violation of the express, intended format of the work and should be examined carefully to determine what effect the poet intended by it.

Given the importance of the dynamic between mortal and god that informs the *Dichterweihe,* discussed in Chapter Three, it is surely significant that the demand for chronological ordering be

placed in the mouth of the mortal poet as he addresses the Muses. As scholars have long recognized, the Muses' own songs (11-21, 36-52) are not organized upon the principle of chronological sequence, and so Hesiod's request for this particular mode of organization represents an obvious divergence from their practice.[4] The Muses, who dance, as Clay points out, *in a circle* around the altar of Zeus, are content to sing a hymn that is likewise circular, beginning and ending with Zeus (48).[5] The Muses seem either unaware of or unimpressed by the human concept of linear chronology, and must be directed to it by the time-bound mortal poet.

As I hope to demonstrate in this chapter, the reason for the mortal poet's insistence upon chronological ordering and the Muses' apparent indifference to it is due to the rift between the mortal and divine realms. In Hesiod's bipolar conception of the cosmos gods and men are separated not only by their physical nature but by their relationship to time, which, as we shall see, Hesiod presents as operating differently in the divine and mortal realms. The places in which the clash between human and divine time occur are precisely those in which mortals encounter gods, whether directly, as in the *Dichterweihe,* or indirectly, as in the Typhoeus passage. Hesiod marks these passages by deliberate and often convoluted anachrony, which has the effect of highlighting the difference between the world of gods and that of men.

There are eight major passages of anachrony in the *Theogony,* and all of them reflect in some way upon the difference between the 'timeless' existence of the gods and the time-bound life of men. The passages, not surprisingly, include those in which the contrast between the divine and human realms is drawn most starkly in other ways as well: The *Dichterweihe,* the 'Hymn to Hecate', the Prometheus episode and the passage describing the winds of Typhoeus. In addition to these episodes, which emphasize the physical and mental distance between men and gods, Hesiod uses anachrony to highlight the non-linear nature of divine time in two parallel but unequal passages, the Muses' songs on Helicon and Olympus (11-21, 36-52) and the description of Tartarus (713-

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[4] See esp. J. S. Clay 2003: Chap. 3. Clay also points out that chronology is not the only type of organization for the Muses' hymn, and perhaps not even the most obvious or effective. In fact the Muses' practice of beginning and ending their hymn with Zeus makes more sense, from a hymnic point of view, than one that begins at the beginning of time and ends with the present day.

[5] *Ibid.*

810). The Olympian and Tartarean episodes serve as opposite yet complementary examples of the timelessness of divine time, and thus present a foil to the concept of the linear human time that governs the majority of the *Theogony*'s story.

Timelessness Among the Gods Above and the Gods Below: The Temporal Aspect of Divine Ἀληθέα

1. *Olympus*

The first major passage of anachrony in the *Theogony* is also the first major passage in the poem: the Muses' Heliconian song:

> Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ' ἀείδειν,
> αἵ θ' Ἑλικῶνος ἔχουσιν ὄρος μέγα τε ζάθεόν τε
> καί τε περὶ κρήνην ἰοειδέα πόσσ' ἁπαλοῖσιν
> ὀρχεῦνται καὶ βωμὸν ἐρισθενέος Κρονίωνος·
> καί τε λοεσσάμεναι τέρενα χρόα Περμησσοῖο
> ἢ' Ἵππου κρήνης ἢ' Ὀλμειοῦ ζαθέοιο
> ἀκροτάτῳ Ἑλικῶνι χοροὺς ἐνεποιήσαντο
> καλοὺς ἱμερόεντας, ἐπερρώσαντο δὲ ποσσίν.
> ἔνθεν ἀπορνύμεναι, κεκαλυμμέναι ἠέρι πολλῷ,
> ἐννύχιαι στεῖχον περικαλλέα ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι,
> ὑμνεῦσαι Δία τ' αἰγίοχον καὶ πότνιαν Ἥρην
> Ἀργείην, χρυσέοισι πεδίλοις ἐμβεβαυῖαν,
> κούρην τ' αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην
> Φοῖβόν τ' Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Ἄρτεμιν ἰοχέαιραν
> ἠδὲ Ποσειδάωνα γαιήοχον ἐννοσίγαιον
> καὶ Θέμιν αἰδοίην ἑλικοβλέφαρόν τ' Ἀφροδίτην
> Ἥβην τε χρυσοστέφανον καλήν τε Διώνην
> Λητώ τ' Ἰαπετόν τε ἰδὲ Κρόνον ἀγκυλομήτην
> Ἠῶ τ' Ἠέλιόν τε μέγαν λαμπράν τε Σελήνην
> Γαῖάν τ' Ὠκεανόν τε μέγαν καὶ Νύκτα μέλαιναν
> ἄλλων τ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων.
> αἵ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν...

> Let us begin to sing from the Heliconian Muses,
> who hold the great and god-haunted mountain of Helicon,
> and they dance around the violet-hued spring on their tender feet
> and around the altar of the mighty son of Kronos,
> and, bathing their tender skin in the stream of Permessos
> or the stream of the Horse or of god-haunted Olmeios
> on the height of Helicon they make their lovely dances
> that instill desire, and they move their feet in intricate steps.
> Setting out from thence, covered in great mist,
> at night they were going, sending forth transcendently lovely voices,

singing hymns to aegis-bearing Zeus and queenly Hera,
the Argive Lady clad in golden sandals,
and they sang the daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, grey-eyed Athena,
and Phoibos Apollo and Artemis the arrow-pourer,
and Poseidon who contains the earth and shakes it,
and reverend Themis and Aphrodite of the fluttering eyelashes
and Dawn and great Helios and shimmering Selene
and Hebe with her golden crown and lovely Dione
and Leto and Iapetos and crooked-counseling Kronos
and Earth and mighty Ocean and black Night
and the holy race of other gods who exist always.
They now once taught Hesiod lovely song….

1-22

The temporal framework in which this hymnic passage exists is the eternal present; the Muses are not represented as having once danced on Helicon or bathed in Permessos, but as forever doing so.[6] It is only when the narrator begins to sing of his own encounter with the Muses that the human concept of the unilinear progression of time becomes relevant.

To mark the importance of this almost inconceivable meeting between the two opposite poles of the cosmic order, the divine and the mortal, the 'eternal present' of the gods and the inexorable law of temporal progression that rules men, Hesiod engages in a striking manipulation of verbal tenses. As Clay notes, the Muses who hold Helicon and dance around the altar of Zeus do so in the present tense (ἔχουσιν 2, ὀρχεῦνται 4). Once they begin their journey down to the world of men, however, they leave the timelessness of their proper sphere and enter the time-bound world of humankind. Hesiod marks this transition with the imperfect tense (στεῖχον 10). In Clay's words,

> This imperfect does not appear to fit into the usual rules of Greek grammar, but it expresses temporally what has already been expressed spatially through the Muses' descent from the sacred locales of the gods to the habitations of mortals. In effect, the imperfect στεῖχον conveys precisely and vividly the moment of transition from the eternal time of the gods to the temporality of mankind.[7]

The moment of arrival, when the Muses finally enter the temporal continuum of mortals, is then denoted by the aorist tense (ἐδίδαξαν 22, ἔειπον 24). In line 22 the timeless world of the gods suddenly comes into contact with the time-bound world of

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[6] J. S. Clay 1989: 27 29.
[7] J. S. Clay 2003: Chap. 3.

mortals. The aorist indicates that the activity of the Muses has left the timelessness of the gods and entered into the temporal sequence of mortal reality. That is to say, the Muses leave the realm of the eternally true and enter that of the *actual,* the 'true-within-time', the realm where a single action happens once and then *has* happened, and can thereafter be recorded as an 'historical' event.

Hesiod marks the very moment of this meeting between the eternal and the time-bound with the curious expression *νύ* ποτε (which I discuss below) and with a sudden infusion of time-words in his description of the Muses' second song:

.... αἵ δ' ἄμβροτον ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι
θεῶν γένος αἰδοῖον *πρῶτον* κλείουσιν ἀοιδῇ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὓς Γαῖα καὶ 'Ουρανὸς εὐρὺς ἔτικτεν
οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων·
δεύτερον αὖτε Ζῆνα, θεῶν πατὲρ' ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν,
[*ἀρχόμεναί θ'* ὑμνεῦσι θεαὶ †*λήγουσαί τ'* ἀοιδῆς,]
ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν κάρτει τε μέγιστος·
αὖτις δ' ἀνθρώπων τε γένος κρατερῶν τε Γιγάντων

And they, sending forth their immortal voices
first glorify with their song the reverend race of gods,
those whom from the beginning Gaia and broad Ouranos produced,
and those who were [later] born from them, the gods who give blessings.
And *then* they sing Zeus again, the father of gods and men;
they hymn Zeus both at the *beginning and the end* of their song,
singing how he is mightiest of the gods in strength, and greatest.
And *then* they sing the race of men and mighty Giants…
43-50

In the text above, terminology that refers explicitly to chronological sequence is marked in italics, while a phrase that strongly implies chronological ordering is underscored. It is striking that out of seven-and-a-half hexameters describing the Muses' second song, Hesiod has contrived that six should feature a word that denotes adherence to a chronological sequence. Moreover, these tactic words are *meant* to be striking, for they appear in positions of metrical prominence either at the beginning of metrical cola (line-initial 45, 47, 48, 50; after the principal caesura 44) or in parallel relationship to a word in this position (ἀρχόμεναί θ'...λήγουσαί τ' 50).

In contrast to this sudden attention to temporal sequence, the Muses' first song contains virtually no temporal markers

whatsoever. The only word in lines 2-21 that has any relationship to temporality is ἐννύχιαι (11), and this cannot be considered a word that marks chronological ordering. For while ἐννύχιαι is a 'temporal marker' in that it nominally denotes a time of day, its very uniqueness as a time-marker in this passage renders it useless as a meaningful demarcation of time. If the Muses are presented as always dancing and always singing, it does not put their actions in any kind of chronological sequence to say that they do so (or once did so?) "at night." If one were to say to an acquaintance, "meet me at night" without specifying which night of which year, not to mention what time of night, one's addressee would be much bemused as to the time of his appointment. In fact, such an 'appointment' would be an anti-appointment, a mockery of an appointment; the one temporal marker serving only to make the time in question more mysterious rather than less. The single time-related word ἐννύχιαι thus acts to highlight the resistance of the Muses' actions in this scene to any kind of temporal specificity by bringing it to our attention.

Nevertheless, it seems significant that the one attempt to fix the Muses' actions in 2-21 to any notion of time, however ambiguous, is linked with the 'transitional' verb in the imperfect (στεῖχον 10). It is only when the Muses begin their descent to the time-fixity of the mortal realm that even the vaguest sort of temporal marker, ἐννύχιαι, is attached to their activities. In fact, in line 9, where we might expect a temporal word to mark the transition from what the Muses sing to Zeus on Helicon to what they were singing on the way to meet Hesiod, we are given instead a *spatial* one: ἔνθεν. Hesiod clearly intends us to contrast the insistently chronological organization of the Muses' second song to the 'timeless' treatment of the subject matter of their first song.

The fundamental shift in 'temporal perspective' that occurs once Hesiod has received inspiration and new knowledge from the Muses is very strongly marked by the poet in his abrupt break at line 35 (the 'oak and rock' riddle) and his striking re-invocation of the Muses at line 36. Hesiod points to his new, post-*Dichterweihe* focus on chronological ordering in lines 36-52 by repeating the catalogue of the Muses' subject matter with words that indicate chronological sequence. One of the main purposes, if not *the* main purpose, of presenting the Muses' song again in 36-52 is to show how it differs from what they sing in 11-22. Since the two

descriptions of the Muses' song straddle the *Dichterweihe,* it is logical to assume that the divergence between them is due to what happened when Hesiod met the Muses. The poet thus uses the devices of the sharp interruption at 35 and the recommencement at 36 to show that his presentation of divine material will henceforth differ significantly from what it had been, and he uses the device of time-oriented words in metrically prominent places to show that the difference will involve chronological ordering.

By crafting the Muses' first song (2-21) to be virtually devoid of temporal markers, and their second song (36-52) to abound with them, Hesiod emphasizes the vastness of the gulf that was so miraculously bridged when the Muses came to him. Not only did the *Dichterweihe* entail the physical manifestation of the divine upon earth, it represented the meeting, scarcely conceivable,of the timeless world of ἀληθέα with the time-bound mortal realm of ἔτυμα. The poem that is the result of this marvelous union, therefore, just as it often spans the spatial divide between man and god by presenting divine events from the mortal perspective, will also span the temporal divide by presenting them in accordance with the laws of chronological progression by which humans must abide.

In showing us that the Muses' actions are 'timeless' before the *Dichterweihe* and ordered chronologically after it, Hesiod causes us to become aware of his construction of the narrative voice in this poem. The post-*Dichterweihe* Hesiod is the mortal poet who has been given the mission to present the story of cosmic genesis in terms that his fellow mortals can understand.[8] In choosing to do so in the Proem he informs the audience that the mortal perception of time, inseparable from the human narrator, will play a role throughout this god-centered poem. The Muses have granted Hesiod the gift of being able to know divine truth, ἀληθέα, 'the things that will be and were before', and present them to his fellow mortals. As I argue above, however, the way in which the Muses address Hesiod makes it clear that they are well aware that their

[8] It should be noted that the narrator, while he does begin the poem with the self conscious ἀρχώμεθα, does not exist as a conscious force shaping the poem in lines 2 21. It is only after he meets the Muses that he becomes the active or "overt" narrator of the *Theogony,* directing the story in the way that seems best to him and showing his audience that he so directs it.

chosen poet is a mortal, and that he will therefore present his song in a particularly *human* way.[9]

A major element of what may be called the 'mortal focalization' of the narrator of the *Theogony* is that of adherence to a linear model of time. Unlike the gods, as we are shown in the Muses' first song, human beings are creatures whose existence is bounded and defined by the passage of time. Hence when the narrator recounts how his own limited existence came into contact with divinity, he must set that meeting within the temporal framework of the world of men. While the gods, the γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, exist in the timelessness of the eternal present, once their deeds are sung by a mortal poet they must be translated into a chronological sequence comprehensible to human beings.

Hesiod, then, informs us that he will impose a mortal's-eye-view on his divine material, requiring his Muses to sing in chronological order, ἐξ ἀρχῆς. But even while he imposes the framework of linear time onto his divine material, the opposite transformation also takes place. As the Muses' chosen poet Hesiod is granted the privilege of entering the realm of divine ἀληθέα (at least for as long as his song lasts) and causing the events of which he sings to *happen again* before the mind's eye of his listeners. This is the gift of memory, or ἐνάργεια, by means of which the inspired poet can access the timeless realm and reenact in song the deeds of long ago.

In a recent discussion of ἐνάργεια in the first 13 lines of the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo,* E. J. Bakker presents an interpretation of the temporal ambiguity surrounding the god's appearance on Olympos that links this passage in the *Apollo* to Hesiod's *Dichterweihe.*[10] Bakker argues that the famously problematic mixture of present with past tenses in the beginning of the Apollo hymn is linked to the notion of poetic 'remembering'. When a poet 'remembers' an event, as in μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λαθῶμαι Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο (*H. Ap.* 1), he engages in ἐνάργεια, the bringing-to-life of a past event through divinely-inspired song. It is through the action of remembering that a poet gains access to 'divine time' and cause the events that he narrates to 'occur again' before the eyes of his audience.[11] The poet's privileged connection

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[9] For the Muses' emphasis on Hesiod's mortality and the programmatic implications of this emphasis, see the discussion in Chap. 3.

[10] Bakker 2002: 63 81.

[11] Bakker 2002: 67 73.

to Apollo and the Muses allows him to perform this feat, which consists of nothing less than the opening of a window from mortal time onto divine time. The poet of the *Hymn to Apollo,* then, begins his tribute to the god of poetic ἐνάργεια with a scene that is itself an example of this phenomenon, and the augmented aorists of the Hymn's first 13 lines should be under-stood to refer neither exclusively to a past action nor to a gnomic omnitemporality, but to an action (i.e. the god's epiphany on Olympus) that occurred once and is now occurring again, through the medium of the poet's enargeic memory.

Another way in which the aorist tenses of the *Dichterweihe* (22-33) can be seen as Hesiod's manipulation of the temporal sequence of this poem is their reference to the actual performance of the poem as it is occurring. As Bakker demonstrates, the augmented aorist tense is frequently used by Homer in conjunction with present tenses (or other words of 'temporal immediacy', such as νῦν) to denote ἐνάργεια, the sense that the events being narrated are not so much historical phenomena as events that are happening again as the poet sings them. If Hesiod also follows this practice, the aorist tenses in lines 22-33 may refer to the poet's present narrating activity, i.e. the performance of the *Theogony* in which he is currently engaged, as the direct result of the Muses' epiphany to him. If the augments on the aorists of this passage in fact serve as deictic prefixes, as Bakker argues is the case in Homeric similes and in the first thirteen lines of the *Hymn to Apollo,* as well as elsewhere in archaic epic, then Hesiod may be using these aorists not only to mark the Muses' entrance into mortal temporality but also to point to the chief effect of that epiphany: the song that he is presently singing before us. In this way the aorist tenses of the *Dichterweihe* would complement the self-referential (and performance-referential) nature of the remarkable statement τόνδε δέ με in line 24.

Hesiod thus can be seen to trace the Muses' epiphany all the way from their 'timeless' activity in the divine sphere, through their downward and time-ward journey to the mortal sphere, to the time in the past when they appeared to Hesiod, to the very time of this performance, where their manifestation has its final result in the presently occurring moment of the song in which he 'remembers' (i.e. reenacts) these events. The power of ἐνάργεια that the Muses grant Hesiod is illustrated in line 22 with the temporal marker νύ πότε:

ἅι νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδὴν

And they now once taught Hesiod lovely song. 22

The combination of νύ with πότε, as West remarks, is unusual.[12] In fact, it is more than unusual, it is close to being a contradiction in terms. The addition of νύ to πότε adds emphasis to the temporal nature of the statement without defining it, an oddity that at first seems like a deliberate attempt on the part of the poet to confuse the temporal environment of his poem. However, the combination of νῦν, a word of temporal immediacy, with an augmented aorist (ἐδίδαξαν) would indicate, according to Bakker, that *Th.* 22 is an example of poetic 'remembering', or ἐνάργεια.[13] Hence by saying νύ πότε, Hesiod is actually bringing the scene of the *Dichterweihe* before our eyes, reenacting it through his poetic skill, and thus bridging the time in the past when the event actually occurred (πότε) to the present reality of his performance (νῦν). Thus Hesiod in the *Dicterweihe* relates not only how the Muses came to him once and taught him enargeic song, but even displays his Muse-granted power of ἐνάργεια in describing this event. Through the person of the inspired poet the divergent temporal realities of gods and men draw closer together. Hesiod both relates the timeless deeds of the gods in (human) chronological order and, through the power of ἐνάργεια, himself now wields the power of entering into divine time with his song.

Tartarus

The timelessness of divine ἀληθέα, while it is emphasized by being thus contrasted to time-bound mortal ἔτυμα, is still not felt to be wholly defined by this opposition. In order to define the temporal aspect of ἀληθέα Hesiod seems to feel the need to present the phenomenon of divine time not only among the Olympians but among the divinities of Tartarus as well. Adhering to the Indo-European tendency to verbalize concepts by means of 'merisms',

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12 West 1966 *ad loc.*

13 Bakker 2002: 74 75. As an example of ἐνάργεια in Homer, Bakker adduces *Il.* 11.362 63: "Once again now you escaped (νῦν ἔφυγες) death, dog. And yet the evil came near you, but now once more Phoibos Apollo has saved you" (νῦν...σ'ἐρύσατο). (Bakker's emphasis. Bakker uses Lattimore's translation here.)

two-part statements that indicate the totality of a thing by referring to its two extremes, Hesiod balances the presentation of timeless time in the realm of the sky gods with a parallel passage in the realm of the underworld.[14] Just as the Olympian Muses in lines 2-21 are presented as dwelling outside of time, the divinities of Tartarus are described as subject to a similar distortion or outright absence of time markers. The literary effect of the 'timeless' representation of the chthonic gods is equivalent to that achieved by the parallel 'timelessness' of the Olympians: the gods above and the gods below—the entirety of the divine order—dwell in a state of anachrony relative to the mortal world. In the mouth of the self-consciously human narrator, this emphasis on divine time underscores the contrast between divine and mortal realities, ἀληθέα and ἔτυμα.

The Tartarus passage (720-819) opens with a curious anachrony. Hesiod tells us that Zeus, after defeating the Titans, bound them

> τόσσον ἔνερθ' ὑπὸ γῆς ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης·
> τόσσον γάρ τ' ἀπὸ γῆς ἐς τάρταρον ἠερόεντα.
> ....
> ἐννέα γὰρ νύκτας τε καὶ ἤματα χάλκεος ἄκμων
> οὐρανόθεν κατιὼν, δεκάτῃ κ' ἐς γαῖαν ἵκοιτο:[15]
>
> As far below the earth as heaven is above the earth;
> so great is the distance to shadowy Tartarus.
> ......
> A brazen anvil, falling from heaven for nine days and nights,
> would reach (Tartarus) on the tenth.
>
> 720-25

Although the topos of falling for a day or a series of days is not original to Hesiod,[16] the traditional nature of this device should

[14] See Watkins 1995 esp. 43 49 for a discussion of the Indo European legacy of the bipartite merism, of which the expression "gods above and gods below" (τῶν ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω) is, as he notes, a salient example. Watkins argues convincingly that such expressions, extremely common in Greek and other Indo European descended languages, constitute a poetic inheritance from the common proto language. The tendency to think of things in bipartite and bipolar "meristic" terms is characteristic of Hesiod in both the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* (e.g. the two Erides, the just and unjust cities, that hawk and the nightingale, the quarreling brothers, etc.).

[15] The Tartarus passage, long suspected by scholars, is now generally accepted as genuine. For a convincing refutation of the arguments against authenticity see the introduction to 720 819 in West 1966. I follow West in rejecting the 734 45 and go on to question the authenticity of 750 54, as discussed below.

not blind us to its striking effect. It is remarkable that Hesiod chooses to measure the distance between earth and the underworld by means of time rather than physical space. Tartarus is not two leagues, thirty fathom, or ten miles distant from the earth, it is 'nine days deep'. The notion of the equidistance from earth of heaven and Tartarus appears in Homer, as West (1966) ad 720 points out, (τόσσον ἔνερθ' Ἀΐδεω, ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ὑπὸ γαίης *Il.* 8.16). Homer uses time to measure space in a passage describing a similar descent (Hephaestus' fall to earth *Il.*1.591-92), though, as West rightly points out, the distance between immortal and mortal realms in Hesiod is exponentially greater than it is in Homer.

Here, as in many places, it seems that Hesiod may 'commenting' on the Homeric text by increasing the tale of distance between gods and men from one day to nine days and nights. If this be the case, which it is impossible to prove, one might hypothesize that it is precisely the *closeness* that Homer portrays between gods and men to which Hesiod objects. Hesiod's cosmos is founded upon the concept of the distance between the divine and mortal realms, and so the easy intermingling of gods and men in the Homeric poems would be completely antithetical to the Hesiodic worldview. By changing the distance between heav-en and earth from one day's fall to nine, Hesiod may be amending what he perceived as a chaotic lack of definite boundaries between god and men in Homer's cosmic thought.

The motivation behind Hesiod's measuring space by means of days is clearly to emphasize the sheer immensity of the distance in question: the place where men dwell is separated from both realms of the gods by a spatial gulf of almost inconceivable profundity. A further result of thus measuring space by time, however, equally intentional on Hesiod's part, is to confuse the notion of time itself. As the narrator takes us into Tartarus by means of the falling anvil, we enter a realm where days no longer measure the passage of the sun but innumerable fathoms of space. The 'falling anvil' thus becomes the vehicle by which Hesiod effectively marks off the Tartarus section from the sequential time scheme he employs in narrating the episode that immediately precedes it, the Titanomachy.

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[16] Cf. *Il.* 1.591 92, cited below; Lucian *vera hist.* 1.10 (Lucian's seven day trip to the Moon).

While the Titanomachy is, of course, an event that occurred on the divine level and has little to do with mortals or mortal time, it consists of a series of actions that must be put into some kind of (chrono)logical order if they are to be comprehensible to a human audience. Hesiod, true to his insistence in the Proem that his theogony be told ἐξ ἀρχῆς, has accordingly narrated the Titanomachy as if it had a beginning, a middle, and an end—i.e. as if it had taken place in mortal time. Once he moves to the Tartarus section, however, Hesiod can make a dramatic shift from a temporal environment in which one event follows another to a dimension in which time and space are not wholly distinct from each other. Our perception of 'normal' (i.e. terrestrial) temporal progression becomes blurred as we enter the realm of timeless time that is the mirror opposite of the timeless dimension that the Muses, descending from Helicon, lately quit.

In an interesting doublet to the space/time confusion invoked by the anvil that falls from earth to Tartarus, the Muses' parallel journey from the realm of the gods to earth is marked, as I observe above, by a word that denotes space rather than time. Instead of making the transition from the Muses' timeless dance on Helicon (2-8) to their katabasis (9-21) by telling us that they "once" came down to meet Hesiod, the narrator declares that they came down "from there" (ἔνθεν 9). The narrator further obscures the temporal environment of this passage by telling us that the goddesses "were traveling" (στεῖχον), the temporally noncommittal imperfect being used instead of a past-aspect-insistent aorist. The notion of time does not make an appearance until the mortal poet does, with the (deliberately) disorienting phrase νύ πότε (22). The temporal/spatial confusion that introduces the Tartarus passage thus comparable to the ambiguity that accompanies the Muses' descent from 'divine' Helicon to terrestrial Helicon. In these parallel moments of transition we are made aware that we are crossing not only a boundary of physical space, but traveling from one dimension to another.

Once the anvil finally stops falling, then, and we find ourselves in Tartarus, it is clear that we are in a realm where terrestrial laws of physics do not apply. Having just encountered night (along with day) as a unit of spatial measurement (724-25), we find that in Tartarus night is also a physical substance that can be 'poured' about the Titans' prison like water: ἀμφὶ δὲ μιν νύξ / τριστοιχὶ κέχυται περὶ δειρήν (726-27). The passage in which Hesiod man-

ipulates our perception of time most overtly, however, is that in which Night and Day "come close and greet each other":

τῶν πρόσθ' Ἰαπετοῖο πάις ἔχει οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν
ἑστηὼς κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀκαμάτῃσι χέρεσσιν
ἀστεμφέως, ὅθι Νύξ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἆσσον ἰοῦσαι
ἀλλήλας προσέειπον ἀμειβόμεναι μέγαν οὐδὸν
χάλκεον· ἡ μὲν ἔσω καταβήσεται, ἡ δὲ θύραζε
ἔρχεται, οὐδέ ποτ' ἀμφοτέρας δόμος ἐντὸς ἐέργει,
ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἑτέρη γε δόμων ἔκτοσθεν ἐοῦσα
γαῖαν ἐπιστρέφεται, ἡ δ' αὖ δόμου ἐντὸς ἐοῦσα
μίμνει τὴν αὐτῆς ὥρην ὁδοῦ, ἔστ' ἂν ἵκηται·

In front of these the son of Iapetos stands holding wide heaven
on his head and with his unwearied hands
steadfastly, where Night and Day, coming close,
greet each other, crossing the great bronze threshold.
The one goes inside, while the other roams abroad;
and the house never contains both of them within,
but always the one being out of the house
wanders over the earth, while the other, being in the house,
awaits the due time for her own journey, whenever it should arrive.
746-54

The Hesiodic passage seeks to effect temporal disorientation in the audience by presenting time in the underworld as if it had physical form and substance. As in the case of the falling anvil, in this passage temporal confusion is joined with spatial confusion: the image of Atlas standing (where?)[17] and supporting the heavens "with his head and hands" (how?) presents a deliberately mind-boggling prospect to our astonished vision. It is amid this unimaginable physical environment that Hesiod introduces the concept of Day drawing close to Night. His purpose is to show that the dwelling-place of the gods below is so far removed from the human realm of linear time that the very concepts of Day and Night lose their meaning there, to the extent that they can even draw nigh to one another. Nor does the fact that they are treated as goddesses in this passage diminish the force of the oddity being described; in a dimension where time is fixed and linear the goddess Night could

[17] In 518 Atlas is described as standing "at the edges of the earth" (πείρασιν ἐν γαίης), near the Hesperides. If this designation seems contradictory to his later placement in Tartarus the contradiction serves to increase our disorientation regarding the physical characteristics of the underworld, and hence it was likely intended by Hesiod. As West 1966 ad 622 notes, "...No sharp distinction is drawn between regions outside and below the inhabited world. The essential fact about these areas is that they are beyond man's ken."

never come close to the goddess Day. That they can do so in Tartarus points to the different meaning that time has in this shadowy realm.[18]

As West (1966) ad loc. points out, *Th.* 748-49 echoes the passage in *Odyssey* 10 that describes the bizarre land of the Laistrygonians:

> ἑξῆμαρ μὲν ὁμῶς πλέομεν νύκτας τε καὶ ἦμαρ·
> ἑβδομάτῃ δ' ἱκόμεσθα Λάμου αἰπὺ πτολίεθρον,
> Τηλέπυλον Λαιστρυγονίην, ὅθι ποιμένα ποιμὴν
> ἠπύει εἰσελάων, ὁ δέ τ' ἐξελάων ὑπακούει.
> ἔνθα κ' ἄυπνος ἀνὴρ δοιοὺς ἐξήρατο μισθούς,
> τὸν μὲν βουκολέων, τὸν δ' ἄργυφα μῆλα νομεύων·
> ἐγγὺς γὰρ νυκτός τε καὶ ἤματός εἰσι κέλευθοι.
> ἔνθ' ἐπεὶ ἐς λιμένα κλυτὸν ἤλθομεν....

> Nevertheless we sailed day and night for six days,
> and on the seventh we came to the steep-walled city of Lamos,
> Laistrygonian Telepylos, where the herdsman driving in his herd
> greets another herdsman, and he, driving his herd out, responds to him.
> There a man who slept not might have earned a double wage,
> One for cowherding and the other for pasturing the bright-fleeced sheep.
> For there the paths of night and day are close together.
> And when we came into the famous harbor….
>
> *Od.* 10.80-87

The Homeric passage, which, like the Tartarus section, also opens with a journey measured in days, resembles the Hesiodic in that it seeks to disorient the listener's sense of temporal reality. Among the Laistrygonians, as in Hesiod's underworld, "the paths of Day and Night run close together." Homer skillfully heightens the uncanniness of the alien world evoked by this comment by setting it against the mundane and familiar world of herdsmen, wages, and self-imposed sleep-deprivation. To add to the effect, the bizarre comment is never explained. Odysseus presents the information about the proximity of day and night in a straightforward, almost offhand manner, as if its meaning were self-evident. The result is that we marvel at it the more, and Homer's purpose is achieved.

It seems likely that Hesiod composed *Th.* 748-49 with the Odyssean passage in mind. Seizing upon the effect created by the unexplained comment about the paths of day and night lying close

[18] Fränkel 1962: 115 explains that in this passage Hesiod is trying to show the orderly progression of Day and Night. I should like to suggest, however, that Hesiod's purpose in these lines is to illustrate precisely the opposite point: in Tartarus, the distinction of day and night is meaningless; they "come close together" and become indistinguishable in this misty netherworld.

together, Hesiod 'improved' the passage by having the greeting exchanged between Day and Night themselves, rather than herdsmen (whose existence in the underworld would be problematic, anyway). Furthermore, Hesiod introduced the concept of the 'great bronze threshold' as a means of focusing our attention on the sudden physicality of these temporal goddesses. In 748-49 we are made to contemplate divinities the whole purpose of whose being is to order time, in a context where they *dis*order time. They become instead physical entities that speak and cross over thresholds. The effect is even more unsettling than that of the Homeric passage and imparts a sense of uncanniness to the underworld scene.

The lines that follow 748-49, however, seem designed to undo the temporal chicanery that Hesiod so carefully devised for our amazement. While lines 748-49 are clearly designed to highlight the timeless nature of the underworld, the following lines approach Tartarus precisely as if it did operate on the basis of fixed linear time. As if striving to erase the unsettling oddity of a place in which the boundary between Day and Night breaks down, lines 750-54 reassert a human temporal environment onto the picture. Day, we are told, can never actually come too close to Night (despite the evidence of 748-49), as one of them is always indoors while the other is abroad. Line 54, with its triple invocation of words that imply obedience to a set chronological order, absolutely insists on the concept of ordered time. It informs us that whichever of the goddesses is in the house μίμνει τὴν αὐτῆς ὥρην ὁδοῦ, ἔστ' ἂν ἵκηται· (awaits the due time for her own journey, whenever it should arrive).

It is scarcely to be doubted that the concept of Night and Day as sisters who share a house to which each repairs in turn is a very ancient Indo-European 'motifeme'; West cites two passages from the *Rig Veda* that exactly parallel the sense of *Th.* 750-54.[19] One wonders, however, if Hesiod ever intended to include it in this passage. In lines 748-49 Tartarus is depicted as a place where meaningful divisions of time dissolve, but with in 750-54 it becomes a place where time is ordered. Since this view of time is foreign to that presented in the rest of the Tartarus passage and in the parallel passage of the Muses on Helicon, and since 750-54

[19] *Rig Veda* i.113. 2 3 and i.123.7, cited in West 1966 ad 748 54. For the term "motifeme," a mythic motif that is transmitted in conjunction with a specific set of words or concepts, see Watkins 1995: 454 and 457 58.

could easily have originated in an interpolator's desire to explain the μέγαν οὐδὸν of line 749, I submit that they are not genuine to the poem. Hesiod may well have imitated the highly effective terseness of the Laistrygonian passage, saying nothing more about Night and Day than that they passed a great threshold and, most unnervingly, came close to each other. The effect of this statement without the contradictory and rather tedious explanation offered in the lines that follow is to disorient the listener and make him realize that his notions about time do not apply to Tartarus.[20] Among the gods below, as among those above, time does not follow the same rules as it does on earth.

Temporality and the Oath of Styx

To Hesiod's mind, all gods, being immortal and ageless, are thus naturally exempt from the exigencies of linear time. That Hesiod considered this exemption one of the positive aspects of divinity is shown by the fact that when a god forswears his oath by Styx, the exemption is temporarily revoked. A god who perjures himself must undergo a punishment measured in linear time:

> κεῖται νήυτμος τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν·
> οὐδέ ποτ' ἀμβροσίης καὶ νέκταρος ἔρχεται ἆσσον
> βρώσιος, ἀλλά τε κεῖται ἀνάπνευστος καὶ ἄναυδος
> στρωτοῖς ἐν λεχέεσσι, κακὸν δ' ἐπὶ κῶμα καλύπτει.
> αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νοῦσον τελέσει μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,
> ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἆθλος·
> εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαμείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων,
> οὐδέ ποτ' ἐς βουλὴν ἐπιμίσγεται οὐδ' ἐπὶ δαῖτας
> ἐννέα πάντ' ἔτεα· δεκάτῳ δ' ἐπιμίσγεται αὖτις

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[20] It seems significant that the passage suspected by West of interpolation in this section, 734 45, also attempts to explain a paradoxical statement concerning the underworld. In the first Atlas passage, 517 518 Atlas is said to stand πείρασιν ἐν γαίης. In lines 736 38, which introduce the second Atlas section, the (probable) interpolator tells us at considerable length that Tartarus is place where the limits (πείρατα 738) of earth, sky, and sea are found. This explanation may have been added to reconcile Atlas' presence both at the ends of the earth and in the underworld. I concur with West (1966 ad 622) in thinking that Hesiod would not have perceived a contradiction between "Atlas at the ends of the earth" and "Atlas in Tartarus." If lines 750 54 are in fact spurious, they may the product of the same punctilious mind, which was disturbed by the physical and temporal abnormalities of the Hesiodic underworld and so sought to smooth them out.

†ειρέας[21] ἀθανάτων οἳ Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσι.

...He lies, breathless for an entire year.
Nor does he ever come close to ambrosia and nectar
to eat it, but lies breathless and without voice,
on his laid-out bed, and an evil coma covers him.
But when he completes his sickness after a full year,
he receives another trial more difficult than the first:
for nine years he stays cut off from the gods who live forever,
nor ever does he take part in their counsel or feasts
for all of nine years. But on the tenth he takes part again
joining the immortals who have their homes on Olympus.

795-804

One cannot but be struck by the impression that a great deal of the unpleasantness of this punishment is expressed by temporal words. It is a bad thing, surely, to lie breathless, but the way in which Hesiod expresses the full direness of this chastisement is by twice stressing that it must be undergone for an entire year (τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν 795, ἐπὴν νοῦσον τελέσει μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν 799). This emphasis on time becomes even more marked in the description of the second part of the punishment, where the perjured god is banished from Olympian society for ten years (801-803). Hesiod describes this part of the sentence as "more difficult" than the κακὸν κῶμα, but the only thing that could possibly make it so is the fact that it lasts longer. The penalty for breaking the Oath of Styx is thus dreadful to the gods principally on account of its duration.

While it may seem self-evident that any punishment that is not permanent must have a time limit, Hesiod was not required to emphasize that limit. He might have presented the punishment of the perjured god in the same 'timeless' way as he depicted the punishment of Prometheus, i.e. by dwelling on the unpleasant things inflicted on the culprit rather than on their duration.

Other Analepses in the 'Theogony'

The remaining three analepses in the *Theogony* are considerably less marked than the analepsis in the *Dichterweihe*. Hesiod employs them as an effective tool for furthering the plot of individual episodes:

[21] West 1966 daggers this word in his text, citing but not adopting the suggestions of Hermann (εἴρας ἐς), Ruhnken (εἴραις), and Sittl (εἴρας).

1. πεύθετο γὰρ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
οὕνεκά οἱ πέπρωτο ἑῷ ὑπὸ παιδὶ δαμῆναι,
καὶ κρατερῷ περ ἐόντι, Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βούλας.

For he learned from Gaia and starry Ouranos
that it was fated for him to be overcome by his son,
mighty though he was, through the counsels of great Zeus.

463-65

2. Ὀβριάρεῳ δ' ὡς πρῶτα πατὴρ ὠδύσσατο θυμῷ
Κόττῳ τ' ἠδὲ Γύγῃ, δῆσε κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ,

When their father first became angry at Obriareus
and Kottos and Gyges he bound them in strong bonds

617-18

3. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς εἵμαρτο περίφρονα τέκνα γενέσθαι·
πρώτην μὲν κούρην γλαυκώπιδα Τριτογένειαν. . . .
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἄρα παῖδα θεῶν βασιλῆα καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἤμελλεν τέξεσθαι, ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ ἔχοντα·

For it was fated that exceedingly wise children be born from her:
first a girl, grey-eyed Tritogenia, ...
but then, indeed, she was going to give birth to a son,
a king of gods and men, who would have an overweening heart.

894-95, 897-98

In these passages Hesiod employs analepsis to refer to a previous action or prophecy at the point in time where that action influences the events of his plot. The narrator delays mention of the prophecies of Kronos and Zeus regarding threats to their rule until the point at which action is taken to avert those prophecies. Similarly, the analepsis describing Ouranos' previous treatment of the Hecatoncheires is employed as a succinct means of providing the background for the account of how Zeus brings them out of bondage. With the exception of the deliberately and programmatically unsettling analepsis in the *Dichterweihe* passage, the analepses in the *Theogony* are designed to delay information until it pertains to the immediate situation being narrated.

Prolepsis in the 'Theogony'

While Hesiod employs analepsis primarily to set out the events of his plot with the greatest effect, his use of prolepsis is more closely tied in with the pervasive themes of the poem: the victory of Zeus' order and the bipolar arrangement of the universe between

god and man. As C. Robert notes, "The whole poem is characterized by a 'manner of prolepsis' that is most evident in the four 'epochs' or 'stages': the scene with Gaia and Ouranos (154-210), the overthrow of Kronos (459-506), the Titanomachy (617-819), and the victory over Typhoeus (820-85)."[22] The primary narrator-focalizer continually refers to the human race and Zeus at points in the poem that predate the birth of either, and, in addition to the main passages of prolepsis enumerated by Robert, Hesiod makes detailed anachronistic comments about the world of men in several other important passages: the monsters (265-336), Hecate (416-52), and Prometheus (550-616). Moreover, the passage describing the Children of Night, which comes very early in the poem (211-32), should also be understood as an anachronistic reference to the human race, as these dark divinities represent the banes and afflictions from which the gods are usually far removed and which primarily affect mankind.

In a recent monograph, J. S. Clay argues that the proleptic references to mankind in the *Theogony* are not prolepses at all, but rather indicate an extremely early date for the birth of the human race. Citing *Works and Days* 145, which states that the race of heroes was descended ἐκ μελιᾶν, Clay locates the creation of mankind as occurring shortly after the birth of the Meliai, or 'Ash-tree nymphs' (*Th.* 185-87) from the blood that issued from castrated Ouranos.[23] Although it would certainly accord with Hesiod's pervasive and fundamental concept of the bipartite universe to have the race of men come into being coevally with its immortal counterpart, it is important not to lose sight of how Hesiod presents—or fails to present—this information to his audience. The Hesiodic narrator in fact does *not* tell us when mankind were born, a point that Clay makes but then fails to carry to its logical conclusion. Hesiod withholds this information because his mandate is to sing of the gods alone; we are meant to see him as the representative of the human race in this poem rather than look for hints as to when our race came into being.[24] Hence even if the

22 Robert 1966: 162.

23 J. S. Clay 2003: Chap. 4.

24 Clay's proposition (*ibid.*) that we should read *Theogony* and *Works and Days* as complementary visions of the universe, and hence use *Op.* 145 as a means of finding out when men were created in the *Theogony,* is intriguing but problematic. In the proem of the *Works and Days* Hesiod makes a point of *not* invoking the Muses to aid him in singing, seeming confident that he is able to utter ἐτήτυμα, "realities" (i.e. mortal truths), quite on his own. His refusal of

human race is born immediately after Ouranos' castration, and the references to men and the human condition that occur in the early part of the *Theogony* are not proleptic, the fact remains that Hesiod rather ostentatiously conceals this information from us.

The uncertainty that surrounds the origins of the human race in this poem serves the same purpose as proleptic references to humans would: by shrouding the date of man's creation in mystery and referring to mankind very early on in his poem Hesiod makes it seem as if human beings were 'always there'. The omnitemporality of the human race in the *Theogony* allows Hesiod to present the cosmos as fundamentally divided between the divine and mortal realms from its earliest beginnings, without obscuring the stark duality achieved by the image of the poet as representative of the human race who sings about the gods.

In addition to the 'main' passages of prolepsis there are many minor proleptic comments, many of which describe a newborn god in terms of the functions that he will fulfill in a later epoch.[25] These proleptic comments all focus the audience's attention on how the earlier events of the poem lead inexorably to the final and permanent ordering that they receive under Zeus.

The catalogue of monsters (270-336) offers the most dramatic example of Hesiod's tendency to compress the temporal framework of many of the events that he recounts. J. S. Clay regards this method of presenting time as a function of the poet's vision of the creation of the cosmos as a series of divine births, beginning with the amorphous, 'primordial principles' of Chaos,

divine aid is made clear when he emphatically assigns to the Muses and Zeus (τύνη 10) the task of singing divine matters and making justice straight, while pointedly distancing himself from their activity by saying that he, on the other hand, will speak ἐτήτυμα to Perses. Line 10 implies that Hesiod's song about human realities will be both parallel to and separate from the song of the Muses. This distance that the narrator of *Op.* places in the proem between himself and his means of gaining divine knowledge renders his account of mankind's origins in this poem suspect. Only the gods know when and how man was created; without their aid, Hesiod has no means of accessing this information. If the realms of god and man are bridged in *Th.* through the agency of the Muse inspired poet, in the Muse denying arena of the *Op.* they are sundered. For this reason I believe that then narrator of the *Works and Days* should be considered "unreliable," i.e. his words are not a true representation of what the implied author wishes us to learn from this poem, especially when he discourses on divine matters, such as the nature of the goddess Eris or the origin of mankind. The mortal ἐτήτυμα that the narrator of *Op.* is so confident he can utter without the Muses' aid are, after all, "only a rumor." I shall explore the dubious nature of the *Op.'s* narrator in a forthcoming book.

[25] Robert 1966: 163.

Gaia, and Ouranos, and ending with gods of much more specific characteristics and functions:

> This genealogical evolution can be seen as a process of successive separation, differentiation, and hierarchization. At the same time, however, this process is radically teleological. As a result, Hesiod frequently collapses chronology. . . . [A]llusions to the final and permanent ordering of the cosmos under Zeus anachronistically intrude on descriptions of earlier phases of cosmic evolution, thus giving the *Theogony* as a whole a double perspective in which being and becoming are intertwined.
>
> Such a double vision likewise informs the catalogue of monsters. While their births occur at a relatively early phase of cosmic evolution, (and hence toward the beginning of the poem) Hesiod also relates how six of them are dispatched by heroes, who belong to a much later stage of cosmic history, postdating Zeus' accession to power.[26]

It is Hesiod's 'radically teleological' view of cosmogony that prompts him to lay the birth of the monsters, which belongs to the primordial past, beside the heroes who later slay them. The monsters belong to a time that predates Zeus and the human race, but by following the description of their birth with the story of what effect they have on mankind, Hesiod is able to link the distant past with the world of men. Zeus, too, is given proleptic mention in the catalogue as the recipient of lightening bolts from Pegasus (285-86).

In the monster catalogue, then, the narrator succeeds in both describing the offspring of Phorkys and Keto and in relating them, through repeated prolepses, to the time of Zeus' reign and the world of the present day. The question now remains, how do these anachronies relate to the narrator's programmatic statement that his poem will proceed ἐξ ἀρχῆς? Can these anachronies be explained as somehow contributing to the 'proper order' in which the events of the *Theogony* are supposedly arranged, or must we attribute them, as West does, to an inability to 'think historically' on the part of the unfortunate poet?[27]

An analysis of the other anachronistic passages of the poem provides the answers to these questions. After the monster catalogue, the Hecate, Prometheus, and Typhoeus passages contain the longest sections of anachrony in the *Theogony.* In each the primary narrator-focalizer relates the interaction of the main character and Zeus with its resulting effect on humanity. In the

[26] Clay 1993: 107.
[27] West 1966: ad 450.

Hecate passage, this explanatory section consists of lines 411-15, which describe the relationship between Hecate and Zeus; and 416-47, in which Hecate's potential harms and benefits to men are described. The explanatory statement of the narrator demonstrates the proleptic and ultimately teleological nature of these lines:

> καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ὅτε πού τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
> ἔρδων ἱερὰ καλὰ κατὰ νόμον ἱλάσκηται,
> κικλήσκει Ἑκάτην· . . . .
>
> And even now, whenever someone of earthbound men
> performs fine sacrifices and prays in the appropriate way,
> he calls on Hecate. . . .
>
> 416-18

The narrator is clearly intent on linking the mythical event that occurred in the past on the divine level to its *telos*: the ramifications it has in the world of men.

The same impulse motivates lines 556-57 of the Prometheus passage. The narrator of the *Theogony* concludes his description of Prometheus' 'sacrifice trick' with an explanatory comment similar to the one used in the Hecate passage:

> ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων
> καίουσ' ὀστέα λευκὰ θυηέντων ἐπὶ βωμῶν.
>
> And because of this the races of men upon the earth
> burn the white bones of sacrificial beasts to the immortals.
>
> 556-57

The comment that ends the Typhoeus passage similarly links an action that occurs on the divine plane (the defeat and imprisonment of the monster Typhoeus, 857-68) to an effect still felt by humans today (the winds of Typhoeus, 869-80). All of these prolepses create a vivid impression of the continuity of events from the distant, mythical past to the conditions that shape mortal existence in the narrator's own day. This use of anachrony helps achieve what I perceive as the all-pervasive goal of the *Theogony*: the desire to explain and reveal the relative positions of god and man in the cosmos as it has evolved.

Prolepsis in the Hecate Passage

The Hecate passage is not itself presented out of chronological order but it contains several striking anachronisms. Zeus is

mentioned four times in the passage (412,423, 428, and 450), despite the fact that he is not born until after line 478, and Poseidon and Hermes also receive proleptic mention. Moreover, in the second half of the Hecate passage the narrator even goes so far as to describe how the goddess affects our own time. Whereas in 411-28 he describes Hecate in terms of her status among her divine peers, in 429-47 he portrays her exclusively in terms of how she affects human beings:

> καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ὅτε πού τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων 416
> ἔρδων ἱερὰ καλὰ κατὰ νόμον ἱλάσκεται,
> κικλήσκει Ἑκάτην· . . . .
> ᾧ δ' ἐθέλῃ, μεγάλως παραγίνεται ἠδ' ὀνίνησιν· 429
> ἔν τε δίκῃ βασιλεῦσι παρ' αἰδοίοισι καθίζει. . . . 434
> ἐσθλὴ δ' ἱππήεσσι παρεστάμεν οἷς κ' ἐθέλῃσιν· ... 439
> καὶ τοῖς, οἳ γλαυκὴν δυσπέμφελον ἐργάζονται, 440
> εὔχονται δ' Ἑκάτῃ καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ Ἐννοσιγαίῳ,
> ῥηιδίως ἄγρην κυδρὴ θεὸς ὤπασε πολλήν,
> ῥεῖα δ' ἀφείλετο φαινομένην, ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷ.
> ἐσθλὴ δ' ἐν σταθμοῖσι σὺν Ἑρμῇ ληίδ' ἀέξειν·
> βουκολίας δὲ βοῶν τε καὶ αἰπόλια πλατέ' αἰγῶν 445
> ποίμνας τ' εἰροπόκων ὀίων, θυμῷ γ' ἐθέλουσα,
> ἐξ ὀλίγων βριάει κἀκ πολλῶν μείονα θῆκεν.
>
> And even now, whenever someone of earth-dwelling mortals
> making lovely sacrifices prays in the proper fashion,
> he calls on Hecate. . . .
> She stands by the one she favors and helps him greatly,
> and at judgment she sits beside awe-inspiring kings….
> She is a noble helper to the horseman whom she favors;
> and to those who labor on the grey and stormy sea
> and pray to Hecate and the loud-roaring Earthshaker
> the glorious goddess easily grants an abundant catch
> and easily takes it away once it appears, when she wishes in her heart;
> and she, with Hermes, excels at increasing the herd in the stables;
> the droves of cattle and the wide herds of goats,
> and the flocks of fleecy sheep, when she wishes so in her heart;
> from few she causes increase, and from many she makes few.
> 416-18; 429-30; 439-47

With the emphatic statement καὶ γὰρ νῦν Hesiod brings the time of Hecate's birth forward into the present, showing as he does so that the divine actions of the distant past have a direct impact on the lives of men.

It is striking how the presentation of Hecate changes once she is proleptically linked with mankind. The sections dealing with Hecate's effects on mortals (416-20; 429-49) are characterized by

pervasive uncertainty. The overwhelming idea in these sections is not so much what Hecate can do for mankind as what she can do *if she please.* The frequent repetition of κ' ἐθέλῃσιν and other phrases indicating Hecate's capricious tendencies in bestowing her blessings is found only in the section focalized from the mortal perspective, and, indeed, itself forms another aspect of that focalization. It is inherent in the human condition that men have no control over their success or failure, even despite their prayers and offerings, and this preoccupation with the helplessness of mankind in the face of the divine contributes to our impression of a human point of view in this section. Just as the benefits bestowed by Hecate apply only to mankind, the arbitrary nature of her distribution of these blessings is likewise a concern for human beings alone. By mentioning Hecate's effects on human beings at a time in the poem before human beings may have been created,[28] Hesiod links the divine events of the distant past with the mortal realities of his own time.

Prolepsis in the Typhoeus Passage

An extended prolepsis on the effect that a god has on post-Promethean humanity (which sails and farms) also occurs in the Typhoeus passage. The last part of the Typhoeus passage mirrors the structure of the second half of the Hecate section, insofar as it relates how the deity affects mankind:

ἐκ δὲ Τυφωέος ἔστ' ἀνέμων μένος ὑγρὸν ἀέντων,
νόσφι Νότου Βορέω τε καὶ ἀργεστέω Ζεφύροιο·
οἵ γε μὲν ἐκ θεόφιν γενεήν, θνητοῖς μέγ' ὄνειαρ.
αἱ δ' ἄλλαι μὰψ αὖραι ἐπιπνείουσι θάλασσαν·
αἳ δή τοι πίπτουσαι ἐς ἠεροειδέα πόντον,
πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι, κακῇ θυίουσιν ἀέλλῃ·
ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλαι ἄεισι διασκιδνᾶσί τε νῆας
ναύτας τε φθείρουσι· κακοῦ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἀλκὴ
ἀνδράσιν, οἳ κείνῃσι συνάντωνται κατὰ πόντον.
αἳ δ' αὖ καὶ κατὰ γαῖαν ἀπείριτον ἀνθεμόεσσαν
ἔργ' ἐρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων,
πιμπλεῖσαι κόνιός τε καὶ ἀργαλέου κολοσυρτοῦ.

And from Typhoeus comes the wet fury of blowing winds,

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[28] It is unclear whether human beings have been created by line 416 or not, but at any rate the mention of sacrifice is a proleptic reference to a post Promethean age.

apart from Notos and Boreas and sky-clearing Zephyros;
these, indeed, are from the gods by birth, a great benefit to mortals,
but the other winds blow upon the ocean without purpose.
They fall upon the cloud-faced sea
a great bane to mortals; they rage with an evil whirlwind,
and, blowing at different times, they rip apart ships
and kill sailors. There is no cure against misfortune
for the men who meet those winds at sea,
and then again on the boundless, blooming earth
they destroy the beautiful works of earthbound men,
filling them up with dust and grievous uproar.

869-80

The proleptic nature of this section is evidenced by the fact that the violent winds of Typhoeus are described solely in terms of the havoc that they wreak on mankind. In an interesting echo of the corresponding 'catalogue of livelihoods' section of the Hecate passage, the 'bane' of Typhoeus is described as affecting two kinds of men, sailors and land-dwellers. Just as the 'Hymn to Hecate' enumerates several types of men who might benefit from Hecate's support, the parallel section of the Typhoeus passage gives a list of those who might suffer at hands of this god.

A significant theme common to both passages is that of man's inability to predict or control the actions of either deity. Hecate, although she can be persuaded, is capricious in her bestowal or removal of blessings, and Typhoeus's winds are unpredictable and randomly destructive. The chaotic nature of Typhoeus's winds is further emphasized by the contrast drawn between them and the divine South, North, and West winds, who can be moved by prayer to help mortals.[29] Thus the second halves of the Typhoeus and Hecate passages both emphasize man's inability to control or predict how the god in question will affect his livelihood. This shared emphasis on man's helplessness in the face of the divine reflects the human-oriented focalization that characterizes these latter sections of the two passages. When discussing how gods and men interact on a daily basis, whether for good or ill, the fact of man's powerlessness in the relationship is as unavoidable to the human narrator of the *Theogony* as it is to all humans who pray. Hesiod proleptically presents the ramifications that Hecate and Typhoeus

[29] Cf. Herodotus, *Hist.* 7.178 and 189, where the Delphians and Athenians are instructed by oracles to pray to the winds for help against the Persians. Cf. also *Il.* 23.194 211, where Achilles prays to the winds for aid in lighting the funeral pyre of Patroklos.

have had for the human race, and in doing so reiterates the poem's main theme of the gulf separating men from gods.

Other Prolepses

The other proleptic statements in the *Theogony* have a similar goal of relating a divine event or personnage to the effect it has or the role the god plays under the present order of Zeus. These include the mention of Eros (120), Aphrodite (204), Nemesis (223), Oath (231) (as well as all the intervening Children of Night, whose very nature connects them with mankind)[30], the Oceanids (347), and the stone at Delphi (500). Certain other prolepses are used in much the same way as the analepses to further the plot or aid in characterization: Pegasus (284), the victory of Zeus (490), and Epimetheus (512). An interesting theory on the reason for the prolepses in the *Theogony* is offered by J. M. Rios, who argues that Hesiod uses the prolepses to construct a 'counter-narrative' concerning the distribution of τιμαί which occurs outside the main catalogue of the birth of the gods.[31] By making proleptic comments that define a god's τιμή, Hesiod is able to superimpose a 'catalogue of honors' onto his catalogue of gods. "Hesiod has no need of a separate catalogue to outline the distribution of honors after Zeus' victory since a description is already embedded within the genealogical catalogue."[32] The ultimate purpose of these prolepses is, however, teleological, pointing to the inevitable victory of Zeus:

> While the main catalogue pursues the development of the genealogical lines and the succession myth to the climactic final battles, the proleptic elaborations depict the course of events and the result of those battles, namely, the establishment of Zeus' rule.[33]

The prolepses are thus designed not only to relate, in many instances, the honors that are bestowed on certain figures, but to demonstrate how the events of the distant, divine past relate to the present-day world of men.

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[30] For more on how the Children of Night relate to mankind, see the treatment of this passage below in Chap. 6.

[31] Rios 1997: 6.

[32] Rios 1997: 15.

[33] *Ibid.*

Similes in the 'Theogony'

One of the most obvious ways in which Hesiod sees the timeless events of his song through the eyes of a mortal in the time-bound world of men is through his extended similes of the Bees (594-602) and of the Metals (861-67).[34] In terms of narratology, similes could be analyzed as sections of Commentary, for they represent the narrator's self-conscious comment upon the events that he is narrating and a decision to intrude his authorial presence into the performance for the purpose of clarifying or enhancing the effect of his words on the audience.[35] Instead of merely telling us that woman was created as a καλὸν κακόν for men, or that the earth was melted by the ardor of Zeus' thunderbolt, the Hesiodic narrator steps forward, breaking the illusion that the divine events being narrated are unfolding without his help, and directs us to look at a scene from the human world in order to more fully appreciate what he is telling us. The anthropocentric nature of similes is emphasized by de Jong, who makes the interesting observation that many of the similes in Homer are focalized from a character's perspective.[36] In telling us that Diomedes shuddered at the sight of Ares like a man who shudders and leaps back from a raging torrent (*Il.* 5.596-600) Homer not only gives us a sense of how Diomedes physically reacted to the epiphany of Ares, but by focalizing the simile from the warrior's perspective he gives us an insight into the character of Diomedes himself. In effect, Homer allows us to know what it *felt like* to be Diomedes at that moment.[37] Similes focalized from a character's perspective can thus be used as devices of characterization.

Because similes represent poetic ἐνάργεια in their own right,[38] however, and because they, in effect, interrupt the temporal flow

[34] For the nature and function of the epic simile, see Fränkel 1921; Bassett 1921: 132 47; Krischer 1971: Scott 1974; Moulton 1977; Bonnafé 1983; Baltes, 1983; Edwards 1987: 102 110; Bakker 2002: 75 81. For recent work on the Homeric simile as a means of producing *enargeia,* see Bakker, 2001: 1 23. For an interesting argument that epic similes represent intrusions of lyric poetic genres into epic see Martin 1997: 138 66.

[35] Richardson 1990: 66 67 makes the point that similes draw attention to the mediation of the narrator.

[36] de Jong 1987a: 126 36.

[37] de Jong 1987: 128.

[38] Bakker 2002: 76.

of the poem and obtrude one time frame over another, it is more useful to analyze them in terms of their temporal impact on the poem. Richardson analyzes Homeric similes under the rubric of ‘descriptive pauses’, in which we encounter the “paradox of a pause in which events occur but the story does not proceed.”[39] The temporal disruption that occurs with the introduction of a simile, however, is considered by Richardson to be less significant than the juxtaposition that the simile offers between the present world of the audience and the distant past of the events being nar-rated.[40] I would argue, however, that one of the purposes of the *Theogony*’s most (in)famous simile, the Simile of the Bees, is to use the anachrony created by its insertion as a means of em-phasizing the bipartite nature of the universe divided between gods and mortals.[41]

In the *Theogony* Hesiod uses similes not only in the traditional way to provide a readily comprehensible image of an abstract concept or a scene that is difficult to imagine (the principle purpose of the simile of the melting metals), but also to explain ‘divine’ events of cosmic magnitude and enduring impact for the human race in terms of everyday mortal realities. The Bee simile is designed to show in what way the punishment that Zeus inflicted upon men for their involvement with Prometheus still endures today. Immediately following the passage describing the creation of Woman (585-93), Hesiod explains the new ‘bane’ that has been inflicted upon the male race (πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι μετ’ ἀνδράσι ναιετάουσιν / οὐλομένης πενίης οὐ σύμφοροι, ἀλλὰ κόροιο 593-94) by likening women to lazy, gluttonous drones:

> ὡς δ’ ὁπότ’ ἐν σμήνεσσι κατηρεφέεσσι μέλισσαι
> κηφῆνας βόσκωσι, κακῶν ξυνήονας ἔργων·
> αἱ μέν τε πρόπαν ἦμαρ ἐς ἠέλιον καταδύντα
> †ἠμάτιαι σπεύδουσι τιθεῖσί τε κηρία λευκά,
> οἱ δ’ ἔντοσθε μένοντες ἐπηρεφέας κατὰ σίμβλους
> ἀλλότριον κάματον σφετέρην ἐς γαστέρ’ ἀμῶνται·
> ὣς δ’ αὔτως ἄνδρεσσι κακὸν θνητοῖσι γυναῖκας
> Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης θῆκε, ξυνήονας ἔργων
> ἀργαλέων....

> Just as when in roofed hives the honeybees
> feed the drones, partners in wicked deeds;
> the former are busy all day long everyday until the sun sets

[39] Richardson 1990: 64.

[40] Richardson 1990: 66 67.

[41] For excellent discussions of the ‘Woman’ in the *Theogony* cf. Loraux 1978: 43 87; Arthur 1982: 74 76, and Zeitlin 1996: 53 86.

and they set out the white combs,
but the latter, remaining inside among their roofed hives,
reap into their own bellies the fruit of others' labor.
Just so high-thundering Zeus made women an evil thing
for men, partners in deeds
—in *grievous* deeds, that is.

594-602

This passage (and its counterpart in the *Works and Days*) has excited a great deal of scholarly discussion on the archaic Greek attitude towards women. It is important to realize, however, that the creation of Woman as presented in the *Theogony* is an event of the same order of cosmic magnitude as the separation of gods and men and constitutes, in fact, the final stage of that separation. Hesiod does not include the 'misogynistic' myth of the creation of Woman simply because he may have personally disliked women any more than he includes the Hecate passage because he had a personal affection for that goddess. The narrator of the *Theogony* is concerned with showing how the cosmos came to be in its present form, and the unhappy position of human beings in that cosmos is a significant part of that question from his mortal point of view.

In describing the creation of women as a punishment from Zeus, therefore, Hesiod continues his pattern, introduced in the *Dichterweihe* and taken up in the Prometheus scene, of explaining the miseries of the mortal condition in terms of separation. Because Prometheus separated the two portions of meat, mankind became separated from the gods, and is henceforth subject to the duality of the mortal—immortal relationship. Because Prometheus then stole fire, mankind became separated from *itself,* becoming divided into the polar opposites of good (man) and evil (woman), and is henceforth unavoidably subject to the male—female relationship.[42] The concept of Woman as the embodiment of all the negative qualities of the human race is a recognized feature of archaic Greek iconography. As C. Sourvinou-Inwood points out, "when the female is opposed to the male (as a symbolic counter)

[42] One is strongly reminded of the myth told by Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium* (189d 191e), in which the double bodied forbears of the human race are split in half for their hubris. It seems not unlikely that Plato's "Aristophanes" had Hesiod's version of the Prometheus Pandora myth in mind when giving his own account of how misery came to men via the splitting of the race into male and female, even though the "misery" in this myth is specifically that of longing for the beloved rather than the misery arising the other baleful necessities of the mortal condition, work and death.

she stands for the negative values in the Greek representations."[43] Hence the division of the human race into male and female reflects the division of the cosmos into immortal and mortal. Hesiod thus should not be regarded as presenting his 'own' view on women in this passage, but as using the male-female polarization to demonstrate the fundamental truth of the mortal condition: we are not like the gods.

In order to portray most vividly how the divided nature of the cosmos is reflected in the henceforth permanently riven nature of mankind Hesiod has chosen the medium of the simile. The sundering of mankind into male and female poles, which occurred in the primordial Urzeit of the mythic past, is brought to life in the Bee simile's enargeic vision of the divided beehive. Hesiod shows how the splitting of mankind, an event that occurred in the past and on the 'divine level' (since it was the gods who made Woman and caused her to dwell among men), continues to affect the human race today by likening it to a (presumably) readily observable aspect of daily life: the division of labor in the beehive. Thanks to a divine action, the way in which women eat men out of house and home, which is, as we have seen, no more than a bipolar conception of humankind's enslavement to the belly and separation from the gods, is now an always-true thing. Therefore Hesiod describes it in terms of another always-true thing, the beehive, which belongs to the mortal sphere and is not presented as resulting from a divine action. Hesiod thus acts as the bridge between immortal ἀληθέα and mortal ἔτυμα, between immortal time and mortal time, a function that he alone, by virtue of his relationship with the Muses, is able to perform.

The Simile of the Metals ('Theogony' 861-67)

Because the creation of woman is a cosmic truth of such vast implications for mankind, Hesiod uses a simile to describe it in a way that human beings can readily grasp. Through the splitting of the human race into its polar opposites, Zeus has caused mortal time to overlap with divine time, with the result that the creation of Woman, an action that happened once on the 'timeless' divine

[43] Sourvinou Inwood 1990: 411 and 1979: 9 10, 53.

level, is now a constant truth in the human sphere. The device of the simile, with its vivid intrusion of another time frame onto the current temporal framework of the story, is an appropriate vehicle for describing this ‘intrusion’ of divine time into mortal time. The *Theogony*’s other extended simile, the Simile of the Metals, while it does not employ the same kind of anachrony as that of the Bees, nevertheless does serve to heighten the contrast, always implicit where not explicit in this profoundly bipolar poem, between the world of gods and that of human beings.

> ....πολλὴ δὲ πελώρη καίετο γαῖα
> αὐτμῇ θεσπεσίῃ, καὶ ἐτήκετο κασσίτερος ὣς
> τέχνῃ ὑπ’ αἰζηῶν ἐν εὐτρήτοις χοάνοισι
> θαλφθείς, ἠὲ σίδηρος, ὅ περ κρατερώτατός ἐστιν,
> οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσι δαμαζόμενος πυρὶ κηλέῳ
> τήκεται ἐν χθονὶ δίῃ ὑφ’ Ἡφαίστου παλάμῃσιν·
> ὣς ἄρα τήκετο γαῖα σέλαι πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο.

> And the monstrous earth was burning greatly
> By the divine blast, and it was melting as tin
> Heated by the art of workmen in well-pierced crucibles,
> Or as iron, which is strongest of all,
> Melts in the glens of a mountain, vanquished by raging fire,
> In the holy earth at the hands of Hephaistos.
> Just so earth was melting by the flash of burning fire.
>
> 861-67

The principle function of this simile is, of course, to allow the audience to envision the terrible intensity of the battle between Zeus and Typhoeus. It is not enough to say that the earth melted in the clash between two mighty gods; Hesiod interrupts the temporal flow of his story to show us an image from the mundane mortal sphere in order to explain what this divine conflict resembled. This simile, which is not concerned with showing how a one-time event on the divine level has affected mortal life in perpetuity, does not seem to share the complexity (or the controversial content) of the Bee Simile, and accordingly it has received far less attention. As an example of anachrony, however, this simile poses several interesting problems.

To begin with, it is striking that in a poem so self-consciously concerned with divine affairs this battle between gods should be compared to the smith-work of men. Hesiod could have easily chosen another image of melting with which to compare the melting of the earth, but he chose to superimpose the activity of human beings (who may or may not exist at this point in the

Theogony) onto that of the gods. The simile itself is bipartite in nature, being divided into the simile of the tin (861-63) and that of the iron (864-67). These two halves of the Metals simile, moreover, are presented as polar opposites of each other in several ways: the tin, which Hesiod does not need to tell us is the weakest of metals, is worked by men in a man-made crucible for a specific reason (possibly, as West *ad loc.* suggests, to make bronze weapons); whereas the iron, which is strongest, is melted for no apparent reason by the craft of a god far from the habitations of men and within 'the holy earth'.

It is clear from the description of these two situations that the melting of the iron represents an intensification of the process that occurs with the tin. Hephaistos is stronger than human craftsmen, even as iron is stronger than tin, and it is hardly a co-incidence that the strife of Zeus and Typhoeus is likened first to the puny efforts of tin-smelting men and then to the mighty power of the god of fire himself. Hesiod ends his brief foray into the world of metal-workmen with a simile that leads him back into the realm of the gods and which gives us a renewed sense of how much mightier they are than mortals.

Thus the Simile of the Metals uses the form of the simile in a different way from that of the Bees: instead of using the simile as a bridge between the divine event recounted and the effect that it continues to have on mankind, the twofold Metals Simile describes how a unique event that occurred on the divine level, the melting of the earth during the battle between Zeus and Typhoeus, is both similar to the actions of mankind and immeasurably more powerful than they.[44] In both of the *Theogony*'s extended similes, then, Hesiod uses the necessarily disruptive form of the simile to point to the difference between gods and men, whether he does so by temporal manipulation, as in the Bee Simile, or by juxtaposing two similar-yet-different images from the world of mortal time as a means of describing an event that occurred in divine time, as in the Metals Simile.

With his teleological references such as those in the Hecate and Typhoeus passages, Hesiod crafts a chronological schema for the

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[44] One notes, however, that the following passage (869 80) is quite similar to the Bee Simile in that it, too, links a past event that occurred on the divine level (Typhoeus's defeat) with the baneful effects that are still caused by that event for human beings today (harmful winds). This passage is treated below in Chap. 6.

Theogony that is much more sophisticated than is often thought. Hesiod, who constructs the Proem of this work as a miniature model of the bipartite cosmos of god vs. man, views the temporal sequence of the events of which he sings as inherently fluid. According to his understanding of the universe, each ancient, divine event that he relates leads not only to the one that follows it, but has a direct relation to the present-day world of men as well. When the narrator expresses his intention to sing ἐξ ἀρχῆς, what he means is not merely that he will start at the very beginning of the creation, or even that he will proceed in chronological order, but that he will show the connection of the most ancient events to the present time. If Hesiod had limited himself to strict chron-ological order, he would not have been able to reveal the significance of past events to the present, and the separate yet interrelated nature of the divine/mortal cosmos would have been obscured. For a poet who clearly identifies himself as a mortal man singing about the gods, 'from the beginning' (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) means presenting events in such a way as to show how they affect not only the divine half of the bipartite universe, but the mortal half as well.

Thus the striking anachronies in the Proem of the *Theogony* themselves constitute a programmatic statement regarding how Hesiod intends to manipulate time in this poem. Hesiod is able to sing of events that took place (still take place?) in the divine sphere because the Muses came from their time frame into his, if only for a brief moment. This clash of temporal frames is brought into greater relief by the confusion inherent in the nearly oxymoronic νῦν πότε comment in line 22, which heralds the intrusion of mortal time into the heretofore 'timeless' world of the Muses (lines 1021) in conjunction with the intrusion of the mortal narrator himself into the poem. Through the Muses' gift Hesiod is able to surmount the relentless linearity of mortal ἔτυμα and enter the omnitemporal time frame of divine ἀλήθεα.[45] Divine truth exists in its own temporal dimension, accessible only to the Muse-inspired poet.

Yet because Hesiod is most inescapably and intransigently mortal, as the Muses take pains to point out to him, he can only view the events of this divine temporal framework through the eyes of a time-bound human. Hesiod, in relating the ἀλήθεα to

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[45] Cf. de Jong 2001 ad *Od.* 8.487 91: "The word 'truth' does not imply historical accuracy, but rather a vivid evocation (what rhetorical theory would later come to describe as ἐνάργεια."

which the privilege of his status gives him unique access, must nevertheless do so from the mortal perspective. The *Dichterweihe* thus presents the meeting of the Muses with Hesiod—of gods with men—as the coming together of beings separated not only by the most extreme divergences of physical and mental characteristics (cf. the Muses' insults in 26-28), but even by the very laws of physics under which they operate. For one, brief moment, divine time overlaps with mortal time in the *Dichterweihe,* and nowhere does the gap between the realms of god and man yawn more abysmally than here, where it is so fleetingly and impossibly bridged.

CHAPTER SIX

COMMENTARY

In narratological terms, Commentary consists of "speech acts that go beyond narrating, describing, or identifying," and which strongly suggest the implied author's own persona.[1] Since the act of Commentary involves a direct statement by the primary narrator-focalizer to the audience, Commentary is considered the most overt of self-conscious narrative devices, second only to (when not equivalent with) "explicit self-mention."[2] Through Commentary the narrator makes the listener aware of his own control over the text, in effect stepping outside of the dramatic illusion that the events of the story are simply unfolding before our eyes, and making clear his position as the possessor of privileged knowledge that he imparts to the audience. In Richardson's words, Commentary "reminds us explicitly that narrative is an act of communication between the narrator and the narratee."[3]

Passages in which the device of Commentary is used can thus be scrutinized not only for the information that they impart, but also for what they say about the relationship of the primary narrator-focalizer to the primary narratee-focalizee. In other words, since Commentary involves a direct act of speech between the implied author and his audience, a poet's use of this device reveals something of how he perceives of his role as the narrator of his poem. If a narrator choose to highlight his involvement with the audience in a particular passage by employing Commentary, this involvement is itself an important element of what he is trying to express.

The narratological model of de Jong does not contain a separate category for Commentary. Since passages of Commentary involve the narrator's self-conscious reference to his role as narrator, de Jong treats them in her section on the primary narrator-focalizer.[4] Richardson, however, treats Commentary in a separate section, dividing it into the three subcategories of Explanation, Interpretation,

[1] Chatman 1978: 228.
[2] *Ibid.* See also Richardson 1990: 140.
[3] Richardson 1990: 140.
[4] de Jong 1987a: 41 53.

and Judgment. Because of the length and importance of the Commentary passages in the *Theogony,* which justify their treatment under a separate heading from that of the implied author, I adopt Richardson's tripartite model for my analysis of Hesiodic Commentary in the *Theogony.*

As Richardson observes, a narrator can employ Commentary both on the story and on the discourse.[5] 'Commentary on the story' refers to situations in which the narrator pauses to explain a point or detail of his story that he has just presented in the narrative. In commenting upon his words in this way the narrator often interprets, judges, or otherwise reveals his emotional reaction to the text he has created. 'Commentary on the discourse,' on the other hand, consists of the narrator's making explicit reference to his activity as narrator. In passages of this sort the narrator alludes in some way to the actual performance of his work, revealing that he is aware of himself in the role of a performer and/or that he is aware of the presence of the audience. In the *Theogony* most of the passages of Commentary occur on the level of the story, such as the Kings and Singers passage in the Proem, or the etymological explanations of the names given to Aphrodite and the Cyclopes.

There are, however, three occasions on which the Hesiodic narrator comments on the discourse of his poem: the 'oak and rock' comment (as I interpret it) (35), the καλέουσι-statement in the Nereus passage (234), and the 'Rivers' comment (369-70). While these Commentaries on the discourse are the strongest examples of the self-consciousness of the narrator of the *Theogony,* they embody the most overt form of a phenomenon represented by all the passages of Commentary in this work: the implied author's desire to inject his 'own' personality into certain passages of the text that he narrates.

The purpose of this section, then, is to investigate how Hesiod uses this most blatantly self-referential of narrative devices to influence the audience's reception of his text. The three passages of Commentary on the Discourse are treated together in one section. For the remaining passages, those containing Commentary on the Story, I follow Richardson's model and discuss them under the categories of Explanation, Interpretation, and Judgment. Although the passages in each category share among themselves a similar narratorial approach to the concept of Commentary, it is important to note that the categories themselves are largely artificial, existing only as a rubric

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5 Richardson 1990: 140.

under which the varying degrees of the narrator's overt involvement with the text can be arranged.

Richardson himself admits the fluidity of his categories, noting that, in Homer, passages of Explanation are often mixed with elements of Interpretation[6] and it would follow that the same sort of merging may occur between passages in the categories of Interpretation and Judgment. The value of these categories lies not in their exclusivity but in their increasing levels of authorial involvement with the text: Explanation represents the least amount of narratorial interruption of the story, while Interpretation and Judgment reveal increasing levels of the narrator's presence. Thus Hesiod does not employ a markedly different narrative technique in each of these three categories, but rather each category represents the same narrative phenomenon to a greater or lesser degree.

According to Richardson's model, the type of Commentary that represents the lowest level of authorial involvement in the text is that of Explanation. In passages of Explanation the narrator furnishes us with information that we need in order to understand the story.[7] On some occasions, however, Richardson notes that Homer uses Explanation not primarily for informative purposes but "to promote a richer and clearer understanding of the immediate context." Thus we are told in the *Iliad* that the gods have *ichor* in their veins not necessarily because the audience is expected to be ignorant of this, but in order to heighten the sense of the difference between gods and men in that particular scene.[8] Hesiod, who uses all forms of narratorial involvement in the *Theogony* more frequently than Homer, uses explanatory Commentary mainly to provide the audience with information about his divine subject matter that only a god could know, since he has been granted the knowledge of divine things by the Muses. The first category of these Explanations that I shall examine is that of etymological commentary.

> Κύκλωπες δ' ὄνομ' ἦσαν ἐπώνυμον, οὕνεκ' ἄρά σφεων
> κυκλοτερὴς ὀφθαλμὸς ἕεις ἐνέκειτο μετώπῳ·
>
> And they were called 'Cyclopes' by name, because
> a circular eye lay positioned in the middle of their foreheads.
>
> 144-45

> ...τὴν δ' Ἀφροδίτην

[6] Richardson 1990: 141.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] Richardson 1990: 143 44.

[ἀφρογενέα τε θεὰν καὶ εὐστέφανον Κυθέρειαν]
κικλήσκουσι θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες, οὕνεκ' ἐν ἀφρῷ
θρέφθη· ἀτὰρ Κυθέρειαν, ὅτι προσέκυρσε Κυθήροις·
Κυπρογενέα δ', ὅτι γέντο περικλύστῳ ἐνὶ Κύπρῳ·
ἠδὲ φιλομμειδέα, ὅτι μηδέων ἐξεφαάνθη.

And gods and men call her Aphrodite
[the foam-born goddess and well-crowned Kythereia]
because in foam she was nurtured.
But they call her Kythereia because she came near to Kythera
and Kyprogeneia, because she was born in wave-girt Kypros,
and Philommedeia, because she emerged from genitals.

195-200

τῆς ὅτε δὴ Περσεὺς κεφαλὴν ἀπεδειροτόμησεν,
ἐξέθορε Χρυσάωρ τε μέγας καὶ Πήγασος ἵππος.
τῷ μὲν ἐπώνυμον ἦν, ὅτ' ἄρ' Ὠκεανοῦ παρὰ πηγὰς
γένθ', ὃ δ' ἄορ χρύσειον ἔχων μετὰ χερσὶ φίλῃσι.

And when Perseus cut her head from her neck
Chrysaor leapt out and the great horse Pegasos.
The latter had his name because by the springs of Okeanos
he was born, and the former because he held a gold sword in his hands.

280-83

These passages of etymological Explanation appear to be designed to do nothing more than explain why the selected subjects were given their particular names. However, the information provided by the narrator in so authoritative a fashion is of a sort not usually possessed by unenlightened mankind. Each of the four etymologies provided by the narrator concerns a god or semi-divine monster, about whom most human beings can be expected to know little, given the distance between themselves and the divine realm. Furthermore, the information provided in each case is not necessary for our understanding of the text. The audience would lose nothing by the omission of these etymological tidbits—except, perhaps, a sense of the narrator's extensive familiarity with his subject. By providing information about these otherworldly subjects, therefore, the Hesiodic narrator primarily reveals the depth of his knowledge of the divine realm I would argue that these passages of Explanation, which by their very nature as Commentaries highlight the narrator's authoritative presence, are included to demonstrate the knowledge that he gained when the Muses inspired him to sing of the divine 'things that will be and were before'. They support the image that

Hesiod has created of himself as the human poet who has a unique authority to sing of divine subjects.[9]

A subset of the Explanation category in the *Theogony* involves those passages that explain phenomena without offering etymologies of their names.

> τόσσον ἔνερθ' ὑπὸ γῆς ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης·
> τόσσον γάρ τ' ἀπὸ γῆς ἐς τάρταρον ἠερόεντα.
> ἐννέα γὰρ νύκτας τε καὶ ἤματα χάλκεος ἄκμων
> οὐρανόθεν κατιών, δεκάτῃ κ' ἐς γαῖαν ἵκοιτο·
> [ἶσον δ' αὖτ' ἀπὸ γῆς ἐς τάρταρον ἠερόεντα·]
> ἐννέα δ' αὖ νύκτας τε καὶ ἤματα χάλκεος ἄκμων
> ἐκ γαίης κατιών, δεκάτῃ κ' ἐς Τάρταρον ἵκοι.
>
> As far below under the earth as heaven is above it:
> for so great is the distance into shadowy Tartarus.
> For nine nights and days a bronze anvil
> falling from heaven would reach earth on the tenth day;
> and equal again is the distance from earth into shadowy Tartarus
> and again for nine nights and days a bronze anvil
> falling from earth would reach Tartarus on the tenth day.
>
> 720-25

> καί νύ κεν ἔπλετο ἔργον ἀμήχανον ἤματι κείνῳ,
> καί κεν ὅ γε θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἄναξεν,
> εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὀξὺ νόησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε·
>
> And now an impossible deed would have occurred on that day
> and he [Typhoeus] would have ruled over both mortals and immortals
> had not the father of gods and men taken sharp thought. . . .
>
> 836-38

These Explanations serve the same purpose as the etymological comments in the first category. In both the Tartarus and the Typhoeus passages the information provided again represents the type of knowledge inaccessible to normal human beings, and the narrator, by providing it, reveals the extent to which he has benefited from the Muses' inspiration. While these two latter passages enhance our understanding of the text in a way that may not be true of the etymological explanations, the fact remains that the story of the *Theogony* would have been intelligible without them, and their inclusion does more to highlight the narrator's role than to advance the plot.

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[9] It should be noted that Hesiod provides his etymology of the Titans' name as well (207 210). This passage, as it occurs in a section of indirect speech, is treated above under the heading of 'Character Text'.

While the level of narratorial self-reference is quite pronounced in passages of Explanation, it becomes significantly more so in passages corresponding to Richardson's 'Judgment' category. In Judgments, the narrator not only speaks directly to the audience in his 'own' voice, he takes an active role in attempting to manipulate our emotional reactions to his words. "By making judgments on the action the narator is…shaping our evaluation of what we see…."[10] Hesiod does this by giving his direct opinion of several events in the *Theogony.*

τὸν τόθ' ἑλὼν χείρεσσιν ἑὴν ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν,
σχέτλιος, οὐδ' ἐνόησε μετὰ φρεσίν, ὥς οἱ ὀπίσσω
ἀντὶ λίθου ἑὸς υἱὸς ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀκηδὴς
λείπεθ', ὅ μιν τάχ' ἔμελλε βίῃ καὶ χερσὶ δαμάσσας
τιμῆς ἐξελάαν, ὁ δ' ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάξειν.

Taking it in his hands he put it down into his belly,
the wretch! Nor did he realize in his heart how,
in exchange for a stone, his son was left undefeated and unharmed,
and how he, soon overpowering him with main strength,
would strip him of honor, and how he would rule among the gods.
487-91

ἲς Ἡρακλῆος, τελέσας στονόεντας ἀέθλους,
παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου,
αἰδοίην θετ' ἄκοιτιν ἐν Οὐλύμπῳ νιφόεντι·
ὄλβιος, ὃς μέγα ἔργον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνύσσας
ναίει ἀπήμαντος καὶ ἀγήραος ἤματα πάντα.

The might of Herakles, having completed his grievous labors,
took as his modest wife the daughter of great Zeus
and Hera of the golden sandals in snowy Olympos,
happy man! He accomplished a deed great among the immortals
and dwells without pain and ageless all his days.
951-55

In these passages the narrator's presence is announced not only by his comment to the audience but by his emotional reaction to his own words. He passes judgment on the divine actions that he describes in an overt attempt to direct the emotions of the audience, thus emphasizing his own role both as a narrator in the process of narration and as a teacher concerned with inculcating the proper evaluation of those actions in his audience. It is important to note, however, that in the first passage Hesiod does not go so far as to accuse Kronos of behavior that is evil in itself, but only of behavior that is wrong in terms of cosmic destiny. Kronos is σχέτλιος not because he tries to swallow his youngest son—after all, the narrator

[10] Richardson 1990: 158.

has not overtly criticized him for swallowing his other five children—but for being ignorant of (and trying to subvert) the destiny by which Zeus will eventually come to rule the universe. His ignorance will lead to his own downfall, and the narrator, who knows this, judges the god's action with scornful pity.

As Griffin notes, σχέτλιος is an emotional word frequently used in Homeric character-text (29 times) but only once in the mouth of the narrator himself (*Od.* 21.28). The word is used by Homer to signal that one of the characters in his story is acting with "unreasonable persistence or disregard of a normal limitation." Griffin points out that although the word σχέτλιος is avoided by Homer in the narrator-text, νήπιος is not. He concludes that, because νήπιος carries not only the emotional meaning of 'deluded' but also the 'factual' meaning of 'young' (as in νήπια τέκνα, 'young children'), the Homeric narrator feels that he can employ this word in commenting on the aberrant mental state of his characters. The words σχέτλιος and δαιμόνιος, however, are avoided by the narrator because of their exclusivelyemotionalsignifications.[11]

As we have seen, the Hesiodic narrator is quite comfortable using the emotional language that in Homer is confined to the character-text. His use of σχέτλιος in 488 is thus not surprising in itself, but it is a remarkable instance of the normally covert narrator's intrusion of his own judgment into the text. I would argue, in fact, that Hesiod in 488 uses σχέτλιος in the same way that Homer normally uses νήπιος. As Bakker argues, the Homeric narrator uses the word νήπιος to refer to one of his characters when the character acts in such a way as to reveal that he is ignorant of the future.[12] This occurs at *Il.* 16.46-47, where Patroklos begs Achilles to lend him his armor; Patroklos is called νήπιος because he does not realize that he is "imploring death and evil destruction for himself."[13] Homer, in making this comment, reveals that he himself is in the position of the poet 'in the future', i.e. that he knows what is fated for Patroklos, while Patroklos cannot know this, since he exists only in the present time of the story. Patroklos "is out of touch with poetic truth," hence he is νήπιος.[14] Like Patroklos, Kronos, too, is 'out of touch' with the 'future' of the *Theogony,* and it is this fault that has earned him the opprobrious epithet σχέτλιος.

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[11] Griffin 1986a: 40.
[12] Bakker 1997a. Bakker's discussion of νήπιος is found on pp. 30 36.
[13] Bakker's translation 1997a: 31.
[14] Bakker 1997a: 36.

Hesiod's poetic vision is more fully realized if the audience regards Kronos' attempt to thwart destiny as wrong, and hence he employs a Judgment Commentary to express the opinion that he wishes the audience to internalize. The Commentary on the newly blessed state of Herakles serves a similar purpose: by emphasizing the absence of pain and labor that Herakles now enjoys, the narrator reminds us of the hero's previous suffering. The resulting contrast is a reminder of the gulf that usually separates gods from men, and which only in the case of Herakles has ever been fully bridged.[15] Thus the ὄλβιος-comment reinforces Hesiod's constant emphasis on the distance separating gods from men in this work.

One step beyond Judgments in the direction of the most overt narratorial self-reference are those cases in which the narrator Comments on the discourse of his work, i.e. refers to this own act of narration in progress.

> ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῦν ἢ περὶ πέτρην;
>
> But what are these things to me concerning oak or rock?
> (Why am I beating around the bush?)
>
> 35
>
> τῶν ὄνομ' ἀργαλέον πάντων βροτὸν ἄνδρα ἐνισπεῖν,
> οἱ δὲ ἕκαστοι ἴσασιν, ὅσοι περιναιετάουσι.
>
> It is hard for a mortal man to tell the names of all of them [*sc.* the rivers], but each of those who live around them know them.
>
> 369-70

In the above examples the narrator refers in some way to his own presentation of the story, and by association to the role of the audience that is present to hear it. The Rivers comment has been discussed extensively above as an example of the self-conscious narrator,[16] but the other two passages also contain the narrator's overt acknowledgment of his narratorial function. If one translates the cryptic 'oak and rock' comment as something equivalent to 'Why am I beating around the bush'[17]—a translation that is strongly suggested by the resumptive tone that dominates the following line—this

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[15] Dionysos, although born of Semele, seems to have been a god from birth. See Eur. *Bacch.* 39 42.

[16] See above Chap. 2.

[17] Translation suggested by J. S. Clay. This cryptic comment has given rise to extensive debate. See West's discussion in West 1966 ad 35. Cf. also Nagy 1990: 182; Hoffmann 1971: 90 97; Schmoll: 1994: 46 52; O'Bryhim 1996: 131 38.

comment, too, refers to the narrator's present function. Coming as it does at the end of a passage of extremelycomplex narrative, in which there are two Hesiods (the character in the story and the primary narrator-focalizer who recounts it), this self-reference emphasizes the degree to which the narrator controls and manipulates his text. By this comment he demonstrates that he is not only aware of, but even insists upon, his own role in directing the action of his poem, perhaps in deliberate reaction to the more covert role adopted by Homer in the *Iliad.*

The next category of Commentary to be discussed here, that of Interpretation, contains some of the longest and most artistically unified passages in the *Theogony.* In Interpretation Comments the narrator guides the audience "by assigning meaning to an event or episode," and thus making certain that the audience reacts to the scene in the desired way.[18] In the *Iliad,* Richardson observes, Interpretation is used in its least intrusive form, as a narrative device that

> accounts for an action on the literal level, answering questions such as "Why was this done?" or "Why is this the case?" without going beyond to consider any deeper meaning in the thematic or symbolic structure of the work.[19]

Hesiod also uses Interpretation to explain why and how things have come to be the way they are, but he does so in the specific context of the relationship of the divine world to the mortal one. The five passages of Interpretation in the Theogony are excerpted below (the fifth, the Kings and Singers passage, will be treated subsequently):

> καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ὅτε πού τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
> ἔρδων ἱερὰ καλὰ κατὰ νόμον ἱλάσκηται,
> κικλήσκει Ἑκάτην· πολλή τέ οἱ ἕσπετο τιμὴ
> ῥεῖα μαλ', ᾧ πρόφρων γε θεὰ ὑποδέξεται εὐχάς,
> καί τέ οἱ ὄλβον ὀπάζει, ἐπεὶ δύναμίς γε πάρεστιν.

> And even now whenever someone of earthbound men
> worships, performing lovely sacrifices in the proper way,
> he calls on Hecate. And much honor follows him very easily,
> when the goddess is favorable to him and receives his prayers,
> and she grants him prosperity, since the power to do so is hers.
> 416-20

> ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων

[18] Richardson 1990: 148.
[19] Richardson 1990: 149.

καίουσ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ θυηέντων ἐπὶ βωμῶν.

From that time the races of men upon the earth for the gods
burn the white bones of sacrificial animals on altars.

556-57

ἐκ τῆς γὰρ γένος ἐστὶ γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων,
[τῆς γὰρ ὀλοίιόν ἐστι γένος καὶ φῦλα γυναικῶν,]
πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι, σὺν ἀνδράσι ναιετάουσαι,
οὐλομένης Πενίης οὐ σύμφοροι, ἀλλὰ Κόροιο.
……
ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως ἄνδρεσσι κακὸν θνητοῖσι γυναῖκας
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης θῆκε, ξυνήονας ἔργων
ἀργαλέων.

And from her is the race of women
for from her is the destructive race and the tribe of women
a great bane to mortals, living among males.
sharers not in destructive poverty, but only in abundance….
……………..
And thus high-thundering Zeus established women
as an evil for mortal men, and as partners in
painful deeds….

590-93; 600-602

ἐκ δὲ Τυφωέος ἔστ᾽ ἀνέμων μένος ὑγρὸν ἀέντων,
νόσφι Νότου Βορέω τε καὶ ᾽αργεστέω Ζεφύροιο·
οἵ γε μὲν ἐκ θεόφιν γενεήν, θνητοῖς μέγ᾽ ὄνειαρ.
αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι μὰψ αὖραι ἐπιπνείουσι θάλασσαν·
αἳ δή τοι πίπτουσαι ἐς ἠεροειδέα πόντον,
πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι, κακῇ θυίουσιν ἀέλλῃ·
ἄλλοτε δ᾽ ἄλλαι ἄεισι διασκιδνᾶσί τε νῆας
ναύτας τε φθείρουσι· κακοῦ δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται ἀλκὴ
ἀνδράσιν, οἳ κείνῃσι συνάντωνται κατὰ πόντον.
αἱ δ᾽ αὖ καὶ κατὰ γαῖαν ἀπείριτον ἀνθεμόεσσαν
ἔργ᾽ ἐρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων,
πιμπλεῖσαι κόνιός τε καὶ ἀργαλέου κολοσυρτοῦ.

And from Typhoeus comes the wet fury of blowing winds,
apart from Notos and Boreas and sky-clearing Zephyros;
these, indeed, are from the gods by birth, a great benefit to mortals,
but the other winds blow upon the ocean without purpose.
They fall upon the cloud-faced sea
a great bane to mortals; they rage with an evil whirlwind,
and, blowing at different times, they rip apart ships
and kill sailors. There is no cure against misfortune
for the men who meet those winds at sea,
and then again on the boundless, blooming earth
they destroy the beautiful works of earthbound men,
filling them up with dust and grievous uproar.

869-80

In each one of these passages Hesiod explains how an action that has occurred in the divine theater affects the lives of men today. Because of her special kind of mediating τιμή (granted to her amid much fanfare by Zeus), Hecate is beneficial to the men who succeed in securing her favor; because of Prometheus' conflict with Zeus, mankind both offer the bones of sacrificial victims to the gods and are burdened with wives; and because Typhoeus was incarcerated by Zeus, human beings are plagued with violent winds.

Even the structural layout of these Interpretative passages emphasizes their connection to the divine events that precede them. In the four Interpretations cited above, the narrator begins with a description of a divine activity, focalized from the gods' perspective, and then immediately follows it with the mortal-focalized Interpretation of how this activity affects men. The polarized and yet connected nature of the presentation of these two widely divergent spheres of experience reinforces the pervasive concept of the gulf separating gods from men, even as it demonstrates the narrator's role as mediator between the two. By virtue of his unique position as divinely-authorized human poet, the narrator is able to explain the causal relationship between divine and human events. In this respect, Hesiodic Interpretations serve much the same self-referential function as the Explanations in that they highlight the extent of the narrator's knowledge of the divine world.

A final passage of Interpretation appears to be a striking exception to the rule that Hesiod uses this narrative device to interpret how divine events relate to human ones. The passage concerning the Oath of Styx is focalized purely from the divine perspective and is not followed by any overt reference to human experience. The Interpretative section of this passage begins at 792, where the narrator ends his description of the physical location of Styx and introduces the idea of Styx as a 'bane to the gods'.

ἡ δὲ μί' ἐκ πέτρης προρέει, μέγα πῆμα θεοῖσιν.
ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐπομόσσῃ
ἀθανάτων οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,
κεῖται νήυτμος τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν·
οὐδέ ποτ' ἀμβροσίης καὶ νέκταρος ἔρχεται ἆσσον
βρώσιος, ἀλλά τε κεῖται ἀνάπνευστος καὶ ἄναυδος
στρωτοῖς ἐν λεχέεσσι, κακὸν δ' ἐπὶ κῶμα καλύπτει.
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νοῦσον τελέσει μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,
ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἆθλος·
εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαμείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων,
οὐδέ ποτ' ἐς βουλὴν ἐπιμίσγεται οὐδ' ἐπὶ δαῖτας

ἐννέα πάντ' ἔτεα· δεκάτῳ δ' ἐπιμίσγεται αὖτις
†εἰρέας ἀθανάτων, οἳ Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσι.
τοῖον ἄρ' ὅρκον ἔθεντο θεοὶ Στυγὸς ἄφθιτον ὕδωρ,
ὠγύγιον….

But one [stream of Ocean] flows forth from a rock, a great bane to the gods. And whoever of the gods who hold the peaks of snowy Olympos
pours a libation of her and forswears his oath,
he lies breathless for an entire year.
Nor does he ever come close to ambrosia and nectar
to eat it, but lies breathless and without voice,
on his laid-out bed, and an evil coma covers him.
But when he completes his sickness after a full year,
he receives another trial more difficult than the first:
for nine years he stays cut off from the gods who live forever,
nor ever does he take part in their counsel or feasts
for all of nine years. But on the tenth he takes part again
joining the immortals who have their homes on Olympus.
Such is the oath the gods set by the imperishable water of Styx,
a hateful one….

792-806

In this section Hesiod uses powerful attributive discourse in an attempt to convince the audience of the extent of the gods' suffering when they forswear themselves: μέγα πῆμα θεοῖσιν 792, κακὸν δ' ἐπὶ κῶμα καλύπτει 798, χαλεπώτερος ἄεθλος 800, ὠγύγιον 806. The use of the phrase μέγα πῆμα θεοῖσιν in connection with an oath, however, recalls the end of the Children of Night passage:

αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα
Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα
Ὑσμίνας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἀνδροκτασίας τε
Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλλογίας τε
Δυσνομίην τ' Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλῃσιν,
Ὅρκόν θ', ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους
πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ·

But hateful Strife bore grievous Toil
And Forgetting and Hunger and tearful Pains
and Combats and Battles and Murders and Manslaughters
and Quarrels and Lies and Words and Disputes,
and Injustice and Ruinous Destruction, who dwell together,
and Oath, who indeed is most greatly a bane for earthbound
mortals, whenever one of them willingly breaks his oath.

226-32

The grim climax of the Children of Night passage is evoked not only by the mention of the Styx oath as a 'great bane', but the audience is further reminded of the grisly catalogue by the fact that the Styx

passage (775-806) is directly preceded by a second Children of Night section (758-74). Why does Hesiod purposely, as I would argue, remind us of the Children of Night passage in describing the penalties of breaking the Oath of Styx? The answer to this question can be found by comparing this passage of Interpretation to the four others we have considered in the *Theogony.* Each presents an action on the divine level immediately followed by an 'interpretation' of how that action affects mortals. The references to Styx in this poem do not follow this pattern in terms of structure (i.e. a divine event immediately followed by its effect on mortals), but it does contain intriguing similarities to it. The first mention of Styx is reminiscent of the first part of the Hecate passage, in which Hecate is granted honor by Zeus:

εἶπε δ', ὃς ἂν μετὰ εἷο θεῶν Τιτῆσι μάχοιτο,
μή τιν' ἀπορραίσειν γεράων, τιμὴν δὲ ἕκαστον
ἑξέμεν ἣν τὸ πάρος γε μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.
τὸν δ' ἔφαθ', ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος,
τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἣ θέμις ἐστίν.
ἦλθε δ' ἄρα πρώτη Στὺξ ἄφθιτος Οὔλυμπόνδε
σὺν σφοῖσιν παίδεσσι φίλου διὰ μήδεα πατρός·
τὴν δὲ Ζεὺς τίμησε, περισσὰ δὲ δῶρα ἔδωκεν.
αὐτὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔθηκε θεῶν μέγαν ἔμμεναι ὅρκον. . . .

And he said that, whoever of the gods should fight on his side against
the Titans, he would not deprive him of prizes, but that each one
would have the honor that he had before among the immortal gods.
And he said that whoever was without honor and prizes under Kronos
would come into honor and prizes, as is proper.
Imperishable Styx came first to Olympos
with her sons through the plans of the father himself.
And Zeus honored her, and gave her excellent gifts.
For he made her to be the great oath of the gods….

392-400

This passage is focalized from the gods' perspective and concerns a transaction that has ramifications on the divine level only. In this sense it is parallel to the other passages mentioned above which immediately precede Interpretative Commentary. This first Styx passage ends with a reference to the river's function as the gods' oath that points ahead to the second Styx passage. If the two mentions of Styx should be understood together, we can see how they resemble the other bipartite passages of Interpretative Commentary: a narrative about a divine interaction followed by an explanation of the effects of that interaction. In this case Hesiod apparently breaks the pattern that

he has established, for instead of linking an action on the divine level to its effects on earth, the second Styx passage describes how the divine action in question has affected *the gods.* The penalties for breaking the oath of the Styx are clearly remote from the experience of human beings.

Hesiod, therefore, creates a pattern of bipartite Interpretation passages that he follows in all cases but one, the Styx passage. The effect of setting up and following a pattern and then deliberately breaking it is that the audience does not hear what it expects to hear. Having been told of the divine interaction that gave Styx her τιμή, we might then expect the following passage to explain the effects of that action on the mortal level. When that expectation is not met immediately, but deferred, and then we are instead informed of the effects of the action on the *immortal* level, we inevitably compare what was described to what was expected. Hearing of the gods' punishment for oath-breaking, the audience compares it with the implied punishment for mortals for the same crime.

The gods' punishment is not only recounted at great length but with emotional words. The narrator seems intent on causing the audience to react with horror to the sufferings inflicted on the perjured god, which, indeed, must constitute a punishment of the most extreme severity for the gods. The audience, however, which was expecting to hear of some effect on mankind and which is furthermore reminded of the Oath that plagues humankind at the end of the Children of Night passage, cannot muster a great deal of sympathy for the gods in this passage.

In fact, the gods' punishment consists of nothing more than an unpleasant illness, a year of sleep (in a comfortable bed, no less!) and nine years spent apart from divine feasting and conversation. While this must be considered a terrible affliction from the standpoint of "the gods who hold the peaks of snowy Olympus" (793), the audience might well be thinking of the punishment that mortals suffer when guilty of the same crime. This punishment is not stated directly at the end of the Children of Night passage, but the fact that Oath "who most greatly plagues earthbound mortals" is given climactic final placement at the end of a series of grisly mortal afflictions implies that the punishment for mortals is much more gruesome—worse, in fact, than death itself.

Focalized as it is from the divine perspective, the Styx oath passage presents the gods' punishment as a terrible thing. The audience, however, who both expects and embodies the perspective of

beings who are regularly maimed in battle, mutilated, murdered, lied to, and ruined, cannot regard the gods' punishment as anything more than a minor inconvenience. This comparison between divine and mortal suffering is, I suggest, what Hesiod may have intended in this passage. As in the other Interpretations, the narrator has used the device of Commentary to point to the contrast between the world of gods and that of men. In the Styx passage he achieves this goal to even greater effect by inviting the audience itself to draw the contrast. Faced with the unimpressive 'sufferings' of the gods in a context where all the most terrible afflictions of mankind are recalled to mind, the audience cannot but realize the magnitude of the gulf separating gods from men. Through his manipulation of the text and our reactions to it, the narrator teaches us the lesson that the Muses in the Proem made sure he learned: mankind are very far beneath the gods, and only by realizing this fact can they comprehend the truth of cosmic order.

Commentary in the 'Kings and Singers' passage: 'Theogony' 80-103

In light of the narratorial self-referential nature of Commentary, which intrudes the narrator's thoughts and opinions onto the listener's awareness, it seems significant that one of the longest passages of Commentary in the *Theogony,* the Kings and Singers section, occurs in the Proem. As we saw above with the *Dichterweihe* passage, Hesiod exploits the Proem to reveal his conceptions of his own poetic role and introduce the cosmic viewpoint that will pervade the rest of the work. Since the Kings and Singers passage also mentions poets (and specifically the effect of their words on those who hear them), it is appropriate to investigate this part of the Proem as well for possible programmatic significance.

The Kings and Singers passage comes at the end of the section describing the Muses' song on Olympus. Hesiod appears to have taken pains to disguise the transition from the description of the Muses' song to his own commentary on it:

> ταῦτ' ἄρα Μοῦσαι ἄειδον Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
> ἐννέα θυγατέρες μεγάλου Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖαι,
> Κλειώ τ' Εὐτέρπη τε Θάλειά τε Μελπομένη τε
> Τερψιχόρη τ' Ἐρατώ τε Πολύμνιά τ' Οὐρανίη τε
> Καλλιόπη θ'· ἡ δὲ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἁπασέων.

ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ᾽ αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.
ὅντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο
γεινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,
τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἐέρσην,
τοῦ δ᾽ ἔπε᾽ ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα· οἱ δέ νυ λαοὶ
πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας
ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν· ὁ δ᾽ ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
αἶψά τι καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσε·
τούνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὕνεκα λαοῖς
βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῆφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι
ῥηιδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν·
ἐρχόμενον δ᾽ ἀν᾽ ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὣς ἱλάσκονται
αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισι.
τοίη Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν.
ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί,
ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες· ὁ δ᾽ ὄλβιος, ὅντινα Μοῦσαι
φίλωνται· γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή.
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδέι θυμῷ
ἄζηται κραδίην ἀκαχήμενος, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὸς
Μουσάων θεράπων κλεῖα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων
ὑμνήσει μάκαράς τε θεοὺς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν,
αἶψ᾽ ὅ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ τι κηδέων
μέμνηται· ταχέως δὲ παρέτραπε δῶρα θεάων.

These things the Muses who have Olympian homes were singing,
nine daughters born of great Zeus,
Kleio and Euterpe and Thaleia and Melpomene
Terpsichore and Erato and Polumnia and Melpomene
and Kalliope, but she is preeminent among them all.
For she also attends reverence-inspiring kings.
Whomever the daughters of great Zeus honor,
and whomever of Zeus-nurtured kings they look upon at birth,
for him they drop sweet dew upon his tongue,
and the words that flow from his mouth are sweet.
And the people, in turn, all look upon him judging claims
with straight judgments. And he, speaking steadfastly,
quickly resolves even a great quarrel expertly.
For this reason kings are reputed wise, because to people
who have been treated unjustly they are persuasive in speech,
easily bending them with soft words.
And they honor him like a god when he comes into the assembly
with honey-sweet reverence, and he stands out among the assembled.
Such is the holy gift of the Muses.
For from the Muses and far-shooting Apollo
are singers upon the earth, and lyre-players,
But from Zeus are kings. And he is blessed, whomever the Muses
Love; a sweet voice flows from his mouth.
For if anyone, possessing even a fresh-paining grief in his soul,

is withered by the grieving in his heart, even so if the singer,
servant of the Muses, will sing the glories of the men of old
and the blessed gods who hold Olympus,
even he may quickly forget his sorrows, nor remember
anything of his griefs; but swiftly the gifts of the goddesses turn his thoughts.

75-103

The voice of the narrator recounting the subject matter of the Muses' Olympian song (75-78)[20] glides elegantly into the section of Commentary (80-103) through the linking device of a catalogue of the Muses' names. This catalogue, which belongs to the passage that immediately precedes it, is linked to the Commentary that follows by the narrator's observation that Kalliope, last named of the nine, is 'preeminent' (προφερεστάτη 79) among them—a statement that is itself a Comment of the narrator's on his text. The adjective is then explained in the following line (ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ 80), and the rest of the Commentary follows naturally from this.

Indeed, the transition is so smooth that some scholars regard the entire Kings and Singers passage as a transitional device, designed to transfer the narrative focus from the description of the Muses' activities to the poet's final invocation of the goddesses at the end of the Proem (104-115). Referring to "the long description of the Muses' relationship to kings and poets" as a "preparation" for the next ten lines of the Proem, Hamilton briefly sums up his view of the Kings and Singers passage thus: "Delight has replaced deceit, and the focus is not now on the Muses but on the performance of the poet. The transition to the poet invoking the Muses to sing the race of gods could not be made easier."[21] Hamilton's assessment of the function of this passage seems founded upon the assumption that Hesiod's poetic style is diffuse and unfocused, and hence prone to wander from his immediate subject matter—an opinion of which he is by no means the sole proponent.[22] Hesiod, however, proves by the abrupt transition that occurs in the 'Oak and Rock' comment (35) that he does not require twenty-three lines of 'wandering' to move his narrative from one subject to another. Moreover, the Kings and Singers section

[20] J. S. Clay 1988: 333 points out that the Olympian song of the Muses differs markedly from the Heliconian one.

[21] Hamilton 1989: 14.

[22] For more statements of this view see Barron/Easterling 1985: 96; Griffin 1986: 95; and Mondi, 1984: 325 44.

occurs in the Proem of this work and concerns the manner in which poets affect their audiences. These facts alone justify a closer examination of this passage for possible programmatic significance concerning Hesiod's vision of his own poetic role in the *Theogony.*

Giving the Kings and Singers passage more of the intense scrutiny that its length and placement demand, other scholars have proposed various explanations. M. L. West, staunchly biographical as always in his approach to Hesiod's poetry, follows van Groningen in arguing that the passage must refer to the conditions that he believes surrounded the first performance of the *Theogony*: the funeral games of King Amphidamus of Chalcis. According to this theory, the flattering references to kings and the references to the singer's power to allay the grief of his listeners in this section represent Hesiod's attempt to ingratiate himself with the grieving sons of the deceased king, with a view to winning the poetry contest at hand.[23] Since West's theory seeks to explain the text of this passage by introducing unprovable biographical details, it remains a dead end for those attempting to understand how and to what ends Hesiod composes poetry. Questions posed by a text can only be answered legitimately by means of the answers gleaned from the text itself, for we must assume that the author has provided us with all the information necessary to understand his words.

In recent years scholars have begun analyzing the Kings and Singers passage with greater attention to the role it plays in the development of a Hesiodic world view, especially with regard to the poet's ideas about justice.[24] One of the more influential treatments of

[23] West 1966: 44; van Groningen 1958: 260.

[24] Pucci 1977 focuses on the contradictory nature of the images in this passage, observing that the 'straight' speech of the good kings 'leads astray' the minds of the people it persuades (18). The speech of poets is similarly paradoxical: "For, like honey, the poetic *logos* implies at once the contradictory presence of divine truth and the simulation of truth, the straightness of discourse that goes directly to 'things as they are' and the deflecting, intoxicating power of the word" (19). Brillante 1994: 14 26, interprets the passage in terms of the Muses as guarrantors of the truth of the words. For poets, this means that the Muses enable their words to embody poetic truth: "Nel poeta ispirato l'efficacia della parola trova riscontro nella 'verita' degli eventi narrati (cosmogonia, genealogie eroiche e divine) e in genere nell'attendibilità dei contenuti (poesia gnomica e didascalica)" 18. For kings, it means that their words are true in that they embody the justice of Zeus: "Nel caso de re l'efficacia della parola si esercita nei giudizi che essi sono chiamanti a pronunciare.... Ristabilendo un equilibrio turbato dall'offesa, i re contribuiscono a realizzare quella giustizia divina che regola il cosmo." 18 19. Duban 1980 interprets the passage in terms of political justice, arguing for an ancient connection between poet and king: "Hesiod...is but further sanctioning an already traditional relationship between poet

the passage is that of C. P. Roth. Roth believes that Hesiod mentions kings in connection with the Muses because of an ancient association between the Muses as daughters of Mnemosyne and the oral nature of the laws that it was necessary for the judge-kings of Hesiod's time to memorize:

> The Muse who knows catalogues of Ships and plots of stories seems to be a personification of the oral tradition, which preserves the people's knowledge. As such she could also remember the oral laws. A judge as well as a poet might invoke her to aid his memory. Perhaps this is why the Muses are important to Hesiod's judge-kings.[25]

The problem with this argument lies in what Roth omits in her analysis. She makes no mention of the role that singers play in the passage, other than to state that they, too, rely on the Muses, despite the obvious parallel that Hesiod draws between kings and poets. Furthermore, the point that Hesiod makes and reiterates in this passage is that the gift of the Muses to kings and poets is not that of memory but of eloquence. Not only does Roth ignore the importance of persuasive speech in this section, she even seems to regard the association of kings with eloquence as some sort of "misinterpretation" on Hesiod's part:

> The poems of…Hesiod…may thus be illuminated by the hypothesis of an old association between the Muses as the personification of oral tradition, and the rulers, as the administrators of justice. This association helps to account for Hesiod's mention of the kings during his hymn to the Muses. *Hesiod himself, however, seems not to have understood the relationship between kings and Muses, and so has reinterpreted it as the gift of persuasive eloquence.*[26]

Roth appears completely oblivious to the possibility that Hesiod may have chosen the poetic images that he portrays in his work for his own artistic purposes, or that by placing comments about poets in the proem of a large work he may be making a programmatic statement about his own poetic vision. It goes without saying that in order to analyze a poem that displays the artistic complexity of the *Theogony*, one ought to assume that the poet says what he wishes to say, in the

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and king by bringing them both under the Muses', and especially Kalliope's, protection" 11. The Muses make it possible for the king to make 'unerring pronouncements' and maintain political stability 19. For other interpretations of this section, see Solmsen1954; Havelock 1963: 153 154; Combellac 1974: 124; Roth 1976: 331 38; Gagarin 1992: 61 78; and Laks 1996: 83 86. The ideas of Roth and Gagarin are discussed below.

[25] Roth 1976: 337.

[26] Roth 1976: 338 (italics mine).

way that he wishes to say it, for the purpose of expressing his ideas to the audience, and not that he has included material that he fails to understand. Whether Hesiod was or was not aware of some traditional relation between kingship and Muses, he exploits his 'reinterpretation' of this relationship for his own artistic purposes.

In answer to the arguments of Roth, who sees the link between kings and poets as consisting of memory, as well as those of others who interpret the βασιλέες of the *Theogony* as fundamentally different on some level from the ἀοιδοί, M. Gagarin points out that Hesiod deliberately makes the two similar: "The text itself…provides no grounds for treating the description of the *basileus*' speech act any differently from that of the poet…."[27] Gagarin argues that to be understood correctly the Kings and Singers passage should be analyzed in terms of the rhetorical skill, shared by judge and poet alike, that allows them to bend the minds of their hearers into more productive paths.[28] Any legitimate analysis of the passage must reflect the strong parallelism that Hesiod draws between kings and poets with respect to their sharing of the Muses' gift of eloquence. The passage's programmatic value for the poem must reflect the strong parallelism that Hesiod draws between kings and poets with respect to their sharing of the Muses' gift of eloquence.

We are thus justified in assuming that the statements about the eloquence of kings and singers so prominently positioned in the Proem reveal how Hesiod wishes us to react to his poetry (and to himself as narrator). Two immediate questions arise: 1. What is the narrator saying about poets in this passage, and, by implication, about his own poetry? 2. How does this artistic self-revelation relate to the one made in the *Dichterweihe* scene and to the rest of the poem? 3. How does this passage function as a Commentary, and how does it fit in with the other passages of Commentary in the work? This last question will shed light upon and introduce the larger concern of this chapter: which is the question of how Hesiod uses the device of Commentary throughout the *Theogony*.

One of the important aspects of the Kings and Singers passage is the way in which it repeats and expands upon themes that first occur in the *Dichterweihe* passage. As I have argued, one of the principal programmatic themes in the *Dichterweihe* is the great distance separating gods from men, a distance reinforced by both the formal

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[27] Gagarin 1992: 65.
[28] Gagarin 1992: 63.

structure of the scene and by the unusually insulting address of the Muses to their favored poet. Hesiod's importance as a poetic 'bridge' between the divine and mortal realms is made the more explicit by this emphasis on the lowliness of mankind, and this sense of the fundamentally bipartite nature of the cosmos can be traced throughout the poem via the primary narrator-focalizer's human orientation in tellingof divine events. One of the ways in which Hesiod indicates his perception of himself as the human mediator between the divine and mortal realms consists of the curious phrase αὐδὴν θέσπιν, the gift which the Muses grant him in 31-32. As A. Ford astutely remarks, "…if *audê* is normally the human voice, *thespis audê,* 'divine human voice', approaches oxymoron."[29] One could take his point further and observe that the unusual enjambment of noun from adjective in this phrase underscores the normal separation of the these two concepts and hence the striking nature of their being combined in the person of the singer. Only the inspired poet possesses a human αὐδὴν that is divinely θέσπιν [30]

A general overview reveals that, by virtue of its double initial invocation of the Muses (lines 1 and 36), the Proem of the *Theogony* is bipartite in nature.[31] The first invocation, which opens the poem, describes the Muses singing of the Olympians, Titans, and the first generation of gods (1-22), after which they appear to Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe* (23-34). After the sharp break at 35-36 the narrator begins again with a description of a different song of the Muses.[32] The narrator describes this second song with a different emphasis from the first, dwelling not on the song's subject matter but primarily on its reception in Olympus: τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον (37); τῶν δ' ἀκάματος ῥέει αὐδή / ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεία (39-40); γελᾷ δέ τε δώματα πατρός (40); τέρπουσι Διὸς νόον (51). The following passage, after emphasizing the Muses' divinity as the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, then returns to the theme of their power to

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[29] Ford 1992: 173. See also J. S. Clay 1974: 129 136.

[30] Ford 1992: 180.

[31] The proem's final invocation of the Muses (114 15) is of a different type from the first two, being in form valedictory rather than introductory. That is, while the invocation at 114 115 certainly introduces the rest of the poem, it also serves to close the hymnic proem by means of the formulaic χαίρετε (114). Hence when I refer to the 'double initial invocation' of the Muses that divides the proem into two unequal halves, I intend this designation to apply to the first invocation (Μουσ άων...ἀρχώμεθ' ἀείδειν 1) and its striking repetition (Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα 36).

[32] J. S. Clay 1988: 323 observes that the Muses are actually depicted singing four separate songs in the proem.

give pleasure to their listeners: ἐρατὴν δὲ διὰ στόμα ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι (65), ἐπήρατον ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι (67); περὶ δ' ἴαχε γαῖα μέλαινα / ὑμνεύσαις, ἐρατὸς δὲ ποδῶν ὕπο δοῦπος ὀρώρει (69-70).

It is in this poetic atmosphere, which so heavily stresses the effect of the Muses' performance on their divine audience, that the second mention of mortals in the Proem occurs: our Kings and Singers passage. It cannot be merely coincidental that the main emphasis of the Kings and Singers section is also on the persuasive force of the Muses, as granted to the βασιλέες, ἀοιδοί, and κιθαρισταί favored by these goddesses. In these adjacent passages the persuasive eloquence of the Muses is thus presented both in its divine and its mortal manifestations. The Muses' activity on Olympus is mirrored by the activity that they make possible in the mortal sphere.

It is important to note that the Proem's first mention of men, the *Dichterweihe* passage (22-34), follows a pattern similar to that of the poem's second mention of them in the Kings and Singers passage. The *Dichterweihe,* too, follows a passage describing one of the Muses' songs (11-21), and the subject matter of the divine song may also be thematically linked with the scene involving humanity that follows. What the Muses sing in their 'Heliconian' song seems to reflect the history of the present balance of power among the gods: they sing first of Zeus and Hera, then the Titans, and finally the older gods (11-21). The reverse order of this song implies that the Muses are not merely singing of the three generations of gods as historical phenomena in a chronological framework, but are instead alluding to the Succession Myth that they later sing in 71-74.[33] The Olympians are mentioned first because they represent the new and final cosmic order. I would argue, then, that the Muses' first song alludes to and confirms the present balance of power in the universe.

If the Muses are indeed glorifying the new status quo among the gods in this song, it is possible to see how the *Dichterweihe* scene that follows is thematically related to it. As I have argued in Chapter 3, one of the concerns of the *Dichterweihe* is the status of mortals in the post-Promethean cosmos. The haughty tone of the Muses in this scene reflects the insistence of the gods that men should know their proper place. The song of the Muses in praise of the final ordering of the divine status quo is thus mirrored by the following *Dichterweihe* passage, which firmly emphasizes the inferior place of humanity

[33] For the 'reverse order' of the Muses' song see J. S. Clay 1988 and Hamilton 1989.

relative to the gods. Thus each of the first two songs of the Muses, which deal exclusively with divine affairs and a divine audience, is followed by a passage that shares its themes but applies them to mortal concerns. The bipartite nature of the Proem is, therefore, reinforced by parallel references to humanity, each one growing out of and to some degree reflecting the content of the preceding passage. Part One consists of the Muses' song (representing the present state of the divine order), which is followed by the description of the present state of humans. Part Two describes the effect of the Muses' song on Olympus, followed by the effect of the Muses' song on the human sphere.

In addition to sharing a similar structural format, the two references to mankind in the Proem are connected on a deeper thematic level as well. In the *Dichterweihe* Hesiod receives two gifts from the Muses: an αὐδὴν θέσπιν (31-32) and a laurel σκῆπτρον (30). These gifts can be interpreted to represent poetic inspiration and authority, respectively. As Clay notes, however, the σκῆπτρον is the attribute not of a poet but of a 'king'.[34] By representing the Muses as giving him the scepter, Hesiod thus clearly places himself in the role of a βασιλεύς as well as a poet in this scene, a point which has hitherto received little attention from scholars. The reason for this neglect may be the same as that which Gagarin adduces for what he perceives as the general misunderstanding of the Kings and Singers passage: a confusion over the term βασιλεύς.

> …[E]ven though everyone recognizes that for Hesiod *basileus* does not designate a 'king' in the sense of an absolute monarch with full executive powers, scholars continue to use this translation. This immediately makes one think of all the various duties and functions of a king, whereas the role of the *basilees* or 'lords' in Hesiod's society is much more restricted…. There is no indication, in other words, that in Hesiod's time the *basilees* have any other public function than that of judging.[35]

If we interpret the laurel scepter as an emblem of royal prerogative it becomes difficult to understand how Hesiod, who has just been emphasizing the lowliness of his status, could presume to appropriate this symbol for himself. If, however, we regard the scepter not as the symbol of supreme authority but as the gavel of a judge, it is then much easier to understand the role that Hesiod assigns to himself: the

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[34] Clay 1988: 333.
[35] Gagarin 1992: 63.

Muses have bestowed upon him not only the 'divine voice' of an inspired poet, but even, as it were, the gavel of a judge.

What, then, of the other gift to Hesiod? The αὐδὴν θέσπιν is granted to him for the purpose of "bringing glory to the things that will be and were before" (ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα 32), i.e. divine matters.[36] Through the use of his 'godlike voice' the poet will glorify (κλείω) the divine events of the *Theogony*.[37] If he is not merely to recount these events but to glorify them, it follows that the αὐδὴν θέσπιν must possess the quality of persuasive eloquence, for in order to make a thing appear glorious one must convince others that it is so. In other words, κλέος (cognate with κλύω and meaning 'that which is heard') is dependent upon the perception of others: glory only exists as a reaction of others to a deed or account thereof which is brought to their attention. Thus if Hesiod is granted the αὐδὴν θέσπιν to glorify the actions of the gods, this 'divine voice' must be divine particularly in terms of its ability to move and give pleasure to listeners.

If the σκῆπτρον of line 30 signifies 'authority to judge' and the αὐδὴν θέσπιν of 31-32, a 'voice with godlike powers of persuasion', the association of kings (judges) with singers is already established in the *Dichterweihe* passage, and this association is embodied in the person of the narrator himself. In effect, Hesiod claims for himself by these words the right to compose *authoritative poetry,* a song that not only pleases, but instructs its audience. The αὐδὴν θέσπιν and the σκῆπτρον are thus the means by which Hesiod makes a programmatic statement about his poetry.

The two gifts that the Muses give Hesiod in the *Dichterweihe,* the laurel scepter and the divine voice, thus anticipate and help to explain the association between kings and singers that is drawn in lines 80-103.[38] Despite his lowly mortal status, emphasized by the Muses in

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[36] I explain this translation in my discussion of the *Dichterweihe* in Chap. 3.

[37] Ford 1992: 180 observes that Hesiod restricts the use of αὐδὴ θέσπις to poets, using the term ἔπεα, 'words', (*Th.* 84) when referring to the non poetic eloquence of kings. Even given a specialized meaning for αὐδὴ θέσπις, however, it is nevertheless likely that Hesiod intends us to compare the king's Muse granted eloquence with the poet's Muse granted 'divine voice'.

[38] Although I agree with Gagarin in that I interpret the *function* of the βασιλεύς in this poem to be primarily judicial, I do not think that it is necessary to use the translation 'judge' in rendering βασιλεύς. The Queen of England today is still called by that title, despite the great difference between her present and former power. Scholars must simply bear in mind that a 'king' in Hesiod's day had different duties than one in Agamemnon's.

26-28, Hesiod possesses both a voice of godlike persuasive force and the authority of a judge. The association of kings and singers with the Muses, elaborated in the long passage of Commentary in 80-103, should therefore be interpreted in light of what has transpired between Hesiod (himself both king and singer) and the Muses in the *Dichterweihe.*

If we interpret the Kings and Singers passage as a statement referring to the implied author's vision of his own poetics, this Commentary passage takes on a significance that is consistent with the double gift of the Muses in the *Dichterweihe,* and in fact its realization. What the Muses give to kings and singers in this passage is persuasive power. For judges, this power allows them to 'bend' the minds of those who have a grievance, and to convince them through 'soft words' to accept a fair settlement (89-90). For poets, the power of persuasion manifests itself in their ability to bend the minds of the sorrowful away from grief (99-103), i.e. to give pleasure. If Hesiod is both poet and king, then he possesses both kinds of persuasion: he can both divert the mind from cares and lead his listeners into the right mode of thinking. In effect, what Hesiod has done in these two passages of the Proem of his *Theogony* is to establish for himself a double legitimacy as both poet and teacher. These self-referential statements are designed to instruct us how to respond to Hesiod's poetic persona in the rest of the poem.

In his presentation of how kings and singers perform their functions Hesiod manipulates our evaluation of both. In dwelling upon the veneration in which the βασιλεύς is held by the people, and the depth of the pain from which the poet can free suffering humanity, Hesiod evokes in us the desired reaction: we, too, are invited to regard the king and the singer as awesome manifestations of the Muses' power. If, then, the purpose of this passage is to ascribe both the judicial and the poetic powers of persuasion to the narrator, it is appropriate that it should be presented in a section of Commentary. For in convincing us of the validity of his judgment that kings and poets are divinely eloquent, he has himself employed powerfully persuasive speech. In revealing that he considers his own poetic responsibilities to include not only the delectation but the instruction of his audience, Hesiod employs the very persuasive force that makes possible that delectation and instruction.

The nature of the 'instruction' that Hesiod is now entitled to impart to us is revealed in the passage describing the nature of kingly eloquence (86-90). Kings 'are wise' because with their eloquence

they can settle disputes and convince aggrieved litigants (βλαπτομένοις 89) to accept fair terms. Hesiod utilizes this kind of wisdom throughout the *Theogony* when he explains how and why the mortal condition came to be the way it is, i.e. why it is that mortals do not dwell on Olympus (hence are ἄγραυλοι, 'field-dwelling'), why it is that they are base (κακ' ἐλέγχεα), and why they are 'nothing but stomachs' (γαστέρες οἶον). Hesiod teaches us the reason why all these unfortunate descriptors now apply to the human condition in the Prometheus passage, in which he shows that Prometheus was the ultimate cause of why humans live apart from the gods, why we are afflicted with the evil misfortune of wives, and why we are the slaves of our stomachs.

The wretched lot of mortals, who may with some justification regard ourselves as βλαπτόμενοι by the actions of Prometheus and the punishment that they brought down upon us, is nevertheless vastly improved by the intercession of the goddess Hecate. Hesiod thus employs his divinely persuasive voice in the Hecate passage to convince us that this benevolent goddess is able to counteract, to some degree at least, the ill effects that resulted from the Prometheus incident. Hesiod, while informing us how the cosmos came to be in its present shape, thus both teaches us why we are so far below the gods and uses his eloquence to try to convince us to accept the mediation of Hecate as a 'just settlement' for our collective grievance. In this way Hesiod can be seen to take on the role of both poet and king in the *Theogony.*

Why does Hesiod choose to make this programmatic self-disclosure in a passage of Commentary? Commentary draws attention not only to the narrator who intrudes his own opinion or interpretation of events into the text but also to the audience as the recipient of that opinion or interpretation.[39] The act of Commentary thus highlights the relationship between narrator and narratee whose existence it presupposes. This narratological device, in which the narrator instructs us how to understand a statement that he has just made in the text, is thus an appropriate vehicle for the programmatic message of the Kings and Singers passage. In lines 80-103 Hesiod expresses his intention to exercise emotional and didactic influence over his audience in the *Theogony.* By expressing this idea in a passage of commentary that itself contains elements of both the laurel (persuasive eloquence) and the scepter (didactic authority), the

[39] Richardson (1990) 140.

Hesiodic narrator fulfils the very role that this passage attributes to him.

CONCLUSION

What I have attempted to show in this book is the extent to which the Hesiodic narrator manipulates his text in order to influence the audience's reception of it. By examining Hesiod's use of character text, attributive discourse, chronological manipulation, and commentary, I have demonstrated that his approach to the narrator's role is considerably more self-assertive than that of Homer, possibly reflecting a reaction against the epic narrative style. In my investigation of Hesiod's narrative technique, I have also attempted to reveal how he has structured the *Theogony* so as to emphasize what he perceived as the fundamental reality that shaped the development of the cosmos: the division of the universe between the sundered poles of mortal and immortal. To this end the Hesiodic narrator has focused on explaining why this division came about (the Prometheus myth), what its effects are (the *Dichterweihe* and Typhoeus passages), and how it can be temporarily bridged by the actions of mankind (the Hecate section). He has also structured his text and his discourse in some places to reflect this division in its formal layout (the immediate following of divine action by its mortal consequences in the Kings and Singers, Hecate, Prometheus, and Typhoeus passages; the following of divine action by its consequences for the gods in the Styx passages; and the use of character-language within the narrator-text, a device reminiscent of the inherently dualistic genre of the hymn).

Most importantly, in my view, I have attempted to demonstrate the programmatic function of the Proem of the *Theogony,* which points ahead to the implied author's purpose in the work. Instead of approaching the *Theogony* under the traditional assumption that it is the disorganized work of an untutored shepherd, I have examined it for evidence of poetic complexity and philosophical unity as a poetic work with a dual function both to teach and delight its audience. By this exercise I hope to have demonstrated the comparative poverty of the attempts to analyze Hesiodic poetry as a reflection of the actual experiences of a Boeotian peasant and the rich possibilities of gaining new insights into this work that arise when one approaches it as sophisticated poetry.

It has been often noted that the image of the king in the *Theogony*'s Kings and Singers passage is quite different from that

which Hesiod presents in the *Works and Days.*[1] Those who adopt a biographical reading of the Hesiodic poems assume that Hesiod had personal reasons both to praise just kings in the *Theogony* and to criticize unjust kings in the *Works and Days.* As usual, there is no way either to prove or disprove this theory. If, however, we regard the Kings and Singers passage as part of a larger programmatic statement of the implied author's conception of his own poetic role, we can then analyze the portrayal of kings in the *Works and Days* from a different perspective.

Kings in the *Theogony* represent the authority to judge and instruct others that is granted to men in the form of persuasive speech by the Muses. Hesiod, in receiving the laurel sceptre from the Muses, represents himself as possessing this authority along with his poetic skill. In the *Works and Days,* however, there is no meeting with the Muses. In fact, the narrator specifically refuses to invoke the authority of these goddesses, feeling confident that he is able to speak 'mortal truths' to Perses without their sanction:

Μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν ἀοιδῇσι κλείουσαι,
δεῦτε, Δι' ἐννέπετε σφέτερον πατέρ' ὑμνείουσαι,
ὅν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε
ῥητοί τ' ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς μεγάλοιο ἕκητι.
ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,
ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
κλῦθι ἰδὼν αἰών τε, δίκῃ δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας
τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.

Pierian Muses, who bring glory with your songs,
come hither, sing of Zeus, hymning your father,
through whom mortal men are made both unknown and famous,
spoken of and not spoken of, by the will of great Zeus.
For easily he makes men strong, and easily he crushes the strong,
easily he diminishes the famous and makes great the insignificant,
easily he straightens the crooked and destroys the arrogant,
high-thundering Zeus, who dwells in loftiest halls.
Give heed, both seeing and hearing, and make straight your judgments with justice;

[1] West 1966: 44, observes that the portrayal of kings in the Kings and Singers passage "contrasts strikingly with the attitude taken towards them in the *Works and Days,*" and the contrast leads Mazon 1928: 8, to posit that the *Theogony* passage must have predated the *Works and Days,* on the theory that Hesiod's quarrel with Perses disillusioned him about the honesty of the local kings.

you do that; but I shall utter *mortal* truths to Perses.

Op. 1–10

What the narrator says in these lines is, in effect, "Muses, you take care of your divine concerns, and I shall take care of my mortal ones—which I am perfectly well able to do without your assistance." The narrator's role in the *Theogony* is defined and legitimized by the Muses' presence, whereas in the *Works and Days* it is defined by their absence.

If the Muses' gifts and the statements about kings in the *Theogony* are designed to legitimize the narrator's didactic stance as a theogonic poet, what is the purpose behind their absence in the Proem of the *Works and Days* and the portrayal of kings as greedy and ignorant?[2] I would argue that what Hesiod is doing in the opening lines of the *Works and Days* is establishing a narrative persona quite different from the one he uses in the *Theogony.* Instead of presenting himself as a legitimate representative of the Muses and a reliable purveyor of cosmic truth, in the *Works and Days* Hesiod adopts the role of the *unreliable narrator.* The narrator of the *Works and Days* cannot be trusted to tell the complete truth.

The 'unreliable' status of the narrator is revealed not only in his proemic repudiation of the Muses' assistance but by many bizarre and self-contradictory statements he makes throughout the poem. Such statements, which I intend to treat in a forthcoming work, are intended to alert the audience to the narrator's questionable didactic authority in this poem. Once we start questioning the validity of our teacher's statements, we begin the important process of formulating our own opinions on what is right and just. It is with precisely this goal in mind, that of inducing the audience to teach itself, that Hesiod adopts the persona of an unreliable narrator in the *Works and Days.* A student who teaches something to himself retains the knowledge much more thoroughly than the one to whom a lesson is preached, or 'spoon-fed'. This method of manipulating the audience into making the intellectual conclusions that the narrator wishes them to make is not a Hesiodic innovation, rather it is characteristic element of Greek αἶνοι and occurs in several extant lyric poems.

In exploring the didactic elements of the *Works and Days,* I continue to reject the biographical approach that has so dominated the scholarship surrounding this poem and assume not that Hesiod

[2] Kings are 'δωροφάγους', 'νήπιοι' and 'οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντὸς…' (39 40).

is describing a conflict that he has with his brother Perses over their inheritance, but rather that the narrator *represents* himself in this situation, in order to better achieve the goals of this particular poem. Needless to say, the poetic goals of the *Works and Days* are not the same or even similar to those of the *Theogony,* except in the very broadest sense that they are both intended to teach something. Within each poem and for the artistic purposes of each poem, the poet creates his persona. In the absence of specific indications to the contrary, the persona of one poem should not be assumed to have any bearing on the persona of another—even if both poems are credited to the same poet, and even if that poet refers to himself in the first person in each.

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INDEX NOMINUM AC RERUM

advice poem, *Works and Days* as, 3, 21 32, 88
Ahl, F. and H. Roisman, 61 62
Aly, W., 9 10
anachrony, xiv, 126 61; *see also* prolepsis, analepsis
analepsis, 126, 127 n. 2, 145 46, 153
angel, appearing to shepherds, 77
anvil, falling to Tartarus, 138 40
Archilochus, 5, 33
Aristotle, 35, 40
Arthur, M., 14
attributive discourse, 98, 109 116, 125, 126, 173
authorial self reference, 1 3, 6, 23, 34, 45,
autobiographical reading of Hesiod, chap.1 *passim,* 36, 46, 68

Ballabriga, A., 6
Bakker, E., 135 36, 169
bees, simile of, 154 57, 159 60
belly, 75, 75 n. 38, 78 79, 99, 104, 157
Boedecker, D., 14
Booth, W., 36 37, 40 42
Burford, A., 31

Calchas, 80 n. 46
character language, 39, 119, 121
character text, 98 109
Chimaira, 58, 59 n. 49 52
Clay, J., xi, 10, 13 14, 24, 27, 33, 52 n. 40, 58 n. 49 50, 64, 65 n. 13, 73 n. 30, 77 n. 41, 80 81, 81 n. 47, 86 n. 55, 91 n. 61, 91 n. 63, 94 n. 65, 101, 101 n. 3 5, 104 n. 8, 105 n. 9, 111 n. 12, 125 n. 24, 128, 130, 146, 148, 170. n. 17, 179 n. 20, 183 n. 29, 183. n. 32, 184, 185
commentary, chap. 6 *passim*

De Grummond, N., 77 n. 42
Dichterweihe, xiii, xiv, 6, 60, 61, 67, 68, 72, 76, 85 87, 89, 91, 93 94, 98 99, 104 105, 109, 128 29, 133 36, 145, 156, 161, 177, 182 86, 189
deixis, 55 56, 56 n. 44, 70 n. 20, 136
demonstrative pronoun, *see* deixis.
Detienne, M., 69 n. 19, 81 n. 49
Dornseiff, F., 7, 8 n. 24, 16, 17 n. 63, 18
Dover, K., 5 n. 18, 6, 6 n. 19

Echidna, 50 51, 82 n. 48
embedded speech, xiv, 37, 38 39, 38 n. 13, 43, 44 n. 29, 60, 69 70, 71 n. 25, 92
Evelyn White, 4 n. 7, 6, 7 n. 21
explanation, type of commentary, 163 67, 173 74
etymologizing, Hesiod's penchant for, 14, 49, 54 n. 41, 81 84, 105, 105 n. 9, 163, 165 67

Fick, A., 8, 9 n. 28
focalization, xiv, xv; 37 39, 42 44, 47 48, 52, 55, 57, 59, 69 72, 80, 85, 92 93, 97, 100, 106, 112, 113, 118 125, 134, 151, 152, 155, 162 63, 172, 173, 175 76, 182 embedded, 117 25, *see also* embedded speech
Ford, A., 48 n. 39, 82 n. 51, 86 n. 55, 89 n. 60, 182, 182 nn. 29 & 30, 185 n. 37
formulae, 37, 80, 84, 113, 127, 182 n. 31
Fränkel, H., 3, 6 n. 23, 27 28, 33, 141 n. 18
Friedländer, P., 8 n. 26, 11

Gaia, 13, 14, 42, 43, 43 n. 29, 46, 65, 70 n. 26, 98, 105 107, 111 12, 115 16, 123, 132, 145, 146, 148
Gagarin, M., 25 26, 180 n. 24, 181, 184, 185 n. 38
gods, separated from men by a great gulf, 46, 50 51, 53, 60, 61, 63, 73 97, 98 105, 108, 113, 124 25, 128 61, 164 76, 181, 184, 187

Griffin, J., 39 nn. 17 & 19, 119 n. 16, 168
Griffith, M., 1 2, 4 5, 10, 11, 19, 28, 33.

Hamilton, R., 5 n. 18, 178, 183 n. 33
Hesiod's father, 2, 4, 8 9, 9 n. 32, 18, 18 n. 71 72
Hecate, 7 11, 34, 56, 90 91, 96, 104 n. 9, 124, 128, 146, 149, 150 51, 170, 172, 174, 187
Hecatoncheires *see* Hundred handers
Homer, 3, 4, 15, 34 53, 61 66, 68, 76, 77, 84, 85, 89 96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 108, 113, 118 24, 134 15, 138, 141, 142, 154 55, 164, 168, 170, 189
Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite,* 72, 76 77; *to Demeter,* 72 n. 30, 82 83 n. 52; *to Hermes,* 86 n. 55, 91 n. 62 & 63
Howe, T., 20 n. 76, 29 31
Huckleberry Finn as unreliable narrator, Booth's example of, 41 42
Hundred handers, 43, 48 49, 70 n. 26, 98, 106 108, 115 16

Iliad, 9, 35 44, 47, 52, 53, 61 65, 67, 74, 74 n. 37, 77, 80 n. 46, 92 n. 64, 94 95, 96 n. 67, 98, 118, 120, 124, 164, 170
implied author, chap. 2 *passim,* 60, 61, 68, 109, 109 n. 11, 112, 116, 116 n. 14, 147 n. 24, 162, 163, 175, 186, 189, 190
indirect discourse, Hesiod's use of, 37, 37 n. 13, 43, 59, 60, 63, 67, 70 71, 70 n. 25, 119, 122 23, 166 n. 9
interpretation, type of commentary, 162 64, 170, 172, 174 76, 187

Jaeger, W., 2 4, 29, 33
Jones, N., 25 26, 29
Jong, I. de, xii xiii, xv, 36, 44, 50, 62 64, 69, 94, 97, 109, 117 20, 124, 155, 161 n. 45, 162; narratological model of, 37 40
Judet de la Combe, P., 5, 12 13
judgment, type of commentary, 162 64, 167 6,

Kass, L., 78 n. 44
kings, 18, 77, 103, 179, 179 80 n. 24, 184, 185 n. 37, 186 87, 189
Kirchhoff , A., 21 22, 26,
Knox, B., 18 n. 71, 29,
Kottos, 48 49, 106, 108, 115 16
Kranz, W., 16 n. 63, 17
Krischer, T., 81 n. 49
Kumaniecki, K., 31, 31 n. 113

Laistrygonians, 141, 143
Lesky, A., 28
lies, *see* truth

Levet, J. P., 81 n. 49, 83 n. 52
lyric 'I,' 16 n. 61; *see also* authorial self reference

Mahnlieder, see advice poems
Marincola, J., 69 n. 23
Mazon, P., 8 n. 29, 9, 9 n. 32
metals, simile of, 158 60
Midsummer Night's Dream, example of embedded focalization in, 117 18
misogyny, *see* woman
Most, G., 2 n. 2, 3 4
Murray, G., 16 n. 62
Muses, 2, 6, 10, 17, 33, 39, 42 45, 43 n. 29, 50, 51, 51 n. 40, 54, chap. 3 *passim,* 98, 99, 104, 105, 108 11, 112, 116, 124, 126 36, 139, 143, 157, 160 61, 164 66, 176 78, 180 86, 190 91

Mycenaean agricultural practices, Howe's theory on how they influenced Hesiod, 29 31

narrator, self conscious, 42 60, 61 64, 95, 126, 134 n. 8, 138, 155, 163, 164; reliable, 42, 110, 192; unreliable, 42, 110 n. 11, 148 n. 24
Nagy, G., 4 5, 11, 19, 24, 33, 68 n. 18, 71 n. 28, 87 n. 57, 93 n. 65, 169 n. 17
Nelson, S., 31 33, 33 n. 120

Nereus, 49, 53 54, 83, 164
Nicolai, W., 18
Night, 65, 66, 141 43, 147, 154; children of, 174 76
Nünlist, R., 69, 69 n. 23, 70 n. 25

oak and rock, riddle of, 61, 88, 94, 133, 164, 170
Odyssey, 10, 36, 46, 52, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 86, 125, 142
Ouranos, 43, 48, 66, 106 108, 113, 123 24, 132, 146 49

Pandora, *see* woman
panhellenic nature of Hesiod's poetry, G. Nagy's theory regarding, 4 5
peasant, Hesiod as, 1 5, 8 10, 27 28, 30, 31, 33
Perses, 3, 4, 9, 15 27, 29, 32, 84, 89, 124, 147 48 n. 24, 191 93
Pfister, F., 8 n. 31, 9 10, 12
Phemius, 90
Pinsent, S. 6 n. 22
Plato, 39
proem, of *Th.,* 1, 6, 10, 17, 21, 33, 41, 44, 45, 47, 61 62, 64, 66 69, 89, 93, 96 97, 99 100, 105, 110, 125, 127, 128, 134, 140, 161, 164, 177, 179 82, 184 85, 187, 190; of *Op.,* 11, 192; of *Il.*, 39, 62 63, 66, 67, 68,; of *Od.*, 62, 66, 67
prolepsis, 59, 126, 145 55
Prometheus, 13, 43, 71 n. 26, 89 n. 58, 91, 97, 99 106, 109, 113 17, 129, 145, 147, 150, 152, 152 n. 28, 156, 157, 173, 184, 188, 190
Pucci, P., 68 n. 19, 83 n. 52, 179 n. 24

Rabel, R., 61, 61 n. 4, 67
Rand, E., 16
Richardson, S., 36, 60, 62 63, 95, 126 n. 3, 154 n. 35, 155, 162 64, 167, 170
rivers, difficulty of naming all, 45, 45 n. 34, 91, 95 97, 164, 170,
Rousseau, P., 16 n. 61, 17, 18 n. 69
Rudhardt, J., 12

'sacrifice trick', Prometheus', 100 115
Sellschop, I., 3, 7, 8 n. 27
scepter, 78, 81, 185 86, 188
Schmidt, J. U., 19, 23, 26 27
shepherds, 7, 70, 71, 73, 74 80, 89
similes, 155 62
Sourvinou Inwood, 158
speeches *see* character text
Stein, E., 34, 34 n. 3, 35
Styx, oath of, 173 7,

Tartarus, 44, 108, 109, 130, 137 44, 167
Theognis, 5, 15, 16
Titans, 13, 43, 49, 82 n. 48, 99, 100, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 123, 138 40, 167 n. 9, 175, 183, 184
timelessness. as attribute of of divine realm, 61, 129, 130 44, 145, 155, 159, 161
Trencsényi Waldapfel, I., 7, 78 n. 44
truth vs. 'lies', chap. 3 *passim* esp. pp. 68 69, 80 88
Typhoeus, 50, 51, 51 n. 40, 57 n. 48, 57 59, 58 n. 50, 59 n. 52, 129, 147, 150, 152 54, 159 61, 167, 172, 173

Vernant, J. P., 78, 98 99, 105 6 n. 9

Walcot, P., 18, 30 31
Waltz, R., 6
Welcker, P., 15 16, 16 n. 61, 19
Welles, C., 17, 19
Wilamowitz Moellendorff, u. von, 3 n. 7, 8, 21 22, 22 n. 81, 24, 26,
West, M., 3, 7 10, 18 19, 22 n. 84, 26 n. 99, 46, 46 n. 35, 47 8 n. 39, 72 73, 73 n. 34, 80 n. 46, 81 n. 48, 87 n. 57, 94, 101, 101 nn. 4, & 5, 102 n. 7, 102 3 n. 7, 104 n. 9, 110 n. 12, 136, 138, 141 42, 148, 159, 179, 190 n. 1
Wismann, H., 12 13
woman, the ('Pandora' in *Th.*), 56, 59 n. 52, 103 n. 6, 105, 155 59
Works and Days, 1 5, 11, 15 27, 34, 38, 46, 79 n. 44, 80, 84, 85 n. 53, 88, 89, 124, 125, 138 n. 14, 147,

147 48 n. 24, 157, 191 93;
agricultural manual? 27 33,
Zeitlin, F., 14 n. 57, 155 n. 41,
Zeus, 13, 14, 21, 33, 43, 49, 53, 57 n. 47, 67, 71 n. 26, 84, 91, 93, 99 106, 108, 109, 111, 113 17, 124, 128, 129, 131 33, 138, 146 51, 154 57, 159, 160, 168, 169, 172, 173, 175, 178, 183, 184, 191

INDEX LOCORUM

HESIOD
Theogony
1 22 129 30
22 136
24 29 69, 110
30 34 80
35 169
43 50 131
53 55 82
75 103 178
102 103 82
105 115 64
114 54
114 15 127
116 117 46
144 45 165
147 49 48
163 73 112
164 66 106
170 72 107
195 200 165
203 204 54
207 10 122
226 302 174
233 35 53
280 83 165
306 307 51
336 54
362 63 54
364, 367 70 95
369 70 169
392 400 175
416 18 149
416 20 171
416 18, 429 30, 150
439 47 150
452 55
463 65 145
469 74 123
487 91 167
542 44 100
542 50 113
546 50 114
548 49 100
556 57 149, 171
558 61 115
590 3, 600 602 171
594 602 155 56
617 18 145
644 53 107
655 63 108
720 25 137, 166
746 54 140
792 806 173
795 804 143
830 35 57
836 38 167
861 67 158
869 80 151 52, 172
894 5, 897 8 145
951 55 167

Works and Days
1 3, 8 10 83
1 10 190
293 97 87 88

HOMER
Iliad
1.1 2, 6 7 65
1.137 41 47
2.783 50
5.305 306 52
12.175 78 95
17.674 75 50
18.487 52
22.29 52
24.316 52

Odyssey
1.1, 10 65
6.42 50
10.80 87 141

Hymn to Aphrodite
177 79 73 n.

Hymn to Demeter
256 58 73 n.